

In & Out: A study on the effects of terrorism on ethnic boundary making and in-group attitudes for native and immigrant populations in Europe.

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Abstract


Research on how terrorist attacks increase shape in-group and out-group attitudes has consistently focused on native populations. But what about immigrants and their descendants? Are their sociopolitical attitudes and identities also affected by terrorist attacks? And if so, do terrorist attacks (re)activate ethnic ancestry identities that reinforce ethnic boundaries with the majority population, or do attacks draw immigrants closer to the host society, thus facilitating their sociopolitical integration? This paper studies the heterogeneous effects of the Charlie Hebdo attack for native and immigrant populations on social and political trust in Europe. Using the date of the interview to leverage a natural experiment framework, this study finds the attack increased social and political trust for natives -enhancing in-group solidarity- whereas the attack decreased social and political trust for 1st generation immigrants. We conclude the effects of terrorism on social and political trust are strongly interrelated with assimilation processes and ethnic boundary making.

Introduction

Research on how violent events shape in-group and out-group attitudes has increased its presence in social science during the last two decades. Most of the research has focused on native populations and potential shifts in their attitudes towards immigrants. The most common findings in this literature are consistent shifts towards increased anti-immigrant sentiments and out-group hostility (Hiers et al. 2017; Bar-Tal & Lebin 2001; Sølheim 2018; Borrel 2015). There is another body of research that suggests terrorist attacks not only generate out-group hostility, but can bring in-group solidarity as well (Inglehart and Welzela 2005; Pelletier and Drozda-Senkowska 2016; Dinesen and Jæger 2013). While the vast majority of research has predominantly focused on the reactions of the host population, research on the reactions of immigrants in response to terrorist attacks is very rare. The aim of this study is to shed light on how terrorist attacks affect in-group attitudes of immigrants as compared to the native population.

In the last decade, reports of number of successful terrorist attacks in Europe have grown substantively (TESAT 2018). This trend is visible in figure 1, which displays the total number of successful terrorist attacks in Europe as registered in the Global terrorism database. Furthermore, not only have the number of attacks increased, but the time span between attacks has become shorter as well. In 2013, the GTD registers only 2 successful attacks. The same is true for 2014. However, in 2015, the GTD registers 20 successful terrorist attacks. In 2016, the number increased to 31. If terrorist attacks has effects on ethnic boundary making, such effects are likely to be stronger now than ever in the past.

Figure 1. Number of terrorist attacks in Europe 2013 - 2016



Source: Global Terrorism Database.

Terrorist attacks are exogenous shocks that increase perceived threat. According to classical social psychology theories, perceived threat simultaneously heightens majority in-group identification and minority outgroup prejudice thus reinforcing ethnic boundaries (see e.g. Blumer 1958; Blalock 1967; Tajfel, and Turner 1979; Bobo 1999). This mechanism is consistent with the rise in anti-immigrant sentiments in Europe (see e.g. Semyonov et al. 2006; Polavieja 2016) as well as with the aforementioned evidence on natives' reactions to terrorist shocks. Threat effects seem also implicit in much of the existing literature that investigates the effect of ethnic diversity on majority's political attitudes (Dancygier 2010; Enos 2016) and their attitudes towards the welfare state (see e.g. Gilens 1995; Alesina et al. 2001; 2004). But what about immigrants and their descendants? Are their sociopolitical attitudes and identities also affected by terrorist attacks? And if so, do terrorist attacks (re)activate ethnic ancestry identities that reinforce ethnic boundaries with the majority population, or do attacks draw immigrants closer to the host society, thus facilitating their sociopolitical integration?

To answer this question we exploit a natural experiment and study the reactions of both native and immigrant respondents of first, 1.5 and second generation by looking at several key social and political indicators, including social trust, trust in national political institutions, feelings of political efficacy and attitudes towards the legal system and the police. Together, we argue, these standard measures of social capital and political legitimacy capture people's degree of socio-political integration. By looking at both natives' and immigrants' reactions to terrorist shocks, we thus offer a more comprehensive analysis of the boundary-making potential of terrorism in Europe.

Case study: The Charlie Hebdo Attack

On January 7th of 2015 a group of armed men attacked the editorial headquarters of the Charlie Hebdo magazine in Paris. That day, 12 people were killed and another 11 were seriously injured. The Al Qaeda branch in Yemen laid claims of responsibility towards the attack and explained the magazine had committed blasphemous actions. A few weeks back, the Charlie Hebdo magazine had released content which used satire in depicting the Prophet Muhammad. This resulted in motivating the attack, as certain perspectives of Islam considered the depiction a direct offense. The attack shocked the West in ways that few other terrorist events have done so. Press all over the world was struck by the Charlie Hebdo attack and news related to the topic often occupied the front pages of major newspapers for days. The Charlie Hebdo attack has a special importance as it was the first large terrorist event in Europe since the Madrid bombings of 2004. Leveraging the Charlie Hebdo attack as a natural experiment, we study the effects of terrorism on trust for both the native and the immigrant population.

Theoretical background:

Trust as a conduit for social cohesion

Trust can be defined as “a generalized expectancy held by an individual that the word, promise, oral or written statement of another individual or group can be relied on” (Rotter 1980). Trust is a crucial component of both general well-being and the socialization process. Previous research has found trust is associated with a wide range of beneficial traits. It encourages solidarity, cohesion, consensus, and cooperation, and it represents a crucial component of the socialization process (Smith 2010; Putnam 2000). A society with high levels of trust is defined by high civic participation and engagement in public matters. In the case of migrants, trust plays a crucial role in the assimilation process (Lindstrom & Mohseni 2009).

We can distinguish between generalized trust -i.e. horizontal trust- and institutional trust -i.e. vertical trust. Horizontal trust is often referred to as generalized or social trust and is relative to trust between individuals, whereas vertical trust refers to political and institutional trust (Fukuyama 1995; Lindstrom & Mohseni 2009). Both generalized trust and political and institutional trust (vertical trust) may be regarded as crucial aspects of social capital, because they are reciprocally associated with and related to the engagement, networks and participation in civil society (Putnam 2007).

In-group solidarity as a reaction to threats.

A growing body of research suggests contexts of existential threat can generate in-group solidarity in the form of trust. Inglehart and Welzela (2005) argue increases in in-group solidarity act as a defense mechanism that aids group survival in a context of existential threat. In a study conducted by the same authors on the effects of terrorism on public opinion in Iraq, they find Iraqi citizens coupled out-group rejection with intense in-group solidarity in the form of higher trust in societal norms and institutions as a response to terrorist events (Inglehart et al. 2006). Another study on

the effects of the attack of September 11th in New York on institutional trust finds that the public showed increased levels of trust in political institutions and the legal system. The same study shows similar patterns for the effects of the Madrid bombings of 2004 (Dinesen and Jæger 2013).

Although most research has found responses to terrorist attacks show coupled reactions of xenophobia and in-group solidarity, there are some studies that have shown out-group rejection and in-group solidarity are not necessarily coupled in all cases. Some findings include a heightening of community solidarity and a reduction in crime following a disaster (Spilerman and Stecklov 2009). A study focusing on the effects of the 2011 terrorist attack in Norway, revealed Norwegians reacted by showing support for democratic values such as “openness,” “democracy,” and “tolerance” (Solheim 2018). One study that looked at the effects of the Charlie Hebdo attack on a sample of 160 undergraduate students found that there were no effects on anti-immigrant sentiment, but they did show increased in-group solidarity in the form of institutional trust (Pelletier and Drozda-Senkowska 2016). However, all of this research has not differentiated between native and immigrant population.

Research question 1: Considering these two populations may have different trust patterns in the social and political institutions, we explore the differential effects the Charlie Hebdo attack had on the native population and the immigrant population.


Research question 2: Considering there are important different assimilation patterns for different immigrant generations, we hypothesize terrorist attacks affect those who are less assimilated.

Data, sample, and analytical approach

For this study we use round 7 of the European Social Survey, for which the field work was carried out throughout the end of 2014 and during the first half of 2015. In this particular round 20 countries participated in the survey, and provides a total of 31,561 respondents. Following a regression discontinuity approach, we leverage the fact that the Charlie Hebdo attack occurred while the ESS round 7 was being collected. This allows to use the interview date as a running variable that delimits the treatment and control group (Imbens & Lemieux 2008) . The key of this treatment variable is that it has to be as close to the event as possible. However, it is also important to have enough cases to maintain a balance between the treatment and the control group in order to carry out the analysis. In order to establish an appropriate bandwidth we estimate a series a formal tests that optimize efficiency and reduce bias to the minimum, in line with previous methodological research (Lee & Lemieux 2010).

The tests establish the most appropriate bandwidth is 21 days after the Charlie Hebdo attack as the treatment groups –shown in figure 2. The control group is established as being interviewed 21 days before the Charlie Hebdo attack occurred. The formal tests are available in the appendix.

Figure 2. Treatment and control delimitation based on the interview date.



Some countries were interviewed completely either before or after the attack, hence; it is not possible to establish treatment and control groups for these countries. As a result, the study focuses exclusively on 8 European countries alone: Germany, France, Finland, Czech Republic, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, and Ireland. The amount of interviewees on either side of the discontinuity is available in the appendix. The final sample size is 4,737.

Dependent variables

A brief summary of the measures are available in table 1.

Generalized trust

This set of measures captures three different ways of measuring generalized trust, as well as a summary measure. Cronbach's alpha for the three items is above 0.85, indicating a strong association between the items.

Institutional trust

This set of measures captures a wide array of items that reveal the respondents' trust in specific institutions such as parliament or political parties. We include a summary measure as well. Cronbach's alpha for the different items is above 0.85, indicating a strong association between the items.

Political efficacy

We use a set of items to gauge respondents' political efficacy. We introduce a summary measure of political efficacy as well as. Cronbach's alpha for this series of items are above 0.85. Political efficacy is defined as the belief "that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process" (Campbell et al. 1954). Further research has expanded on this concept and deemed there are two forms of political efficacy. The first form of political efficacy is known as internal efficacy, and it relates to one's own confidence in their ability to understand and influence political discussions, events and outcomes. The second form of political effectiveness relates to government responsiveness and is known as external political efficacy (Craig & Mariotto 1982 ; kim 2015).

Key Independent variables

Treatment: Charlie Hebdo attack

We follow the method Legewie (2013), and Kim and Kim (2018) use in their respective articles to leverage the fact that the Charlie Hebdo attack occurred while the ESS round 7 was being collected. This allows to create a dichotomous variable that separates treatment and control group using the interview date as a delimitation. The key of this treatment variable is that it has to be as close to the event as possible. However, it is also important to have enough cases to maintain a balance between the treatment and the control group in order to carry out the analysis. For this reason, we establish the limit of being interviewed 23 days after the Charlie Hebdo attack as the treatment groups –shown in figure 2. The control group is established as being interviewed at anytime 23 days before the Charlie Hebdo attack occurred. Additional robustness tests on the specification of this variable are available in the appendix.

Controls

The rest of the variables of interest can be seen in table 1.

Table1. Brief description of variables

<i>Dependent variables</i>	Brief description	Measure
<i>Generalized trust</i>		
Trust in people	Item: Most people can be trusted.	Scale
People help	Item: Most of the time people are helpful.	Scale
People are fair	Item: Most people try to be fair.	Scale
Social trust (Summary)	Summary measure that identifies how much social trust the respondent has.	Continuous
<i>Institutional trust</i>		
Trust in Police	Item: trust in [country's] police.	Scale
Trust in Legal System	Item: trust in [country's] legal system.	Scale
Trust in Politicians	Item: trust in [country's] politicians.	Scale
Trust in Parliament	Item: trust in [country's] parliament.	Scale
Trust in Parties	Item: trust in [country's] political parties.	Scale
Institutional trust (Summary)	Summary measure that identifies how much trust the respondent has in institutions .	Continuous
<i>Political efficacy</i>		
Political confidence	Item: I am confident in own ability to participate in politics	Scale
Political activity	Item: I am Able to take active role in politics	Scale
Politicians care	Item: Politicians care what people think	Scale
Say in politics	Item: The political system allows people to have a say in what government does	Scale
Political influence	Item: political system allows people to influence government	Scale
Political trust (Summary)	Summary measure that identifies how much trust the respondent has in the political system.	Continuous
<i>Key independent variables</i>		
Charlie Hebdo attack	Treatment: whether the respondent was interviewed within 21 days of the attack. Control: whether the respondent was interviewed 21 days prior to the attack.	Dichotomous
Generations	Categorical variable that identifies whether the respondent is native, a 1st generation immigrant, a 1.5 generation immigrant, or a 2nd generation immigrant.	Categorical
<i>Controls</i>		
Muslim	Dummy variable that identifies whether the respondent is a Muslim or not.	Dummy
Education	ISCED educational attainment.	Ordinal
Urban	Whether the respondent lives in an urban or rural area.	Dichotomous
Female	Whether the respondent identifies as female or male.	Dichotomous
Age	Age at the moment of the interview.	Continuous
Date of interview	Running variable that identifies when the individual took the interview.	Continuous
Country	Country respondent resides in.	Categorical

Analytical approach

The Charlie Hebdo attack provides a natural experiment scenario that allows for a strong causal claim. There are many social scientists that argue conflict events such as terrorism or war, although “man-made”, are a randomly occurring event for those who are exposed (Lindeboom 2015; Alastalo et al. 2009; Kesternich et al. 2015; Akresh 2011). The validity of the natural experiment resides in that the assignment into the treatment is random (Firebaugh 2008). In this case, the assignment to treatment is contingent on being interviewed immediately after the terrorist attack. Considering ESS conducted randomized sampling, there is no reason to believe the date of the interview would not be random. However, there is still potential for bias that arise from spatial data collection processes. In other words, it may coincide that certain areas of a country –e.g. an urban area- happened to be interviewed during those dates. In order to control for this source of bias and exploit the random shock appropriately, it is possible to conceive the design in a similar way to a regression discontinuity framework.

In this framework, the running variable would be date of interview. The sharp discontinuity is the Charlie Hebdo attack. Ultimately, treatment groups would be those on the exposed side of the cut-off point, whereas the control group would be those on the non-exposed side of the cut-off point. However, it is crucial that the observations are close enough within the bandwidth interval in order to avoid the effects of potential biases and be able to make a strong causal argument (Imbens et al. 2008; Hahn et al. 2001). Hence, by focusing on 21 days before and after the attack, it is possible to rid the estimates of bias.

As our main set of analysis we estimate a set of regressions that follow the regression discontinuity strategy and entails the following specification:

$$Y_{ji} = \alpha + \beta_1 \Gamma_i + \beta_2 \Theta_i + \beta_3 \Gamma_i x \Theta_i + \beta_1 \Pi_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Where Y_{ji} represents the outcome of interest j for individual i . $\beta_1 \Gamma_i$ represents the treatment dummy variable that delimits whether the individual was interviewed after the Charlie Hebdo attack, and $\beta_2 \Theta_i$ represents a set of dummy variables that represent whether they are natives or of a certain immigrant generation for individual i . $\beta_3 \Gamma_i x \Theta_i$ is an interaction term that represents the treatment effect of being interviewed 21 days after the Charlie Hebdo attack for a given generational group. Finally, $\beta_1 \Pi_i$ represents a set of controls listed in the table in the previous section, which includes both country fixed effects and the running variable to control for any potential confounding trends in institutional trust.

However, in order to ensure balance between the treated and the control group we estimate propensity scores and match them following nearest neighbor procedures. These additional estimates can be considered as robustness checks and are available in the appendix.

Results

Table 2 shows a set of descriptive statistics for the different dependent and independent variables by treatment and control group in the study.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics by treatment and control groups.

<i>Dependent Variables</i>	Mean		Std. Dev.		%		Min	Max
	Control	Treatment	Control	Treatment	Control	Treatment		
<u>Generalized trust</u>								
Generalized trust (Summary)	15.65	15.67	5.40	5.35			0	30
Trust in people	4.94	4.95	2.29	2.28			0	10
People help	4.94	5.08	2.18	2.09			0	10
People are fair	5.77	5.65	2.15	2.07			0	10
<u>Institutional trust</u>								
Institutional trust (Summary)	22.47	23.37	9.68	9.77			0	50
Trust in Police	6.14	6.40	2.34	2.30			0	10
Trust in Legal System	5.18	5.40	2.53	2.50			0	10
Trust in Politicians	3.41	3.58	2.32	2.30			0	10
Trust in Parliament	4.32	4.44	2.42	2.45			0	10
Trust in Parties	3.41	3.55	2.28	2.26			0	10
<u>Political efficacy</u>								
Political trust (Summary)	17.25	17.86	9.54	9.64			0	40
Political confidence	3.90	3.87	2.76	2.70			0	10
Political activity	3.61	3.79	2.77	2.74			0	10
Politicians care	3.03	3.24	2.25	2.25			0	10
Say in politics	3.42	3.58	2.39	2.37			0	10
Political influence	3.29	3.38	2.37	2.31			0	10
<i>Key independent variables</i>								
<u>Generations:</u>								
-Host population								
-1.5 gen					80.48	81.00	0	1
-2nd gen					4.37	4.53	0	1
-1st gen					8.68	7.66	0	1
<u>Controls</u>								
Muslim					6.46	6.81	0	1
Urban					3.16	1.96	0	1
Female					64.29	67.26	0	1
Education	3.29	3.33	0.02	0.02			1	5
Age	47.99	47.96	18.10	17.16			15	95

Table 3 shows regression estimates of the effects of the Charlie Hebdo attack on generalized trust. The causal effect of the terrorist attack for the native population is shown in the first row of the table. The causal effect for the different generation of immigrants is given in the following rows under the interaction subtitle. As can be seen in the first row of the table, none of the coefficients for the native population are statistically significant, indicating the Charlie Hebdo attack did not increase or decrease generalized trust. We find the same pattern of statistical significance for both the 2nd generation and the 1.5 generation. That being said, The first generations shows a strong and statistically significant effect for both trust in people and generalized trust. For the *Trust in people* item, the Charlie Hebdo attack decreased trust in people by a factor of 0.729, and this is statistically significant at a $p > 0.01$ level. Similar effects are found for the summary measure.

Table 3 . Regression estimates of the effects of the Charlie Hebdo attack on generalized trust.

	Trust in people		People are fair		People help		Generalized trust (summary measure)	
	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE
T - Charlie Hebdo	0.113	(0.15)	-0.023	(0.14)	-0.048	(0.14)	0.042	(0.35)
<i>Interactions</i>								
T x 1.5 generation	-0.217	(0.41)	-0.273	(0.37)	-0.249	(0.38)	-0.739	(0.94)
T x 2nd generation	-0.223	(0.23)	0.02	(0.21)	0.013	(0.21)	-0.194	(0.52)
T x 1st generation	-0.729**	(0.29)	-0.160	(0.26)	-0.299	(0.27)	-1.188*	(0.56)
<i>Controls</i>								
1.5 generation	0.006	(0.27)	-0.370	(0.25)	-0.101	(0.26)	-0.466	(0.63)
2nd generation	-0.116	(0.15)	-0.164	(0.14)	-0.247+	(0.14)	-0.527	(0.35)
1st generation	0.544**	(0.20)	-0.184	(0.19)	0.388*	(0.19)	0.748	(0.47)
ISCED education	0.328***	(0.03)	0.225***	(0.03)	0.112***	(0.03)	0.666***	(0.07)
Muslim	-0.155	(0.22)	0.140	(0.20)	-0.216	(0.21)	-0.231	(0.51)
Urban	-0.077	(0.07)	-0.133*	(0.06)	-0.236***	(0.06)	-0.447**	(0.16)
Female	-0.075*	(0.03)	0.039	(0.03)	0.054+	(0.03)	0.018	(0.07)
Age	-0.004	(0.00)	0.000	(0.00)	0.001	(0.00)	-0.003	(0.00)
Running variable	0.000	(0.00)	0.002	(0.00)	0.003	(0.00)	0.005	(0.01)
Constant	4.567***	(0.53)	5.054***	(0.49)	4.927***	(0.50)	14.549***	(1.23)

All models include country fixed effects; $N = 4,737$; Standard errors in parentheses; † $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Although we only find statistical significance for the 1st generation, it is worth pointing out the direction of the coefficients for the rest of the generational immigrant groups. Whereas the native population shows a positive direction in the coefficients – meaning the native population increased generalized trust- the immigrant population shows negative directions -indicating immigrants decreased generalized trust.

Table 4 shows regression estimates for the effects of the Charlie Hebdo attack on institutional trust. As can be seen in the first row of the table, we find the Charlie Hebdo attack increased trust in all institutions with the exception of trust in police. The strong effect is found in trust in parliament, as the Charlie Hebdo attack increased 0.604 units of the trust scale for the native population, and it is statistically significant at a $p > 0.001$. Conversely, we find no statistically significant coefficients for any of the immigrant generational groups, with the exception of trust in police, which shows strong decreases in trust for the 1.5 generation -although the effects are marginally significant at a $p > 0.10$ value.

These results show the Charlie Hebdo attack increased overall institutional trust for the native population alone.

Table 4 . Regression estimates of the effects of the Charlie Hebdo attack on institutional trust.

	Trust in Police		Trust in Legal System		Trust in Politicians		Trust in Parliament		Trust in Parties		Institutional trust (summary measure)	
	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE
T - Charlie Hebdo	0.120	(0.16)	0.489**	(0.17)	0.332*	(0.15)	0.604***	(0.16)	0.336*	(0.15)	1.880**	(0.64)
<i>Interactions</i>												
T x 1.5 generation	-0.727+	(0.42)	-0.286	(0.44)	-0.008	(0.41)	-0.579	(0.43)	-0.044	(0.41)	-1.646	(1.70)
T x 2nd generation	0.275	(0.23)	0.364	(0.24)	-0.046	(0.23)	0.038	(0.24)	0.130	(0.23)	0.760	(0.94)
T x 1st generation	0.014	(0.29)	-0.147	(0.31)	-0.185	(0.29)	-0.032	(0.30)	0.376	(0.29)	0.026	(1.20)
<i>Controls</i>												
1.5 generation	-0.264	(0.28)	-0.118	(0.30)	0.141	(0.28)	0.506**	(0.29)	0.222	(0.27)	0.486	(1.15)
2nd generation	-0.332*	(0.16)	-0.416*	(0.17)	-0.248	(0.16)	-0.163	(0.16)	-0.216	(0.15)	-1.375*	(0.64)
1st generation	0.163	(0.21)	0.627*	(0.22)	0.631**	(0.21)	0.609**	(0.21)	0.223	(0.20)	2.253**	(0.85)
ISCED education	0.082*	(0.03)	0.242***	(0.03)	0.174***	(0.03)	0.291***	(0.03)	0.116***	(0.03)	0.906***	(0.12)
Muslim	0.063	(0.22)	0.547*	(0.24)	0.514*	(0.22)	0.334	(0.23)	0.3914987	(0.22)	1.85*	(0.92)
Urban	0.019	(0.07)	-0.098	(0.07)	-0.157*	(0.07)	-0.001	(0.07)	-0.076	(0.07)	-0.314	(0.28)
Female	-0.035	(0.03)	-0.076*	(0.03)	-0.110**	(0.03)	-0.157***	(0.03)	-0.116***	(0.03)	-0.495***	(0.13)
Age	-0.002	(0.00)	-0.012***	(0.00)	-0.003	(0.00)	-0.005*	(0.00)	-0.007***	(0.00)	-0.028***	(0.01)
Running variable	0.003	(0.00)	-0.009*	(0.00)	-0.004	(0.00)	-0.011*	(0.00)	-0.007	(0.00)	-0.028	(0.02)
Constant	6.131***	(0.55)	6.816***	(0.58)	3.843***	(0.54)	5.358***	(0.56)	4.459***	(0.53)	26.608***	(2.24)

All models include country fixed effects; $N = 4,737$; Standard errors in parentheses; † $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 5 shows regression estimates for the effects of the Charlie Hebdo attack on Political efficacy . As can be seen in the first row of the table, the Charlie Hebdo attack increased political efficacy by several measures. In terms of whether individuals' think politicians care what people think, the Charlie Hebdo attack increased the political efficacy scale by 0.432 for the native population -this coefficient is statistically significant at a $p > 0.01$ level. Conversely, we find the opposite effect for 1st generation immigrants.

Table 5 . Regression estimates of the effects of the Charlie Hebdo attack on political efficacy.

	Political confidence		Political activity		Politicians care		Say in politics		Political influence		Political trust (summary measure)	
	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE
T - Charlie Hebdo	0.088	(0.17)	0.300+	(0.18)	0.432**	(0.15)	0.260	(0.16)	0.255+	(0.16)	1.335*	(0.62)
<i>Interactions</i>												
T x 1.5 generation	0.028	(0.46)	0.472	(0.48)	0.546	(0.40)	-0.068	(0.43)	-0.363	(0.42)	0.615	(1.65)
T x 2nd generation	-0.088	(0.25)	-0.094	(0.26)	0.290	(0.22)	0.212	(0.24)	0.169	(0.23)	0.488	(0.91)
T x 1st generation	-0.685*	(0.32)	-0.885**	(0.34)	-0.352	(0.28)	-0.411	(0.31)	-0.396	(0.29)	-2.731*	(1.16)
<i>Controls</i>												
1.5 generation	0.225	(0.31)	0.098	(0.32)	-0.205	(0.27)	-0.017	(0.29)	-0.025	(0.28)	0.076	(1.11)
2nd generation	0.164	(0.17)	0.085	(0.18)	-0.284+	(0.15)	-0.176	(0.16)	-0.196	(0.16)	-0.407	(0.62)
1st generation	-0.095	(0.23)	-0.149	(0.24)	0.459*	(0.20)	0.240	(0.22)	0.109	(0.21)	0.564	(0.82)
ISCED education	0.599***	(0.03)	0.583***	(0.03)	0.264***	(0.03)	0.251***	(0.03)	0.337***	(0.03)	2.036***	(0.12)
Muslim	0.582*	(0.25)	0.521*	(0.26)	0.209	(0.22)	0.241	(0.23)	-0.066	(0.22)	1.487+	(0.89)
Urban	-0.012	(0.08)	0.045	(0.08)	0.041	(0.07)	0.029	(0.07)	-0.010	(0.07)	0.094	(0.28)
Female	-0.371***	(0.04)	-0.428***	(0.04)	-0.085**	(0.03)	-0.143***	(0.03)	-0.178***	(0.03)	-1.206***	(0.13)
Age	-0.004+	(0.00)	-0.005*	(0.00)	-0.004*	(0.00)	-0.002	(0.00)	-0.007***	(0.00)	-0.023**	(0.01)
Running variable	0.000	(0.00)	-0.001	(0.00)	-0.004	(0.00)	-0.001	(0.00)	-0.003	(0.00)	-0.008	(0.02)
Constant	3.652***	(0.60)	3.124***	(0.63)	2.678***	(0.53)	3.042***	(0.57)	3.541***	(0.55)	16.038***	(2.16)

All models include country fixed effects; $N = 4,737$; Standard errors in parentheses; † $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Conclusions

Previous research on how terrorist attacks increase shape in-group and out-group attitudes has consistently focused on native populations. However, the effects of terrorism on immigrants and the subsequent generations have not yet been studied in depth. This body of research shows the native population tends to show in-group responses to terrorism and overall threats. But what about immigrants and their descendants? Are their sociopolitical attitudes and identities also affected by terrorist attacks? And if so, do terrorist attacks (re)activate ethnic ancestry identities that reinforce ethnic boundaries with the majority population, or do attacks draw immigrants closer to the host society, thus facilitating their sociopolitical integration?

This paper studies the heterogeneous effects of the Charlie Hebdo attack for native and immigrant populations on social and political trust in Europe. Using the date of the interview as a running variable to leverage a natural experiment in the form of a regression discontinuity framework, we find the Charlie Hebdo attack had important heterogeneous effects for native and immigrant populations. This study finds the attack increased social and political trust for natives -enhancing in-group solidarity- whereas the attack decreased social and political trust for 1st generation immigrants. We conclude the effects of terrorism on social and political trust are strongly interrelated with assimilation processes and ethnic boundary making.

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Appendix

Table A1. Treatment and control groups for each country in the ESS.

	Control	Treatment
Austria	11	129
Belgium	247	15
Switzerland	38	19
Czech Rep	526	796
Germany	321	369
Denmark	164	18
Estonia	104	0

Female	1	1.02	1	1.01	1	1	1	1	1	1
Age	0.83	0.98	1.11	0.98	0.91	1.04	0.85	0.9	0.86	1.02
Muslim	0.99	1.01	1.06	1.04	1.08	1.04	0.91	1.04	0.75	1.07
Unemployed	1	1.01	1.02	1	1.01	1	1	1.03	0.99	1
Contact frequency	0.94	1.06	0.85	1.05	1	1	1.1	1.17	0.96	1.08

Note: Imbalance between treatment and control groups for countries in the sample in terms of the variance ratio between the treatment and the control groups. Variance ratios outside of the interval of 0.5 – 2.0 are considered problematic (Rubin 2001).


Results using multiple imputation

Multiple imputation diagnostics

Table. Summary of imputed cases.


<u>Variable</u>	<u>Complete</u>	<u>Incomplete</u>	<u>Imputed</u>	<u>Total</u>
Social trust (Summary)	37935	2250	2250	40185
Institutional trust (Summary)	38419	1766	1766	40185
Political trust (Summary)	39759	426	426	40185
Muslim	39910	275	275	40185
Urban	40095	90	90	40185
Education	39919	266	266	40185
Generations	40075	110	110	40185

Mean of Imputed Values by Iteration



Each line is for one imputation

Standard Deviation of Imputed Values by Iteration Numbers



Each line is for one imputation

Table . Regression estimates of the effects of the Charlie Hebdo attack on social trust.

	Trust in people		People are fair		People help		Social trust (sum. measure)	
	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE
T - Charlie Hebdo	0.082	(0.15)	-0.080	(0.13)	-0.074	(0.14)	-0.072	(0.34)
<i>Interactions</i>								
T x 1.5 generation	-0.135	(0.39)	-0.346	(0.37)	-0.148	(0.37)	-0.628	(0.92)
T x 2nd generation	-0.218	(0.21)	0.003	(0.20)	-0.015	(0.20)	-0.230	(0.49)
T x 1st generation	-0.661**	(0.27)	-0.260	(0.25)	-0.273	(0.26)	-1.194*	(0.63)
<i>Controls</i>								
1.5 generation	-0.061	(0.25)	-0.273	(0.25)	-0.172	(0.25)	-0.506	(0.61)
2nd generation	-0.113	(0.14)	-0.147	(0.13)	-0.241+	(0.13)	-0.501	(0.33)
1st generation	0.388*	(0.18)	-0.059	(0.17)	0.296+	(0.17)	0.626	(0.43)
ISCED education	0.333***	(0.03)	.222***	(0.03)	0.109***	(0.03)	0.663**	(0.06)
Muslim	-0.189	(0.21)	0.040	(0.19)	-0.175	(0.20)	-0.324	(0.49)
Urban	-0.083	(0.06)	-0.143**	(0.06)	-0.212***	(0.06)	-0.438**	(0.15)
Female	-0.073**	(0.03)	0.045	(0.03)	0.057*	(0.03)	0.029	(0.07)
Age	-0.004*	(0.00)	0.000	(0.00)	0.001	(0.00)	-0.003	(0.00)
Running variable	-0.001+	(0.00)	0.003*	(0.00)	0.002	(0.00)	0.005	(0.01)
Constant	4.626***	(0.51)	5.052***	(0.47)	4.999***	(0.48)	14.678***	(1.18)

All models include country fixed effects; $N = 5,313$; Standard errors in parentheses; † $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Number of imputations: 10.

Table 3 . Regression estimates of the effects of the Charlie Hebdo attack on institutional trust.

	Trust in Police		Trust Legal System		Trust Politicians		Trust Parliament		Trust in Parties		Institutional trust (sum measure)	
	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE
T - Charlie Hebdo	0.128	(0.15)	0.411**	(0.16)	0.288*	(0.15)	0.526***	(0.15)	0.276*	(0.15)	1.628**	(0.61)
<i>Interactions</i>												
T x 1.5 generation	-0.738*	(0.35)	-0.319	(0.42)	0.034	(0.40)	-0.602	(0.41)	0.052	(0.40)	-1.572	(1.65)
T x 2nd generation	0.256	(0.22)	0.424	(0.23)	0.050	(0.22)	0.109	(0.23)	0.263	(0.21)	1.103	(0.90)
T x 1st generation	-0.001	(0.28)	-0.090	(0.29)	-0.007	(0.27)	0.215	(0.29)	0.415	(0.27)	0.532	(1.13)
<i>Controls</i>												
1.5 generation	-0.259	(0.26)	-0.089	(0.28)	0.129	(0.27)	0.588*	(0.27)	0.172	(0.26)	0.542	(1.09)
2nd generation	-0.361*	(0.15)	-0.451**	(0.15)	-0.322*	(0.14)	-0.233	(0.15)	-0.307*	(0.14)	-1.675**	(0.60)
1st generation	0.195	(0.19)	0.56**	(0.20)	0.479**	(0.19)	0.435*	(0.19)	0.167	(0.18)	1.836*	(0.77)
ISCED education	0.092**	(0.03)	0.254***	(0.03)	0.182***	(0.03)	.308***	(0.03)	.123***	(0.03)	0.958***	(0.12)
Muslim	-0.018	(0.22)	0.378	(0.23)	0.546**	(0.21)	0.245	(0.22)	.373+	(0.21)	1.523+	(0.88)
Urban	0.004	(0.07)	-0.065	(0.07)	-0.161*	(0.07)	-0.004	(0.07)	-0.081	(0.06)	-0.308	(0.27)
Female	-0.029	(0.03)	-0.075**	(0.03)	-0.1**	(0.03)	-0.145***	(0.03)	-0.101**	(0.03)	-0.449***	(0.13)
Age	-0.001	(0.00)	-0.012**	(0.00)	-0.002	(0.00)	-0.005**	(0.00)	-0.006**	(0.00)	-0.026***	(0.01)
Running variable	0.001	(0.00)	-0.009*	(0.00)	-0.004	(0.00)	-0.01*	(0.00)	-0.006+	(0.00)	-0.027+	(0.02)
Constant	6.287***	(0.52)	6.714***	(0.55)	3.822***	(0.52)	5.225***	(0.54)	4.393***	(0.51)	26.441***	(2.13)

All models include country fixed effects; $N = 5,313$; Standard errors in parentheses; † $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Number of imputations: 10.

Table 3 . Regression estimates of the effects of the Charlie Hebdo attack on institutional trust.

	Political confidence		Political activity		Political participation		Political accessibility		Political influence		Political trust (summary measure)	
	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE
T - Charlie Hebdo	0.022	(0.15)	0.272	(0.17)	0.349*	(0.14)	0.235	(0.15)	0.223	(0.15)	1.101*	(0.51)
<i>Interactions</i>												
T x 1.5 generation	-0.044	(0.35)	0.374	(0.47)	0.465	(0.40)	-0.118	(0.44)	-0.432	(0.40)	0.246	(1.65)
T x 2nd generation	-0.080	(0.22)	-0.072	(0.25)	0.278	(0.21)	0.262	(0.23)	0.182	(0.22)	0.570	(0.87)
T x 1st generation	-0.602*	(0.28)	-0.729*	(0.32)	-0.081	(0.27)	-0.290	(0.29)	-0.250	(0.28)	-1.953+	(1.10)
<i>Controls</i>												
1.5 generation	0.254	(0.26)	0.155	(0.31)	-0.155	(0.27)	0.022	(0.30)	0.025	(0.27)	0.301	(1.14)
2nd generation	0.098	(0.15)	0.004	(0.17)	-0.331**	(0.14)	-0.253	(0.15)	-0.265+	(0.15)	-0.747	(0.58)
1st generation	-0.128	(0.19)	-0.237	(0.22)	0.270	(0.18)	0.158	(0.19)	0.006	(0.19)	0.068	(0.75)
ISCED education	0.613***	(0.03)	0.599***	(0.03)	.280***	(0.03)	0.257***	(0.03)	0.355***	(0.03)	2.105***	(0.11)
Muslim	0.487*	(0.22)	0.456	(0.25)	0.178	(0.21)	0.235	(0.22)	-0.027	(0.21)	1.330	(0.85)
Urban	-0.024	(0.07)	0.0402352	(0.08)	0.027	(0.06)	0.005	(0.07)	-0.022	(0.07)	0.027	(0.26)
Female	-0.364***	(0.03)	-.411***	(0.04)	-.085**	(0.03)	-0.136***	(0.03)	-0.169***	(0.03)	-1.166***	(0.12)
Age	-0.004*	(0.00)	-0.005**	(0.00)	-.005**	(0.00)	-0.004*	(0.00)	-0.007***	(0.00)	-.026***	(0.01)
Running variable	0.002	(0.00)	-0.001	(0.00)	-0.002	(0.00)	-0.001	(0.00)	-0.002	(0.00)	-0.004	(0.02)
Constant	3.393***	(0.52)	3.058***	(0.60)	2.449***	(0.51)	3.174***	(0.54)	3.455***	(0.52)	15.531***	(2.06)

All models include country fixed effects; $N = 5,313$; Standard errors in parentheses; † $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Number of imputations: 10.