Unintended Consequences of Immigration Enforcement: Household Services and High-Skilled Women's Work

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Abstract

We examine the spillover effects of enforcement policies on the labor supply of high-skilled citizen women by exploiting the staggered rollout of Secure Communities (SC), a national immigration enforcement policy that led to over 450,000 deportations. Combining data on the timing and location of adoption of SC, with data on labor supply from the American Community Survey over 2005-2014, we implement a difference-in-difference approach with time and location fixed effects. We find that exposure to SC reduced the labor supply of college-educated citizen women, particularly women with young children. Several results suggest that changes in the price of outsourcing household services are driving these results including: 1) SC has a negative effect on the number of low-skilled non-citizen workers in the personal services industry, and a positive effect on wages of workers in this industry; and, 2) there are no effects for high-skilled citizen men or women without children, who are both less likely to outsource these services. This is the first evidence that restrictions on immigration have important unintended consequences on the labor supply of high-skilled women.

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1 Introduction

Roughly 11 million undocumented immigrants lived in the U.S. in 2015, making up 3.4% of the U.S. population (Krogstad, Passel and Cohn, 2017). While undocumented immigrants represent 5% of the total workforce in the U.S., they make up 24% of maids and housekeepers, 22% of workers in private households, and 7% of workers in personal and laundry services (Passel and Cohn, 2016).

Over the last 15 years, many policies have been put in place to address the issue of undocumented immigration by increasing both border and interior immigration enforcement. Interior enforcement action has devolved to state and local governments, while comprehensive federal immigration reform has continually stalled in Congress. Although an extensive literature has studied the impact of migratory flows on labor outcomes, the evidence on the effects of *enforcement policies* on citizens' wages and employment is more limited.[2]

In this paper we focus on the potential unintended consequences enforcement laws can have on the labor supply of high-skilled women. The presence of low-skilled immigrants reduces the cost of household services (Cortes, 2008), so the removal of undocumented immigrants, who disproportionately work in these services, is predicted to increase the cost of these services. Women may be particularly affected by changes in the cost of household work, as they both spend more time engaging in this type of work, and have a more elastic labor supply, when compared to men (Blau and Kahn, 2007; Pew Research Center, 2013). Additionally, high-skilled workers are expected to be the most affected, since they spend a larger fraction of their income on outsourcing household work (Cortes, 2008).[3] To test this

[2]Many studies on the effect of migration inflows on native wages and employment exist. For excellent reviews of the literature see Friedberg and Hunt (1995), Longhi, Nijkamp and Poot (2005), and Longhi, Nijkamp and Poot (2006). Previous studies on the labor market impacts of recent immigration enforcement policies in the U.S. have mostly focused on the direct effects on the migrant population. See Phillips and Massey (1999), Bansak and Raphael (2001), Orrenius and Zavodny (2009), Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak (2014), and Orrenius and Zavodny (2015). The exception is East et al. (2018), who study the effects of Secure Communities on citizen and non-citizen employment outcomes.

[3]On average, college-educated households spend 30% more on household services compared to lower-education households in the Consumer Expenditure Survey: `https://www.bls.gov/cex/tables.htm#`

hypothesis empirically, we focus on the roll-out of Secure Communities–a nationally implemented enforcement program. Briefly, SC requires the fingerprints of all individuals booked in jail to be sent to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). SC is credited with more than 450,000 deportations over our sample period of 2005-2014. Of those deported over this time period, 17% were not convicted of a crime, and 29% were not convicted of a serious crime (17% because of traffic violations and DUIs), so a broad population may have been affected by these policies.[4] Moreover, SC is believed to have deleterious effects on immigrants who were not deported, due to fear of deportation and mistrust of local law enforcement.[5]

Our empirical specification exploits both the temporal and geographic variation in the roll-out of SC to examine the effects on high-skilled (college-educated) female labor supply. While SC was not optional, it was rolled out in a staggered fashion across localities, and we exploit the timing of the rollout in our identification strategy. To conduct our analysis, we gathered data on the timing and location of the implementation of SC and merged these data to the American Community Survey (ACS) from 2005-2014, which allows us to measure the labor supply of high-skilled women. The smallest consistent and comprehensive geographic area available in the ACS is the Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA), so we create measures of the presence of SC by PUMA and year (described in more detail in Section 2). This allows us to estimate a difference-in-difference model, while controlling for PUMA and survey year fixed effects. For our empirical strategy, our focus on SC has several main advantages: first, local areas had little influence over the timing of adoption of SC, and, once it was in place, they had limited discretion in the operation of the program; second, because the program was rolled out quickly and eventually covered the entire country internal migration of citizens

`annual`.

[4]Appendix Table (A1) shows information about the criminal convictions of individuals who were deported.

[5]Wang and Kaushal (2018) show the implementation 287(g) agreements and Secure Communities increased the share of Latino immigrants with mental distress; Alsan and Yang (2018) find a negative effect of SC on sign-ups for the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and participation in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) among Hispanic citizens.

is less likely to contaminate the results (Borjas, 2003; Borjas and Katz, 2007; Cadena and Kovak, 2016).

For our main sample–working-age (20-64) college-educated citizen women–we find strong evidence that the roll-out of SC reduced labor supply. The estimates indicate that exposure to SC reduces the probability of working and the usual hours worked. These effects are driven by women with children, who experience a decline in the probability of working of 0.4% relative to the sample mean. This is consistent with the fact that mothers will have more household production responsibilities, and thus be more sensitive to changes in the price of outsourcing this production. We find larger effects for women with children under 6 (before children are likely to enter school)–a reduction in the likelihood of working by 0.8%. To give context to the magnitude of these effects, our point estimates are about 5% of the effect of having a child for women born in the U.S.(Kuziemko et al., 2018).[6] We then investigate the extent to which having SC in place in the years following a child's birth affects' women's longer-run outcomes and we find that, similar to the persistent reduction in labor supply after having a child, there are persistent effects of exposure to SC around a birth on the labor supply of college-educated women.

We conduct a number of tests to support the idea that changes in the prices of market-provided household services are driving the results. First, we find that SC had a negative and significant effect on the share of "likely undocumented" immigrants working in personal services.[7] Second, we examine the effect on the cost of household production, as proxied for by wages of personal service workers. We find evidence of a positive effect on personal service workers' wages, particularly at the lower end of the wage distribution, where undocumented immigrants are most likely to be. If we assume that all of the change in mothers' labor

[6]Kuziemko et al. (2018) estimates having a child decreases labor force participation by 36 percentage points for a sample of college-educated women in the NLSW68 (average birth cohort of 1951), 20 percentage points for women in the NLSY79 (average birth cohort of 1962), and 13 percentage points for women in the PSID (average birth cohort of 1967).

[7]We measure "likely undocumented" as non-citizens with high-school education or less (Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak, 2012, 2014).

supply is operating through this change in price, our estimates imply an elasticity of high-skilled female work to this price of -0.15.[8] Third, we estimate the effects of SC on two groups of the population whose labor supply should not be as responsive to changes in the prices of household services: high-skilled men, and high-skilled women with no children. In both cases we find no significant effects of exposure to SC on their labor supply. Taken together, this provides strong evidence that changes in the price of outsourcing home production is an important mechanism behind the labor supply effects.

This paper builds on previous work documenting a positive relationship between the presence of low-skilled immigrants, and high-skilled women's labor supply in the United States (Cortes and Tessada, 2011; Furtado and Hock, 2010; Amuedo-Dorantes and Sevilla, 2014; Furtado, 2015, 2016), Italy (Peri, Romiti and Rossi, 2015; Barone and Mocetti, 2011), Hong Kong (Cortes and Pan, 2013), and Spain (Farré, González and Ortega, 2011).[9] Our paper makes several contributions to this literature. First, while the literature has focused on studying the effect of migratory inflows on the outcomes of interest, we focus on evaluating the effects of recent enforcement policy in the U.S. that focused on the removal of immigrants. President Trump recently reinstated SC and expanded other interior enforcement policies (Alvarez, 2017; Sakuma, 2017)[10], so, understanding the spillover effects of enforcement policies is crucially important for policy-makers as they actively change immigration policy. The second contribution is methodological: we use local enforcement policies as an exogenous driver of the size of the undocumented population, which relies on relatively innocuous and easily testable assumptions. Our identification strategy relies on the assumption that, conditional on observables, there are not time-varying differences within

[8]de V. Cavalcanti and Tavares (2008) estimate an elasticity of -0.46 of of female labor force participation to the price of home appliances using a sample of 17 OECD countries between 1975 and 1999.

[9]These papers primarily rely on cross-sectional variation in the concentration of immigrants across locations. With the exception of Cortes and Pan (2013), all these papers use an instrumental variables strategy in the spirit of Card (2001), which takes advantage of historical immigration settlement patterns to predict future patterns.

[10]SC was replaced by the Priority Enforcement Program in 2015, but it was reactivated in January of 2017.

PUMAs that are correlated with the timing of the adoption of SC. We conduct a number of tests to provide evidence that the results are driven by the implementation of enforcement policies. First, we show event studies to test the parallel trends assumptions and provide evidence that there were no systematic differences in high-skill female labor supply before SC was put into place. Second, we account for differential trends across locations based on pre-existing demographic characteristics, and the results are robust to the inclusion of these controls.

Our paper also contributes to several other literatures. First, a number of researchers have examined the effect of a change in the price of one specific type of household service–childcare–on women's labor supply (see for example: Baker, Gruber and Milligan (2008); Cascio (2009); Havnes and Mogstad (2011)). These papers primarily take advantage of changes in government-provided childcare, and our findings suggest that policies that affect the presence of undocumented immigrants may also be important for determining these outcomes. Second, our paper speaks to the literature on the effect of "family-friendly" policies on women's work and wages (see for example: Baker and Milligan (2008); Rossin-Slater, Ruhm and Waldfogel (2013)). Our work demonstrates that enforcement policies may have an unintended effect of decreasing work among women with children, which may have far-reaching consequences to the gender gap in work and wages, as well as children's well-being. We view this paper as a first step to analyzing the full impact of immigration enforcement policies on high-skilled women and their families' well-being.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: in the next section we provide details about SC and the data we use. Section 3 describes our empirical strategy and section 4 presents our results. Section 5 concludes.

2 Policy Background and Data

We examine the effects of the Secure Communities Program (SC), which is one of the largest interior immigration enforcement programs in the United States.[11] SC increased information sharing between local law enforcement agencies and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The goal of SC was to identify individuals eligible for removal from the US. Prior to SC, individuals' fingerprints would be taken upon being booked in state prisons or local jails and would be sent to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to conduct a criminal background investigation. Under SC these fingerprints would now also be sent to ICE, who would try to determine an individual's immigration status using their Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT).[12] Based on this information, a detainer may be issued and the law enforcement agency would then be required to hold the individual for up to 48 hours in order for ICE to obtain custody and start the deportation process. Importantly, detainers could be issued for criminal reasons or for immigration-crime-related reasons, and they did not have to be proceeded by a conviction.

SC was not optional and was rolled out county-by-county between 2008 and 2013 until the entire country was covered. Figure (1) shows the pattern of the rollout across counties. The timing of county adoption was determined by the federal government. This is important for the assumptions underlying our empirical model, since local areas had little discretion about the implementation. Previous evidence suggests the initial set of counties was chosen based on the size of their Hispanic population, proximity to the U.S.-Mexico border, and presence of other local enforcement policies (Cox and Miles, 2013).[13] However, Cox and Miles

[11] For comprehensive reviews of SC see Alsan and Yang (2018), Cox and Miles (2013), and Miles and Cox (2014). The information in this section comes primarily from these reviews, as well as from East et al. (2018).

[12] IDENT includes biometric and biographical information on non-U.S. citizens who have violated immigration law, or are lawfully present in the U.S., but have been convicted of a crime and are therefore subject to removal, as well as naturalized citizens whose fingerprints were previously included in the database. In addition, the IDENT system includes biometric information on all travelers who enter or leave the U.S. through an official port, and when applying for visas at U.S. consulates.

[13] These other local enforcement polices are 287(g) agreements, discussed in more detail below.

(2013) also show that early adopters were not selected in terms of the county's economic performance, crime rates and potential political support for SC, and that later adopters were more "randomly" selected because the government shifted to mass activations, and this was based on resource constraints and waiting lists. Over the period 2009 to 2014, more than 450,000 individuals were deported under SC. SC ended in 2014 (before being reinstated in 2017 by President Trump) so we focus on the period 2005-2014 for our main analysis so our results should be thought of as the effect of *increasing* immigration enforcement.[14]

We expect SC will reduce high-skilled women's labor supply through increases in the cost of services that substitute for household production–such as childcare, cleaning, cooking, and gardening (Cortes and Tessada, 2011). This price increase will be due to a reduction in the labor supply of undocumented individuals who provide these types of services through two channels: 1) forced or voluntary out-migration of immigrants, and 2) reductions in immigrants' labor supply due to fear of deportation. Enforcement policies may also affect documented immigrants, if documented immigrants worry about the deportation of their friends and relatives, or fear changes in their own immigration status as a result of the policies.[15]

The literature on the labor market effects of SC is limited. East et al. (2018) examine the effects of SC on local labor markets and find that SC reduced male low-educated non-citizens employment, as well as male *citizens* employment in high-skilled occupations, particularly in sectors that employ many low-educated non-citizens. This suggests that there may be complementarities in production between workers in low and high-skilled occupations

[14]Our estimates could be biased if there is selected migration of high-skilled citizen women: for example, if high-skilled citizen women who are more likely to work and work longer hours move away from counties with a less friendly environment towards migrants. However, given that SC was designed to be implemented at the national level, and the rollout was relatively fast, internal migration as a response to SC does not seem likely.East et al. (2018) shows that SC did not have a significant effect on overall migration rates, and specifically of citizens during the same sample period.

[15]Alsan and Yang (2018) finds a negative effect of exposure to SC on sign-ups for the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) participation for Hispanic citizens. These results suggest enforcement policies can affect both the undocumented and documented immigrant population.

that cause negative spillover effects onto citizen males. In this paper, we examine another potential type of complementarity: between low-skilled non-citizens working in personal services and high-skilled citizen women working outside the home.

During this period another local interior enforcement policy–287(g) Agreements–was experiencing differential changes across locations. 287(g) agreements were optional agreements law enforcement agencies could enter into with the federal government, and were authorized by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Local and state law enforcement agencies that adopted these agreements received training from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to carry out immigration enforcement action. There were two types of 287(g) agreements. First, the "Task Force" model, which permitted trained law enforcement officials to screen individuals regarding their immigration status during policing operations, and arrest individuals due to suspected immigration violations. Second, the "Jail" model, which allowed screening for immigration status for individuals upon being booked in state prisons or local jails, and was more similar to SC in design. Beginning in 2013 some 287(g) agreements were ended due to changes in federal rules. By January 2012, 36 counties had either the Task Force or Jail model, and 14 had both. Figures (A1) and (A2) show maps of the takeup of these agreements by county. In our analysis of SC we control for the presence of local 287(g) agreements.[16]

We gathered information about the implementation of these policies at the county level from a variety of sources. Information on the rollout dates of Secure Communities comes from ICE. Start and end dates for all 287(g) agreements came from reports published by ICE, the Department of Homeland Security, the Migration Policy Institute, as well as Kostandini, Mykerezi and Escalante (2013), and various news articles. We merge the information about local enforcement policies with data on local-level high-skilled citizen women's labor supply

[16]Two papers examine the labor market effects of 287(g) agreements and find evidence of reduced employment in local areas after implementing these policies (Bohn and Santillano, 2017; Pham and Van, 2010). However, these papers do not separate these effects by citizenship status or gender.

over the period 2005-2014 from the American Community Survey (ACS) (Ruggles et al., 2017). The ACS is a repeated cross-sectional dataset covering a 1% random sample of the U.S., and in the publicly available data set, the smallest geographic area available is the Public-Use Microdata Area (PUMA). PUMAs allow us to identify the location of residence for all individuals and they respect state lines. Some PUMAs are equivalent to counties, whereas others include several counties, and still others are smaller than individual counties. The policy data is at the county-level, so to merge this with the annual PUMA-level ACS data, we calculate the population-weighted average of the county values of the enforcement variables within each PUMA, similar to the approach taken by Watson (2013).[17] Additionally, we have no information about the month of survey within the ACS, only the year of survey, so we assign to each observation the enforcement policies in January of the survey year and test the robustness of this choice.

Our main sample includes citizen women ages 20-64 with a four-year college degree or more, which we refer to as "high-skilled".[18] As women with children may have more demands on household production, we also explore the results on women with children living at home, and women with children younger than age 6 at home. The primary outcome variables in the ACS are high-skilled citizen women's usual hours per week worked in the past year and whether the woman worked any positive hours usually in the past year. To provide direct evidence that changes in the cost of personal services may be an important mechanism, we also look at employment and wages in this industry.[19] We construct a sample of individuals ages 20-64 who report that either their industry or occupation at their current or most recent job was personal services. The outcomes of interest are the number of low-skilled

[17]If a PUMA is equivalent to a county, or smaller than a county, the PUMA will get the value of the enforcement variables for that county. If multiple counties are contained within a PUMA, we weight the value of the enforcement variable for each county by the fraction of the total PUMA population that each county represents. Additionally, the PUMA codes were revised after the 2011 ACS survey, so we use the time-consistent version of the PUMA codes provided by the IPUMS website.

[18]Citizens include U.S.-born as well as foreign-born who report being naturalized citizens.

[19]Personal services include, for example, work in private households, child care workers, barbers, laundry/cleaning work, hospitality, and other miscellaneous personal services.

non-citizens who are working in personal services, as well as the average wage of all personal service workers and low-skilled non-citizen personal service workers.[20]

Additionally, we use the data from 2005 to 2014 from the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) to examine changes over this period in women's time use beyond changes in labor supply. ATUS respondents are randomly selected from households who completed their participation in the Current Population Survey (CPS), so this is also a nationally-representative (with survey weights) cross-sectional data set.[21] We focus our analysis on measures of time spent weekly on household activities, care of household children, and leisure activities. Time on household activities include time spent on maintaining the respondent's household, like housework, cooking, and home maintenance. If, for example, the respondent's spends time on food preparation for children, this will be coded under household activities instead of childcare. Time spent caring for a household children, for example, feeding them, socializing with them and time spent on activities related to their education, are coded under care of a household children. Leisure activities include time spent socializing and on relaxation activities, sports and recreation, which may be important as an additional pathway through which women's well-being can be affected by the policies.

We construct a sample with the ATUS that is as close as possible to the sample in the ACS: citizen women aged 20-64 with a college degree or more. The main differences between the ATUS and the ACS are that the ATUS is available at the monthly and county level (rather than the annual and PUMA level) and this allows us to merge the ATUS and the enforcement data directly at both of these levels.[22] Only large counties, with population greater than 100,000 are identified in the ATUS, so we are not able to cover the entire U.S. with this dataset like we can with the ACS.

[20]Low-skilled non-citizens are those with a high school degree or less.

[21]The ATUS interview is conducted two to five months after an individuals' last CPS interview. Interviews are conducted by phone and the interviewer collects information about the respondent's activities over a 24-hour period. We inflate this to weekly measures to match the ACS measures.

[22]We have also estimated this model using the variation of the enforcement policies at the year level based on the policy as of January, replicating the model we follow for the ACS. The results are similar.

Since our sample period spans the Great Recession, to account for changes in economic conditions that may influence women's labor supply, we add to the data several "Bartik-style" measures of labor demand, as well as housing price values. Details on these variables are included in the Appendix.

Summary statistics for the ACS and ATUS are in Table (1). In both data sets we use the survey provided person weights in all summary statistics and regressions. In the ACS we have over 2.5 million observations of high-skilled women for the period between 2005 and 2014. In the ACS sample we multiply the dichotomous labor supply variables by 100 in the summary statistics and regressions, to ease presentation of the results. So, for example, 85.49% of high-skilled women worked at all in the past year, and this number goes down to 78.98% for women with young children. In the ATUS we have 8,068 individual observations for the same period. It is important to highlight that, although the women sampled in both surveys are not the same, we construct the samples to be as closely comparable as possible. The demographics of all high-skilled citizen women (column 1), high-skilled citizen women with children (column 2), high-skilled citizen women with young children (column 3), and high-skilled citizen men (column 4) across surveys show that both samples are closely related in these observable characteristics. Our main focus in this paper is the effect of immigration enforcement policies on high-skilled citizen women as they spend more time relative to men on household activities (8.91 hours compare to 13.84 hours, respectively). Moreover, an important degree of heterogeneity in time use for high-skilled women is whether they have children and, in particular, young children. High-skilled citizen women spend on average 5.6 hours on activities related with childcare and this more than triples for women with young children, while men spend on average 2.87 hours on childcare activities.

3 Empirical Strategy

Our identification strategy looking at contemporaneous outcomes exploits both the geographic and temporal variation on the implementation of the SC program between 2005 and 2014 to identify its effect on labor market outcomes of high-skilled citizen women. Our main analysis examining the effect on high-skilled women's labor supply with the ACS is estimated with the following model:

$$Y_{ipt} = \alpha + \beta SC_{pt} + X'_{ipt}\delta + Z'_{pt}\gamma + \mu_p + \phi_t + \theta \Delta W'_p * t + \epsilon_{ipt} \quad (1)$$

Where Y_{ipt} represents different measures of labor outcomes for a woman i, living in PUMA p and year t. SC_{pt} is a continuous variable measuring exposure to SC at the PUMA level, and takes values between 0 and 1. SC_{pt} is equal to zero if SC has not been implemented by January of the survey year in any of the counties in PUMA p, and a value of one once it has been implemented in all counties in the PUMA by January of the survey year. Since we focus on the roll-out period of SC, once SC_{pt} takes a value equal to one, it keeps that value for the remainder of the sample period. The coefficient of interest, β should be interpreted as the effect of SC when the entire population in a PUMA is exposed to this immigration enforcement policy by the beginning of the survey year.

In order for the difference-in-differences model to be valid there should not be time-varying differences within PUMAs that are correlated with the timing of the adoption of SC in those PUMAs. Since the early adopters of SC were chosen based on the size of their Hispanic population, and proximity to the U.S.-Mexico border, we include fixed effects at the PUMA level, μ_p, that account for any time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity at the PUMA level. Our initial specification also includes year (ϕ_t) fixed effects to account for national shocks to labor outcomes over time. We then subsequently add in controls, first at the PUMA level, and then at the individual level. The PUMA-year controls (Z'_{pt}) include Bartik-style

measures of labor demand, housing price values, and 287(g) programs. Following Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2009) and Almond, Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2011), in order to control for pre-trends, we interact changes in PUMA characteristics between 2000 and 2005 (vector $\Delta W_p'$) with linear time trends.[23] Finally, the individual level controls (X_{ipt}') include the following individual characteristics: age and age squared, race, marital status, educational attainment, number of children and number of young children in the household.[24]

4 Results

We begin our analysis in Table (2) by showing the effects of SC on the labor supply of all high-skilled citizen women (columns (1)-(2)), as well as women with children (columns (3)-(4)), and women with young children (columns (5)-(6)). The baseline model (Panel A) includes only PUMA and year fixed effects, and across the subsequent panels we include additional controls: Panel B adds controls for 287(g) agreements and economic conditions (bartik-style variables and housing prices); Panel C includes interactions between changes in PUMA characteristics from 2000 to 2005 and a linear trend to account for the fact that PUMAs may have been trending differentially based on these characteristics; and, finally, in Panel D we add demographic characteristics measured at the individual level. The results across panels show that evidence of negative effects of SC on high-skilled women's labor supply, which are larger and robust to additional controls for both groups of mothers. This suggests that variation in other enforcement programs or economic conditions, pre-treatment PUMA demographic trends, or demographic characteristics are not driving our main results for the sample of mothers. Our preferred specification, based on equation (1) and shown in

[23]The variables included are labor force participation rate, share of citizens, blacks, non-citizens, individuals with children and young children, individuals working more than 50 and 60 hours, total people and women with a college degree, masters degree, and a Ph.D.. The results are robust to using only the levels in 2000, or in 2005, interacted with a time trend.

[24]Fertility may be directly affected by enforcement if the price of, for example child care, changes (Furtado, 2016). We directly test for this and find no evidence of changes in fertility as shown in Appendix Table (A2).

Panel D, includes all these controls. The results for all mothers indicate that SC reduces the likelihood of working by 0.35 percentage points (p=0.06), a 0.4% reduction off the sample mean, and for mothers of young kids, SC reduces the likelihood of working by 0.82% (p=0.06). Additionally, there is a significant decline of 1.2% in usual hours worked for the sample of mothers of young kids.[25]

To further test the validity of our identification strategy, we estimate an event study approach using the model with the full set of controls (corresponding to Panel D of Table (2)). This allows us to test our key empirical assumption, which is that, conditional on observable characteristics of the PUMAs and individuals, the timing of SC adoption is exogenous. Figure (2) shows the results of the event study model for the three groups of high-skilled women and both measures of labor supply. There is little evidence that prior to SC adoption, high-skilled women's labor supply was differentially trending across PUMAs, particularly when looking at mothers (Panels (b) and (c)). Moreover, there is strong evidence of significant negative effects of SC on labor supply after implementation, which mimics our regression results in Table (2).

We further examine the margins on which this decline in labor supply is operating by estimating the effect of SC on the probability of working full-time (35+ hours), part-time (20-35 hours), and being marginally employed (0-20 hours). The reduction in full time work may be larger because outsourcing of household production may be important for women who work longer hours. The results in Table (3) suggest that indeed most of the change in labor supply is coming from a reduction in the likelihood high-skilled women work full-time, although the effects are only statistically significant for mothers with young kids.[26]

[25]We also look at the effect on the number of hours worked, conditional on working in the first column of Appendix Table (A3). We see little evidence of changes in hours among workers, except for mothers of young children. This suggests that the changes we see in Table (2) may be mostly occurring at the extensive margin of work, rather than at the intensive margin. However, it is important to note that changes in the population of workers may also drive the conditional results on working hours.

[26]We also estimate the effect of SC on the probability of being self-employed or a wage-worker. We do not find evidence of changes in the type of work.

For mothers of young kids, the estimates indicate a reduction in full-time work of 1.7% (p=0.03). To further investigate whether women working longer hours are more affected, we also examine whether SC affects the propensity to work more than 50 and 60 hours per week in Appendix Table (A3). Overall the effects are mostly negative, although imprecisely estimated and not statistically different from zero. However, focusing only on these point estimates, the effect sizes are large: for example there is a reduction in the likelihood of working 50 or more hours per week of about 0.2 percentage points for mothers, a roughly 2% decline. Overall this indicates that SC may be particularly impactful for women working long hours, and may have important implications for the potential career progression of women in very time-intensive jobs (Bertrand, Goldin and Katz, 2010).

4.1 Mechanisms

To better understand whether changes in the cost of outsourcing household work are driving the negative effect of SC on high-skilled mothers we conduct several tests. First we directly examine the market for personal service workers. In Panel A of Table (4) we explore the effect of SC on the number of "likely undocumented workers", and therefore those directly affected by enforcement policies, who are working in personal services. Recall, since the ACS does not have information about undocumented status, we define "likely undocumented workers" as low-skilled non-citizens. The dependent variable in this panel is the number of low-skilled non-citizens who are employed in personal services, scaled by total PUMA working age population.[27] SC reduces the number of immigrants in this sector by 230 workers per 100,000 people, a 0.3% effect (p<0.05). We also investigate an event study version of this result in Figure (3) using the same approach as before. This demonstrates that there are no pre-trends in the number of low-skilled non-citizen workers in this sector before the policy

[27]Specifically, we sum the total number of 20-64 year old low-skilled non-citizens who report working at all in the past 12 months in personal service, in each PUMA and year. We then divide this by the total number of 20-64 year olds in each PUMA and year, and finally divide by 100,000 to ease the presentation of the results. We weight these models with the total PUMA population in 2000.

implementation, and that there is a significant negative effect after SC implementation.

We investigate whether this reduction in the supply of workers translates into higher wages in this sector, both for all workers (Panel B) and among the low-skilled non-citizens who remain in the US (Panel C). We find that all personal service workers wages go up by about 1.3% and low-educated non-citizens wages go up by 3.5%, although neither effect is significantly different from zero.[28] We further explore the effect on personal service worker wages in Figure (4). In this figure we plot the effect of SC on wages across the distribution from the 5th percentile to the 95th percentile. The point estimates indicate larger positive effects of SC at the lower part of the wage distribution, where undocumented immigrants are most likely to be.[29] As points of comparison, Furtado (2016) finds that a 1% change in the low-skilled immigrant population in the U.S. reduced the median wage of child care workers by about 4%, and Cortes (2008) finds that a 10% increase in low-skilled immigrants reduced the price of immigrant-intensive services (mostly household services) by roughly 2%. To compare this to the potential effect of enforcement policies, we note that 1% of the low-skilled immigrant population today is roughly 225,000 individuals and over our sample period about 450,000 individuals were deported under SC.[30]

The results so far suggest changes in the cost of personal services is an important mechanism through which enforcement policies affect high-skilled women's labor supply. However, there are other channels through which changes in the labor supply of undocumented immigrants could affect high-skilled individuals' work, such as complementarities in

[28]This outcome variable is constructed by taking annual labor income and dividing by the usual hours worked per week in the past year, to get a measure of weekly earnings in the past year, which we take the log of to ease interpretation. We then collapse to the PUMA-year level using the sample weights.

[29]Appendix Figure (A3) plots the share of workers by wage percentile bin that are low-skilled non-citizens. The left-hand-side dot represents workers in the 0-5th percentile of the wage distribution and so on. Note that one possibility is that enforcement policy induces workers to switch from formal work to more informal work, which might include personal services. However, these results show the net effect on all workers who report personal services as their industry or occupation, so this switching should be included in this total result.

[30]Information on deportations under SC come from the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC).

the production process of market work (Chassamboulli and Peri, 2015; East et al., 2018). We therefore look at the effect of enforcement on two different groups in the population whose labor supply should not be as highly affected through changes in the price of outsourcing household production. First, we look at high-skilled men. We argue that since women have been found to be more sensitive to changes in the price of household services in other contexts (such as child care), and because high-skilled women spend more time in household production relative to high-skilled men (13.84 vs. 8.91 hours in our sample), high-skilled men are less likely to change their time use directly due to the changes in the cost of household services. Second, we estimate the effects for high-skilled women with no children since the presence of a child at home affects the demand of household services. Table (5) show the results for these two groups. The results show small and insignificant effects of SC both for high-skilled men and high-skilled women without children. Although the sign of the coefficients in Table (5) goes in the same direction of those in Table (2), their magnitudes are smaller both in absolute levels and in percentage terms. These results further suggest that the effects we find for high-skilled women are at least in part, and may be fully, operating through the mechanism of reduced prices of personal services. Due to these smaller and statistically insignificant findings for high-skilled women without children, we focus only on mothers for the remainder of the analysis.

As final pieces of evidence about the potential mechanisms, we investigate two dimensions of heterogeneity. First, if changes in the supply of low-skilled non-citizens are driving the results on high-skilled citizen mothers, we should expect stronger effects in places with a higher initial share of low-skilled non-citizens. In Table (6) we explore the heterogeneity of the results based on the initial share of low-skilled non-citizens in the PUMA. We interact the SC variable with the share of the PUMA working-age population that is low-skilled non-citizen in 2005. We expect the effects of SC to be larger in places with a greater share of low-skilled non-citizens and this is indeed what we see, although the interaction is not always statistically significant. Focusing on the outcome for which we do find a significant

interaction effect, the effect on hours worked for mothers with young kids almost doubles from -0.14 percentage points to -0.27 percentage points when moving from a PUMA with the average share of low-skilled non-citizens (3.4%), to a PUMA with a standard deviation (about 5 percentage points) higher share of low-educated non-citizens. Second, we expect stronger effects for women who do not have access to informal help with household production. To proxy for this, we explore the heterogeneity of the results by whether a woman lives in the state of her birth. Women that live in their state of birth might be more likely to live in proximity to their own families and thus have more access to informal household production outsourcing, so we expect the effects of SC to be larger for women who have moved out of their state of birth.[31] In Table (7) we show the results of the model that interacts SC with an indicator variable equal to one if a woman does not live in her state of birth. As expected, the results are stronger for this sample of women.[32]

4.2 Robustness Checks

We test the robustness of our main results on the labor supply of high-skilled mothers. First, we test the sensitivity of the findings to alternative timing assumptions. In the baseline results, we code an enforcement policy as being in place in a given survey year if it was in place in January of that year. Since the ACS interviews are conducted continuously throughout the year, but we do not know the month of the interview, we test the sensitivity of the findings to alternative timing assumptions. Appendix Table (A4) Panel A replicates the results from the main specification that uses enforcement in January to code SC implementation. In Panel B we show the results coding the enforcement policy as the fraction of the current survey year. Recall that our labor supply outcomes are measuring the 12 months before the survey took place, so the fraction of the current year may be more of a lead measure of SC

[31] Compton and Pollak (2014) find that close proximity to mothers or mothers-in-law increases the labor supply of mothers of young children by 4-10 percentage points.

[32] It is possible that the decision to live in proximity of relatives is not random. We find no evidence that SC affects whether a women lives in her state of birth. Results available upon request.

than a contemporaneous one, and indeed we find slightly smaller point estimates with this lead measure of SC. Panel C shows the fraction of the year before the survey each policy was in place and this shows very similar results to our baseline measure.

Second, because the early adopters of SC may be more highly selected, we test the robustness of the results to dropping areas that adopted SC in 2008-2009. The results, in Appendix Table (A5) are similar to the full sample, although smaller point estimates and larger standard errors cause the effects to no longer be significant. However, we note that the confidence intervals of the estimates are overlapping.

Finally, since housing prices may be directly affected by SC, we include more aggregate measures of housing prices instead in Appendix Table (A6). The results are similar with state-level housing prices, or state-level housing prices that leave out each individual PUMA.

4.3 Time Use

To explore in more detail how women's time allocation is changing we estimate the following empirical model with the ATUS data:

$$Y_{icmt} = \alpha + \beta_3 SC_{icmt} + X'_{icmt}\delta + Z'_{ct}\gamma + \theta W'_{2005c} * t + \lambda_m + \mu_c + \delta_t + \epsilon_{icmt} \tag{2}$$

All the control variables are the same as in equation (1) and, in addition to the previous controls, we also add month fixed effects and an indicator variable for whether the time-use data was collected for a weekday or a weekend day. Y_{icmt} measures the time (hours per week) allocated to care of children living in the household, household and leisure activities.[33]

Table (8) shows the effect of enforcement policies on the number of hours per week

[33]Because the ATUS dataset is available from 2003, instead of interacting the change in county characteristics between 2000 and 2005 with a time trend, we interact 2005 characteristics with a time trend.

spent in activities related to household care of children (column (1)), household activities (column (2)) and leisure activities (column (3)). Estimating the effect of SC on care of household members and household activities separately is important because it sheds light on the different types of activities performed at home for which a woman is likely to hire services. Recall that activities like feeding and socializing with children are included in care of household members, but activities like preparing food for children are included in household activities.

Overall the results in Table (8) are imprecisely estimated and do not show significant effects of SC on women's time allocation, which may be due to the small sample sizes. For the sample of mothers of young kids, Panel B, the sign of the coefficients suggest a decline in time allocated to childcare and leisure activities, and an increase in household activities.[34]

4.4 Long-term Effects

To better understand the impact of SC on women's labor supply, we explore the potential long-term effects of this policy. Previous evidence on the effects of motherhood have found persistent effects of having a child on women's labor market outcomes (Juhn and McCue, 2017; Kuziemko et al., 2018). We expect the same may be true in the case of SC–having SC in place around the time of a child's birth may have lasting negative consequences on women's labor market outcomes.

The previous results above suggested that the biggest contemporaneous effects of SC were when children are 0-5. We explore first in more detail at what ages SC has the biggest contemporaneous impact in order to motivate our long-run model in Appendix Table (A7). This table suggests SC has the largest negative effects while a child is under age 3. As a result, to explore the long-term effects of SC on women's labor supply, we explore the longer-

[34]When interpreting the results from the ATUS sample, it is important to keep in mind the differences in the sample between the ATUS and ACS–in particular, we can only observe individuals living in large counties in the ATUS, which can affect the precision of the estimates.

run effect of exposure of SC when the youngest child was between 0 and 2, and therefore at the most vulnerable age to affect women's labor supply. We estimate the following regression for the sample of high-skilled women who had their youngest child between 2000 and 2012 and were observed in 2005-2017[35]:

$$Y_{ipts} = \alpha + \beta_2 SC_{pts} + X'_{ipt}\delta + Z'_{pt}\gamma + \mu_p + \phi_t + \lambda_s + \theta \Delta W'_p * t + \epsilon_{ipts} \tag{3}$$

Where Y_{ipts} represents the labor outcomes for a woman i, living in PUMA p and year t, who had their youngest child in year s. SC_{pts} represents the exposure to SC when the youngest child is between 0 and 2.[36] In addition to the controls specified in equation (1) we add a youngest child birth year fixed effect, λ_s.[37]

Table (9) shows the results for the probability of working positive hours in column 1, the usual hours worked in column 2, and we add the log of weekly hourly wages in column 3 since reductions in labor supply in the short run may lead to diminished wages in the longer-run. Panel A shows the effect of SC exposure during the first two years of life of the youngest child when they are between 3 and 5 years old. The negative effects on working hours are similar to those in Table (2), which suggests that there are lasting effects of SC exposure around the birth of a child. In addition there is evidence of a negative effect on weekly hourly wages. This suggests there may be persistent effects of SC on women's labor market outcomes.[38] When expanding the sample in Panel B to observe children at older ages (and thus longer-run effects) the point estimates shrink and become insignificant.[39]

[35]SC was rolled-out between 2008 and 2014. By choosing children born in this period we have a sample of children who were exposed to the roll-out of SC during their first two years of life. We choose the 2012 cut-off since children who were born after 2012 would be exposed to the ending of SC in the first two years of life and our focus is on the effect of the roll-out.

[36]Following equation (1) SC measures the fraction of enforcement exposure in the PUMA. Note that we do not observe PUMA of youngest child's birth, only PUMA of current residence, so we assume the child was born in the PUMA of current residence.

[37]The only controls measured based on the year of the youngest child's birth are the controls for task and jail exposure at ages 0-2 to mimic the measure of SC exposure.

[38]The negative effect on working hours can be accompanied by a reallocation from full-time work to partial-time work, as seen in Table (3). If full-time occupations are better remunerated, then women's labor income might be impacted negatively both because of the fewer working hours and because of lower wages.

[39]Note that because we cannot observe PUMA of birth of the youngest child, the potential for measurement

We also estimate the same model for fathers. Appendix Table (A8) shows that in this case there are no significant effects, even on the short-term for fathers of young children, and the point estimates are much smaller than those estimated for women. These results suggest that an increase in the cost of personal services may be another avenue that affects the gender gap in the labor market.

4.5 Discussion

Low-skilled immigrants are over-represented in personal services, and a policy-driven decrease in immigration may result in an increase in the price of these services, which has important consequences for workers who outsource household production. Our results support this hypothesis; they indicate a statistically significant negative effect of the roll-out of SC on high-skilled mother's labor supply. When interpreting our results, it is important to remember that our estimates are the "Intent to Treat" effect of SC and the effects among mothers who change their outsourcing of household production may be much larger. Comparing our estimates to those in the related literature is difficult, as other papers typically look at how high-skill women's labor supply is related to the quantity of immigrants in a local area. For example, Cortes and Tessada (2011), who use the closest sample to ours, but take a different approach to identification, find that a 10% increase in low-skill immigration in the U.S. was associated with an increase in hours of work by 0.3% among women earning wages at the top of the distribution. Moreover, Cortes (2008) finds that a 10% increase in low-skill immigration decreased prices of immigrant-intensive services by 2%. We find SC reduced hours work among all high-skilled women by 0.2% and increased personal service wages by 1.3%, although these effects were not precisely estimated. This suggests that our estimated elasticity of high-skilled women's labor supply with respect to the price of personal services is similar as other researchers have fond: 0.15. However, this ignores the large confidence

error in the SC exposure variable likely increases when we look at older ages of the youngest child.

intervals on our estimates and assumes that the entire change in high-skilled women's labor supply is due to this change in price.

In a different context, Farré, González and Ortega (2011) find that, in Spain, a 10 percentage point increase in the predicted number of female immigrants living in a local area increases the likelihood women with children or elderly dependents living with them work by about 2 percentage points. In the paper using the empirical approach most similar to ours, but in a very different setting, Cortes and Pan (2013) examine the effect of a series of policy changes in the 1970s to 2000s regarding foreign domestic workers in Hong Kong on high-skill women's labor supply. To identify the effects of these policy changes, they compare long-run changes in the labor supply of women with and without children over the period of these policy changes in Hong Kong. [40] They find that women with young children increase the likelihood of working by 12-13 percentage points over time.

5 Conclusion

This paper examines the effect of a recent surge in local interior immigration enforcement on high-skilled mothers' labor supply. We find that SC reduced the labor supply of high-skilled citizen mothers in a difference-in-difference and event study framework. To provide support for the hypothesis that changes in the price of outsourcing household services are an important mechanism behind the labor supply results, we look directly at the presence of likely undocumented workers in the personal service industry and find that this declines after SC. This is accompanied by suggestive evidence of increases in the wages of workers in this industry. We also see little evidence of similar effects on high-skilled men and high-skilled women without children, who are less likely to rely on outsourcing home production.

[40] Cortes and Pan also have a third difference and compare these changes in Hong Kong to similar changes over the period in Taiwan, as well as estimate a structural model, which yields similar results as in their quasi-experimental method.

The results of this paper show important spillover effect of immigration enforcement policies aimed to affect only the migrant population. These spillover effects are particularly important to quantify today, as immigration policy, specifically increased interior enforcement, is being actively debated and changed.

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6 Figures

Figure 1: Rollout of Secure Communities by Year



Notes: Counties that had adopted the Secure Communities based on January of each year are shaded. See text for sources.

Figure 2: Effect of SC on High-Skilled Women's Labor Supply

(a) All High-Skilled Women



(b) Mothers with Kids of Any Age



(c) Mothers with Kids Under 6



Notes: Data are from the 2005-2014 American Community Survey. The sample includes U.S. citizen women with a college degree or more aged 20-64. The model includes PUMA fixed effects, year fixed effects, PUMA-year controls, PUMA characteristics trends and individual demographic controls. The PUMA-year controls include: labor demand controls, housing price controls, and 287(g) programs at the PUMA level. The PUMA characteristics trends include interactions of time trends with the change in PUMA characteristics between 2000 and 2005 (this include: labor force participation rate, share of citizens, blacks, non-citizens, individuals with children and young children, individuals working more than 50 and 60 hours, total people and women with a college degree, masters degree, and a Ph.D.). The demographic controls include: age, number of kids, number of kids under age 6, educational attainment, marital status, and race. The results are weighted using the individual-level weights in the ACS. Standard errors are clustered at the PUMA level and the 95% confidence intervals are shown by the dashed lines. The horizontal axis denotes "event time" where the omitted year is the year before the first SC policy in the PUMA was implemented.

Figure 3: Effect of SC on Low-Skilled Non-Citizen's Work in Personal Services



Notes: Data are from the 2005-2014 American Community Survey. The sample includes individuals aged 20-64 and the data is collapsed at the PUMA by year level. The model includes PUMA fixed effects, year fixed effects, PUMA-year controls, and PUMA characteristics trends. The PUMA-year controls include: labor demand controls, housing price controls, and 287(g) programs at the PUMA level. The PUMA characteristics trends include interactions of time trends with the change in PUMA characteristics between 2000 and 2005 (this include: labor force participation rate, share of citizens, blacks, non-citizens, individuals with children and young children, individuals working more than 50 and 60 hours, total people and women with a college degree, masters degree, and a Ph.D.). The results are weighted by the PUMA population in 2000. Standard errors are clustered at the PUMA level and the 95% confidence intervals are shown by the dashed lines. The horizontal axis denotes "event time" where the omitted year is the year before the first SC policy in the PUMA was implemented.

Figure 4: Effect of SC on All Personal Service Worker's Log Wages By Percentile



Notes: Data are from the 2005-2014 American Community Survey. The sample includes all individuals aged 20-64 who report working in the personal services and the data is collapsed at the PUMA by year level. The model includes PUMA fixed effects, year fixed effects, PUMA-year controls, and PUMA characteristics trends. The PUMA-year controls include: labor demand controls, housing price controls, and 287(g) programs at the PUMA level. The PUMA characteristics trends include interactions of time trends with the change in PUMA characteristics between 2000 and 2005 (this include: labor force participation rate, share of citizens, blacks, non-citizens, individuals with children and young children, individuals working more than 50 and 60 hours, total people and women with a college degree, masters degree, and a Ph.D.). The results are weighted by the PUMA population in 2000. Standard errors are clustered at the PUMA level and the 95% confidence intervals are shown by the dashed lines. The results are weighted by the PUMA population in 2000. The horizontal axis denotes the percentile at which the effect on wages are evaluated. The far left-hand-side estimate is for average wages across all percentiles.

7 Tables

Table 1: Summary Statistics

	High-Skilled Women			High-Skilled Men
	All	With Kids	With Kids Under 6	All
ACS				
Demographics				
Age	41.87	42.07	34.28	43.31
Black	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.07
Married	0.61	0.81	0.89	0.66
# Children Under 6	0.20	0.43	1.30	0.20
# All Children	0.86	1.83	1.94	0.85
College Degree	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66
Masters Degree	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.22
Ph.D.	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.11
Labor Supply Variables				
Work >0 Hours (*100)	85.49	83.00	78.98	93.14
Usual Hours Worked	33.10	31.12	28.78	41.43
Enforcement Variables				
Jail 287(g)	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.10
Task 287(g)	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
SC	0.36	0.36	0.35	0.35
N	2556962	1212842	392473	2214982
ATUS				
Demographics				
Age	41.61	39.95	35.08	42.50
Black	0.10	0.09	0.08	0.07
Married	0.63	0.86	0.90	0.65
# Children Under 6	0.22	0.54	1.14	0.22
# All Children	0.92	1.99	1.94	0.90
College Degree	0.66	0.66	0.64	0.66
Masters Degree	0.31	0.31	0.33	0.29
Ph.D.	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.05
Time Use Variables				
Care Children in Household	5.58	13.58	19.87	2.87
Household Activities	13.84	16.14	15.16	8.91
Leisure Activities	25.80	21.99	20.67	29.33
Enforcement Variables				
Jail 287(g)	0.13	0.12	0.13	0.13
Task 287(g)	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.03
SC	0.45	0.44	0.44	0.45
N	8068	4316	2048	6681

Notes: Data are from the 2005-2014 American Community Survey and the American Time Use Survey. The sample includes all U.S. citizens with a college degree or more, ages 20-64. The results are weighted the using individual-level weights in the ACS and in the ATUS.

Table 2: Effect of SC on High-Skilled Women's Labor Supply by Presence of Children

	All Women		With Kids of Any Age		With Kids Under 6	
	Work > 0 Hours	Usual Hours Worked	Work > 0 Hours	Usual Hours Worked	Work > 0 Hours	Usual Hours Worked
A: No Controls						
Secure Communities	-0.257**	-0.117*	-0.365**	-0.131	-0.606*	-0.335**
	(0.121)	(0.065)	(0.179)	(0.089)	(0.358)	(0.159)
P-Value	0.03	0.07	0.04	0.14	0.09	0.04
B: Add PUMA-Year Controls						
Secure Communities	-0.225*	-0.069	-0.385**	-0.120	-0.774**	-0.401**
	(0.125)	(0.067)	(0.183)	(0.091)	(0.363)	(0.163)
P-Value	0.07	0.30	0.04	0.19	0.03	0.01
C: Add PUMA Characteristic Trends						
Secure Communities	-0.190	-0.059	-0.361*	-0.110	-0.707*	-0.365**
	(0.126)	(0.066)	(0.184)	(0.090)	(0.362)	(0.161)
P-Value	0.13	0.38	0.05	0.22	0.05	0.02
D: Add Demographics						
Secure Communities	-0.236*	-0.074	-0.345*	-0.099	-0.651*	-0.343**
	(0.123)	(0.065)	(0.183)	(0.088)	(0.353)	(0.153)
P-Value	0.06	0.25	0.06	0.27	0.06	0.03
Mean Y	85.49	33.10	83.00	31.12	78.98	28.78
N	2556962	2556962	1212842	1212842	392473	392473

Notes: Data are from the 2005-2014 American Community Survey. The sample includes all U.S. citizen women with a college degree or more aged 20-64. All models include PUMA fixed effects, and year fixed effects. The PUMA-year controls include: labor demand controls, housing price controls, and 287(g) programs at the PUMA level. The PUMA characteristics trends include interactions of time trends with the change in PUMA characteristics between 2000 and 2005 (this include: labor force participation rate, share of citizens, blacks, non-citizens, individuals with children and young children, individuals working more than 50 and 60 hours, total people and women with a college degree, masters degree, and a Ph.D.). The individual demographic controls include: age, number of kids, number of kids under age 6, educational attainment, marital status, and race. The results are weighted using the individual-level weights in the ACS. Standard errors clustered at the PUMA level in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 3: Effect of SC on High-Skilled Women's Full-Time and Part-Time Work by Presence of Children

	Hours 35+	Hours 20−35	Hours <20
A: Full Sample			
Secure Communities	-0.243	0.120	0.123
	(0.173)	(0.120)	(0.143)
Mean Y	67.24	12.45	20.31
P-Value	0.16	0.32	0.39
N	2556962	2556962	2556962
B: Kids of Any Age			
Secure Communities	-0.225	0.083	0.141
	(0.251)	(0.179)	(0.206)
Mean Y	62.25	13.78	23.98
P-Value	0.37	0.64	0.49
N	1212842	1212842	1212842
C: Kids Under 6			
Secure Communities	-0.976**	0.155	0.821**
	(0.436)	(0.318)	(0.368)
Mean Y	57.43	13.65	28.92
P-Value	0.03	0.63	0.03
N	392473	392473	392473

Notes: Data are from the 2005-2014 American Community Survey. The sample includes all U.S. citizen women with a college degree or more aged 20-64. All models include PUMA fixed effects, and year fixed effects. The PUMA-year controls include: labor demand controls, housing price controls, and 287(g) programs at the PUMA level. The PUMA characteristics trends include interactions of time trends with the change in PUMA characteristics between 2000 and 2005 (this include: labor force participation rate, share of citizens, blacks, non-citizens, individuals with children and young children, individuals working more than 50 and 60 hours, total people and women with a college degree, masters degree, and a Ph.D.). The individual demographic controls include: age, number of kids, number of kids under age 6, educational attainment, marital status, and race. The results are weighted using the individual-level weights in the ACS. Standard errors clustered at the PUMA level in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 4: Effect of SC on Non-Citizens' Labor Supply and Personal Services Worker Wages

A: # Low-Skilled Non-Cit Work in Personal Services / Pop	
Secure Communities	-230.055**
	(93.151)
Mean Y	78882.01
N	10700
B: All Personal Services Workers Log Wage	
Secure Communities	0.013
	(0.009)
Mean Y	6.01
N	10700
C: Low-Skilled Non-Cit Personal Services Workers Log Wage	
Secure Communities	0.035
	(0.036)
Mean Y	5.82
N	6745

Notes: Data are from the 2005-2014 American Community Survey. The sample includes individuals aged 20-64 and the data is collapsed at the PUMA by year level. The model includes PUMA fixed effects, year fixed effects, PUMA-year controls, and PUMA characteristics trends. The PUMA-year controls include: labor demand controls, housing price controls, and 287(g) programs at the PUMA level. The PUMA characteristics trends include interactions of time trends with the change in PUMA characteristics between 2000 and 2005 (this include: labor force participation rate, share of citizens, blacks, non-citizens, individuals with children and young children, individuals working more than 50 and 60 hours, total people and women with a college degree, masters degree, and a Ph.D.). The results are weighted by the PUMA population in 2000. Standard errors clustered at the PUMA level in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 5: Effect of SC on Labor Supply of Low Impact Population Groups

	Work > 0 Hours	Usual Hours Worked
A: High-Skilled Men		
Secure Communities	-0.146	-0.030
	(0.103)	(0.064)
Mean Y	93.01	41.29
N	2214982	2214982
B: High-Skilled Women with No Children		
Secure Communities	-0.103	-0.027
	(0.159)	(0.085)
Mean Y	87.67	34.85
N	1344120	1344120

Notes: Data are from the 2005-2014 American Community Survey. The sample includes U.S. citizen men and women with a college degree or more aged 20-64. The model includes PUMA fixed effects, year fixed effects, PUMA-year controls, PUMA characteristics trends and demographic controls. The PUMA-year controls include: labor demand controls, housing price controls, and 287(g) programs at the PUMA level. The PUMA characteristics trends include interactions of time trends with the change in PUMA characteristics between 2000 and 2005 (this include: labor force participation rate, share of citizens, blacks, non-citizens, individuals with children and young children, individuals working more than 50 and 60 hours, total people and women with a college degree, masters degree, and a Ph.D.). The individual demographic controls include: age, number of kids, number of kids under age 6, educational attainment, marital status, and race. The results are weighted using the individual-level weights in the ACS. Standard errors clustered at the PUMA level in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 6: Effect of SC on High-Skilled Women's Labor Supply by Female Low-Skilled Non-Citizen Population Intensity

	Work > 0 Hours	Usual Hours Worked
A: Kids of Any Age		
Secure Communities	-0.300	-0.055
	(0.214)	(0.104)
share LSNC*SC	-1.355	-1.188
	(3.116)	(1.486)
Mean Y	83.00	31.12
N	1212842	1212842
B: Kids Under 6		
Secure Communities	-0.326	-0.142
	(0.425)	(0.186)
share LSNC*SC	-8.926	-5.327**
	(5.443)	(2.699)
Mean Y	78.98	28.78
N	392473	392473

Notes: Data are from the 2005-2014 American Community Survey. The sample includes U.S. citizen mothers with a college degree or more aged 20-64. The model includes PUMA fixed effects, year fixed effects, PUMA-year controls, PUMA characteristics trends and demographic controls. The PUMA-year controls include: labor demand controls, housing price controls, and 287(g) programs at the PUMA level. The PUMA characteristics trends include interactions of time trends with the change in PUMA characteristics between 2000 and 2005 (this include: labor force participation rate, share of citizens, blacks, non-citizens, individuals with children and young children, individuals working more than 50 and 60 hours, total people and women with a college degree, masters degree, and a Ph.D.). The individual demographic controls include: age, number of kids, number of kids under age 6, educational attainment, marital status, and race. The results are weighted using the individual-level weights in the ACS. Standard errors clustered at the PUMA level in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 7: Effect on Mothers with Young Kids by State of Birth vs. State of Residence

	Work > 0 Hours	Usual Hours Worked
A: Any Kids		
Secure Communities	-0.178	0.012
	(0.212)	(0.100)
SC * State Birth NOT = State Resid	-0.334*	-0.213**
	(0.189)	(0.086)
Mean Y	83.00	31.12
Fraction State Birth NOT = State Resid	52.07	52.07
N	1212842	1212842
B: Kids Under 6		
Secure Communities	-0.500	-0.266
	(0.380)	(0.168)
SC * State Birth NOT = State Resid	-0.310	-0.147
	(0.344)	(0.146)
Mean Y	78.98	28.78
Fraction State Birth NOT = State Resid	49.29	49.29
N	392473	392473

Notes: Data are from the 2005-2014 American Community Survey. The sample includes U.S. citizen mothers with a college degree or more aged 20-64. The model includes PUMA fixed effects, year fixed effects, PUMA-year controls, PUMA characteristics trends and demographic controls. The PUMA-year controls include: labor demand controls, housing price controls, and 287(g) programs at the PUMA level. The PUMA characteristics trends include interactions of time trends with the change in PUMA characteristics between 2000 and 2005 (this include: labor force participation rate, share of citizens, blacks, non-citizens, individuals with children and young children, individuals working more than 50 and 60 hours, total people and women with a college degree, masters degree, and a Ph.D.). The individual demographic controls include: age, number of kids, number of kids under age 6, educational attainment, marital status, and race. The results are weighted using the individual-level weights in the ACS. Standard errors clustered at the PUMA level in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 8: Effect of SC on High-Skilled Women's Time Use

	Care HH Children	Household Activities	Leisure Activites
A: Kids of Any Age			
Secure Communities	-0.661	-0.113	-2.183
	(0.975)	(0.992)	(1.346)
Mean Y	13.57	16.14	22.04
N	4270	4270	4270
B: Kids Under 6			
Secure Communities	-1.527	0.113	-2.545
	(1.655)	(1.465)	(1.940)
Mean Y	19.87	15.08	20.71
N	1988	1988	1988

Notes: Data are from the 2005-2014 American Time Use Survey. The sample includes all U.S. citizen women with a college degree or more ages 20-64. The model include county fixed effects, year fixed effects, month fixed effects, county characteristics trends and whether the interview was conducted during the weekend. Additionally, we include demographic controls of age, number of kids, number of kids under age 6, educational attainment, marital status, and race. We also include labor demand controls, housing price controls, and 287(g) programs at the county level. The results are weighted using the ATUS person weights. Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 9: Long-Run Effect of SC around Birth on Labor Supply of High-Skilled Citizen Mothers

	Work > 0 Hours	Usual Hours Worked	Log Weekly Wages
A: Youngest Child Age 3−5			
SC when Youngest Aged 0−2	-0.368	-0.283**	-0.015**
	(0.281)	(0.129)	(0.007)
Mean Y	80.21	29.41	7.07
P-Value	0.19	0.03	0.02
N	215705	215705	163448
B: Youngest Child Age 6−9			
SC when Youngest Aged 0−2	-0.117	-0.072	0.001
	(0.305)	(0.150)	(0.007)
Mean Y	84.24	31.23	7.07
P-Value	0.70	0.63	0.84
N	178710	178710	142714

Notes: Data are from the 2005-2017 American Community Survey. The sample includes U.S. citizen mothers with a college degree or more aged 20-64.The model includes PUMA fixed effects, year fixed effects, year of birth of the youngest child fixed effects. PUMA-year controls, PUMA characteristics trends and demographic controls. The PUMA-year controls include: labor demand controls, housing price controls, and 287(g) programs at the PUMA level. The PUMA characteristics trends include interactions of time trends with the change in PUMA characteristics between 2000 and 2005 (this include: labor force participation rate, share of citizens, blacks, non-citizens, individuals with children and young children, individuals working more than 50 and 60 hours, total people and women with a college degree, masters degree, and a Ph.D.). The demographic controls include: age, number of kids, number of kids under age 6, educational attainment, marital status, and race. The results are weighted using the individual-level weights in the ACS. Standard errors clustered at the PUMA level in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

A Control Variables Description

In the baseline regressions, we include controls for labor demand as well as housing prices. We construct four Bartik-style measures of labor demand that correspond to the following four demographic groups: 1) all working-age adults, 2) foreign-born working-age adults, 3) working-age women with a college degree or more, and 4) working-age men with a college degree or more. For each group, we calculate the PUMA-level employment by industry, as a fraction of total PUMA employment in 2005. We then apply to these industry shares the changes in national employment for the full national sample of working age adults for each industry over time, to obtain a measure of predicted changes in local labor demand. The housing prices information comes from the Federal Housing Finance Agency and is available at the county by year level, which we aggregate up to the PUMA level using a similar weighting process as described in the main text for the SC and 287(g) variables.

B Additional Results

Figure A1: Rollout of Jail 287(g) Model by Year

Notes: Counties with a Jail 287(g) agreement based on January of each year are shaded. See text for sources.

Figure A2: Rollout of Task Force 287(g) Model by Year



Notes: Counties with a Task Force 287(g) agreement based on January of each year are shaded. See text for sources.

Figure A3: Fraction of Household Worker's who are Low-Skilled Non-Citizens across the Wage Distribution



Notes: Data are from the 2005 American Community Survey. The sample includes all individuals aged 20-64 who report working in the personal service industry or occupation. Fraction of workers in each wage percentile bin (0-5, 6-15, etc) that are low-skilled non-citizens shown. The results are weighted using individual survey weights.

Table A1: Deportees by Most Serious Criminal Conviction, 2008-2014

MSCC	Share of Deportees (percent)
None	17.45
Traffic	5.57
Immigration	7.67
DUI	11.50
Marijuana	4.63
Other	53.18

Notes: This table and notes are reprinted from East et al. (2018). Data on deportees comes from individual listings of all deportations under SC from TRAC records. This table summarizes the share of deportees by most serious criminal conviction. These categories include no criminal conviction, convictions for traffic offenses, convictions for immigration-related offenses, driving under the influence, and marijuana-related convictions. Note that the most serious criminal conviction may be, but is not necessarily, the crime for which the deportee was initially apprehended.

Table A2: Effect of SC on High-Skilled Women's Fertility

	Birth Last 12 Months	Num Kids Under 5
A: Enforcement- January		
Secure Communities	0.001	0.003**
	(0.001)	(0.002)
Mean Y	0.06	0.20
N	1768834	2556962
B: Enforcement- Fraction Current Year		
Secure Communities	0.002	0.003
	(0.001)	(0.002)
Mean Y	0.06	0.20
N	1768834	2556962
C: Enforcement- Fraction Last Year		
Secure Communities	0.001	0.003
	(0.001)	(0.002)
Mean Y	0.06	0.20
N	1768834	2556962

Notes: Data are from the 2005-2014 American Community Survey. The sample includes all U.S. citizen women with a college degree or more aged 20-64. All models include PUMA fixed effects, and year fixed effects. The PUMA-year controls include: labor demand controls, housing price controls, and 287(g) programs at the PUMA level. The PUMA characteristics trends include interactions of time trends with the change in PUMA characteristics between 2000 and 2005 (this include: labor force participation rate, share of citizens, blacks, non-citizens, individuals with children and young children, individuals working more than 50 and 60 hours, total people and women with a college degree, masters degree, and a Ph.D.). The individual demographic controls include: age, number of kids, educational attainment, marital status, and race. The results are weighted using the individual-level weights in the ACS. Standard errors clustered at the PUMA level in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A3: Effect of SC on High-Skilled Women's Labor Supply, Additional Outcomes

	Usual Hours if Working	Work > 50 Hours	Work > 60 Hours	Work > 50 Hours if Working	Work > 60 Hours if Working
A: Full Sample					
Secure Communities	0.018	-0.060	-0.087	-0.015	-0.088
	(0.047)	(0.128)	(0.075)	(0.147)	(0.087)
Mean Y	38.72	14.60	4.49	17.08	5.25
N	2175199	2556962	2556962	2175199	2175199
B: Kids of Any Age					
Secure Communities	0.020	-0.218	-0.029	-0.204	-0.022
	(0.070)	(0.168)	(0.099)	(0.200)	(0.119)
Mean Y	37.50	12.33	3.54	14.86	4.27
N	1008296	1215978	1215978	1008296	1008296
C: Kids Under 6					
Secure Communities	-0.157	-0.177	0.088	-0.139	0.129
	(0.125)	(0.267)	(0.156)	(0.331)	(0.196)
Mean Y	36.44	9.86	2.51	12.48	3.18
N	310084	393517	393517	310084	310084

Notes: Data are from the 2005-2014 American Community Survey. The sample includes all U.S. citizen women with a college degree or more aged 20-64. All models include PUMA fixed effects, and year fixed effects. The PUMA-year controls include: labor demand controls, housing price controls, and 287(g) programs at the PUMA level. The PUMA characteristics trends include interactions of time trends with the change in PUMA characteristics between 2000 and 2005 (this include: labor force participation rate, share of citizens, blacks, non-citizens, individuals with children and young children, individuals working more than 50 and 60 hours, total people and women with a college degree, masters degree, and a Ph.D.). The individual demographic controls include: age, number of kids, number of kids under age 6, educational attainment, marital status, and race. The results are weighted using the individual-level weights in the ACS. Standard errors clustered at the PUMA level in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A4: Effect of SC on High-Skilled Women's Labor Supply, Robustness to Timing

	Work > 0 Hours	Usual Hours Worked
A: Any Kids, January		
Secure Communities	-0.350*	-0.099
	(0.182)	(0.088)
Mean Y	83.00	31.12
N	1212842	1212842
B: Any Kids, Fraction Current Year		
Secure Communities	-0.239	-0.025
	(0.221)	(0.108)
Mean Y	83.00	31.12
N	1212842	1212842
C: Any Kids, Fraction Last Year		
Secure Communities	-0.242	-0.120
	(0.241)	(0.118)
Mean Y	83.00	31.12
N	1212842	1212842
D: Kids Under 6, January		
Secure Communities	-0.659*	-0.341**
	(0.355)	(0.154)
Mean Y	78.98	28.78
N	392473	392473
E: Kids Under 6, Fraction Current Year		
Secure Communities	-0.150	-0.117
	(0.442)	(0.188)
Mean Y	78.98	28.78
N	392473	392473
F: Kids Under 6, Fraction Last Year		
Secure Communities	-0.878**	-0.406**
	(0.441)	(0.196)
Mean Y	78.98	28.78
N	392473	392473

Notes: Data are from the 2005-2014 American Community Survey. The sample includes all U.S. citizen women with a college degree or more aged 20-64. All models include PUMA fixed effects, and year fixed effects. The PUMA-year controls include: labor demand controls, housing price controls, and 287(g) programs at the PUMA level. The PUMA characteristics trends include interactions of time trends with the change in PUMA characteristics between 2000 and 2005 (this include: labor force participation rate, share of citizens, blacks, non-citizens, individuals with children and young children, individuals working more than 50 and 60 hours, total people and women with a college degree, masters degree, and a Ph.D.). The individual demographic controls include: age, number of kids, number of kids under age 6, educational attainment, marital status, and race. The results are weighted using the individual-level weights in the ACS. Standard errors clustered at the PUMA level in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A5: Effect of SC on High Skill Women's Labor Supply, Robustness to Dropping Early Adopter SC

	Work > 0 Hours	Usual Hours Worked
A: Kids of Any Age, Full Sample		
Secure Communities	-0.350*	-0.099
	(0.182)	(0.088)
Mean Y	83.00	31.12
N	1212842	1212842
B: Kids of Any Age, Drop Early Adopter SC		
Secure Communities	-0.215	-0.110
	(0.236)	(0.114)
Mean Y	83.42	31.10
N	939415	939415
C: Kids Under 6, Full Sample		
Secure Communities	-0.659*	-0.341**
	(0.355)	(0.154)
Mean Y	78.98	28.78
N	392473	392473
D: Kids Under 6, Drop Early Adopter SC		
Secure Communities	-0.254	-0.289
	(0.459)	(0.208)
Mean Y	79.40	28.76
N	305176	305176

Notes: Data are from the 2005-2014 American Community Survey. The sample includes all U.S. citizen women with a college degree or more aged 20-64. All models include PUMA fixed effects, and year fixed effects. The PUMA-year controls include: labor demand controls, housing price controls, and 287(g) programs at the PUMA level. The PUMA characteristics trends include interactions of time trends with the change in PUMA characteristics between 2000 and 2005 (this include: labor force participation rate, share of citizens, blacks, non-citizens, individuals with children and young children, individuals working more than 50 and 60 hours, total people and women with a college degree, masters degree, and a Ph.D.). The individual demographic controls include: age, number of kids, number of kids under age 6, educational attainment, marital status, and race. The results are weighted using the individual-level weights in the ACS. Standard errors clustered at the PUMA level in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A6: Effect of SC on High Skill Women's Labor Supply, Robustness to Alternative Housing Price Controls

	Work > 0 Hours	Usual Hours Worked
A: Kids of Any Age, Baseline		
Secure Communities	-0.350*	-0.099
	(0.182)	(0.088)
Mean Y	83.00	31.12
N	1212842	1212842
B: Kids of Any Age, State Housing Prices		
Secure Communities	-0.362**	-0.101
	(0.183)	(0.089)
Mean Y	83.00	31.12
N	1213275	1213275
C: Kids of Any Age, State Leave Out PUMA Housing Prices		
Secure Communities	-0.334*	-0.091
	(0.184)	(0.088)
Mean Y	82.98	31.12
N	1201624	1201624
D: Kids Under 6, Baseline		
Secure Communities	-0.659*	-0.341**
	(0.355)	(0.154)
Mean Y	78.98	28.78
N	392473	392473
E: Kids Under 6, State Housing Prices		
Secure Communities	-0.677*	-0.346**
	(0.354)	(0.154)
Mean Y	78.98	28.78
N	392637	392637
F: Kids Under 6, State Leave Out PUMA Housing Prices		
Secure Communities	-0.625*	-0.324**
	(0.354)	(0.154)
Mean Y	78.98	28.80
N	388302	388302

Notes: Data are from the 2005-2014 American Community Survey. The sample includes all U.S. citizen women with a college degree or more aged 20-64. All models include PUMA fixed effects, and year fixed effects. The PUMA-year controls include: labor demand controls, housing price controls, and 287(g) programs at the PUMA level. The PUMA characteristics trends include interactions of time trends with the change in PUMA characteristics between 2000 and 2005 (this include: labor force participation rate, share of citizens, blacks, non-citizens, individuals with children and young children, individuals working more than 50 and 60 hours, total people and women with a college degree, masters degree, and a Ph.D.). The individual demographic controls include: age, number of kids, number of kids under age 6, educational attainment, marital status, and race. The results are weighted using the individual-level weights in the ACS. Standard errors clustered at the PUMA level in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A7: Effect of SC on High-Skilled Women's Labor Supply, By Age of Youngest Child

	Work > 0 Hours	Usual Hours Worked
A: Youngest Kid 0-2		
Secure Communities	-0.778*	-0.440**
	(0.424)	(0.194)
Mean Y	78.85	28.73
P-Value	0.07	0.02
N	268524	268524
B: Youngest Kid 3-5		
Secure Communities	-0.261	-0.163
	(0.502)	(0.225)
Mean Y	79.65	29.05
P-Value	0.60	0.47
N	179463	179463

Notes: Data are from the 2005-2014 American Community Survey. The sample includes all U.S. citizen women with a college degree or more aged 20-64. All models include PUMA fixed effects, and year fixed effects. The PUMA-year controls include: labor demand controls, housing price controls, and 287(g) programs at the PUMA level. The PUMA characteristics trends include interactions of time trends with the change in PUMA characteristics between 2000 and 2005 (this include: labor force participation rate, share of citizens, blacks, non-citizens, individuals with children and young children, individuals working more than 50 and 60 hours, total people and women with a college degree, masters degree, and a Ph.D.). The individual demographic controls include: age, number of kids, number of kids under age 6, educational attainment, marital status, and race. The results are weighted using the individual-level weights in the ACS. Standard errors clustered at the PUMA level in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A8: Long-Run Effect of SC around Birth on Labor Supply of High-Skilled Citizen Fathers

	Work > 0 Hours	Usual Hours Worked	Log Weekly Wages
A: Youngest Child Age 3−5			
SC when Youngest Aged 0−2	-0.070	-0.136	-0.007
	(0.115)	(0.093)	(0.006)
Mean Y	97.76	45.08	7.55
P-Value	0.55	0.14	0.24
N	176777	176777	165477
B: Youngest Child Age 6−9			
SC when Youngest Aged 0−2	-0.074	-0.045	0.004
	(0.141)	(0.113)	(0.007)
Mean Y	97.53	44.87	7.61
P-Value	0.60	0.69	0.60
N	144887	144887	134956

Notes: Data are from the 2005-2017 American Community Survey. The sample includes U.S. citizen fathers with a college degree or more aged 20-64.The model includes PUMA fixed effects, year fixed effects, year of birth of the youngest child fixed effects. PUMA-year controls, PUMA characteristics trends and demographic controls. The PUMA-year controls include: labor demand controls, housing price controls, and 287(g) programs at the PUMA level. The PUMA characteristics trends include interactions of time trends with the change in PUMA characteristics between 2000 and 2005 (this include: labor force participation rate, share of citizens, blacks, non-citizens, individuals with children and young children, individuals working more than 50 and 60 hours, total people and women with a college degree, masters degree, and a Ph.D.). The individual demographic controls include: age, number of kids, number of kids under age 6, educational attainment, marital status, and race. The results are weighted using the individual-level weights in the ACS. Standard errors clustered at the PUMA level in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01