**Preliminary Draft**

# Immigration Enforcement, Police Trust and Domestic Violence

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**Abstract**

Domestic violence is a serious under-reported crime in the U.S., and undocumented women are particularly prone to this type of violence given their low socio-economic status and frequent dependence on their partners' income. While immigrant survivors qualify for protections under the 1994 Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), recent immigration policies have affected their reluctance to seek assistance for fear of deportation. We use data on VAWA self-petitions, along with information on immigration enforcement and Trust Acts or alike regulations creating the so-called sanctuary cities, to identify the impact of both types of immigration policies on the rate of VAWA-self petitions between the year 2000 and 2016. We find that a one standard deviation increase in immigration enforcement lowers the VAWA self-petition rate by approximately 5 percent, whereas the adoption of more permissive Trust Act and alike regulations counteracts that effect by raising the share by close to 2 percent.

**Keywords:** Immigration Enforcement, Trust Acts, Undocumented Immigration, United States.

**JEL codes:** J12, J16, J15, K37.

The past decades have witnessed an extraordinary growth in immigration enforcement that relies heavily on state and local law enforcement to apprehend undocumented

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immigrants. Police testimony, anecdotal reports, and empirical research suggest local police involvement in immigration enforcement increases fear and mistrust among immigrant communities, reducing their willingness to engage with the police (Nguyen and Gill 2016). In response, a number of states have pushed for and adopted the so-called *Trust Acts*. Trust Acts are policies intended to increase community trust and cooperation with the police following the implementation of immigration enforcement measures promoting information sharing between local, state, and federal agencies.

Mistrust has become particularly palpable among immigrants victims of domestic violence (LAPD 2009). Domestic violence is a serious under-reported crime in the United States, with an average of 20 people being physically abused by an intimate partner every minute.[3] Undocumented women are particularly prone to this type of violence given their low socio-economic status and frequent dependence on their partners' income –traits linked to domestic violence (Aizer 2010).[4] In addition, partners of undocumented immigrant women, to ensure they do not leave an abusive relationship, often use immigration status as a control mechanism.[5] While immigrant survivors still qualify for protections under the 1994 Violence Against Women Act (VAWA),[6] intensified enforcement has exacerbated their reluctance to seek assistance for fear of deportation (Orloff *et al.* 1995). This situation might have only gotten worse with Attorney General Jeff Sessions' decision to deny protection from deportation on the grounds of domestic violence on June 11, 2018.[7]

Our aim is to answer the following policy questions: Has the intensification of immigration enforcement inhibited VAWA self-petitions by immigrants possibly fearful of

[3] Domestic violence national statistics retrieved from www.ncadv.org
[4] According to the National Violence Against Women Survey (NVAWS), 23.4 percent Hispanic/Latino females are victimized by intimate partner violence in a lifetime. 48 percent of Latinas reported that their partner's violence against them had increased since they immigrated to the United States (Tjaden and Thoennes 2000).
[5] See: https://www.nationallatinonetwork.org/safety-planning/systems-based-safety-and-security-from-the-aggressor/143-english/facts-statistics
[6] Under the 1994 VAWA, undocumented immigrant victims of domestic abuse can petition for legal status without relying on the sponsoring of their abusive citizen/legal permanent resident spouse, parent or child.
[7] See: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/11/us/politics/sessions-domestic-violence-asylum.html

deportation? If so, has the subsequent adoption of Trust Acts by some localities helped counteract such impacts? Understanding how domestic violence reports respond to these policy measures is crucial in ensuring public safety and human rights, regardless of immigration status.

To our knowledge, this is the first study examining how tougher immigration enforcement, as well as the subsequent Trust Acts creating the so-called sanctuary cities, might impact VAWA self-petitions. As such, it contributes to the growing literature analyzing the impact of immigration enforcement on undocumented immigrants (e.g. (Amuedo-Dorantes *et al*. 2018; Amuedo-Dorantes and Arenas-Arroyo 2018; Amuedo-Dorantes and Lopez 2017b), as well as to our understanding of the impact of sanctuary cities (Wong 2017).

In addition, the analysis makes an important contribution to the domestic violence literature focused on examining how domestic violence reporting responds to policy changes. Miller and Segal (2016) show that having more female officers increases the number of domestic violence incidents reported to the police. In our case, we explore how the adoption of tougher immigration enforcement policies, followed in some instances by the passage of Trust Acts or alike regulations that convert cities and counties into the so-called sanctuary cities, might affect VAWA self-petitions filed by undocumented immigrants to the police. Understanding these impacts is crucial given the current policy environment of heightened immigration enforcement and the announcement by the June 11, 2018 Administration's decision to deny protection from deportation on the grounds of domestic violence.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the data and Section 2 the empirical methodology. Section 3 presents the main findings, as well as the results from a number of identification and robustness checks. Finally, Section 4 concludes the study.

## 1. Data and Descriptive Statistics

We combine state-level data on VAWA self-petitions over the 2000-2016 period, with two population-weighted indexes: one created using detailed data on interior immigration enforcement measures at the local and state levels, and another one using information on Trust Acts enacted at the state level and sanctuary cities.

**1.1 VAWA Self-Petitions:** Data on VAWA self-petitions come from the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and were obtained through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. Figure 1 displays the mean share of VAWA self-petitions per one thousand immigrants computed using the state-year shares. Overall, since their inception, the share of VAWA self-petitions overall rose to reach a peak around 2007. From 2008 onward, coinciding with the implementation of Secure Communities and the intensification of interior immigration enforcement,[8] the share dropped until 2014 –when prioritized immigration enforcement (Priority Enforcement Program, PEP) was announced by the Department of Homeland Security Secretary, Jeh Johnson, as a replacement for Secure Communities.[9] On average, as shown in Table 1, yearly VAWA self-petitions averaged 0.21 per 1,000 foreign-born –that is, 21 per 100,000 immigrants, over the period under consideration at the state level.

**1.2 Immigration Enforcement:** We collect historical data on various immigration enforcement measures detailed in Table A in the Appendix. Data on 287(g) agreements at the county and state levels is gathered from the ICEs 287(g) Fact Sheet website,[10] and Kostandini *et al*. (2013). Data on the rolling of the Secure Communities program at the

[8] As we shall explain in what follows, Secure Communities is one of the various interior immigration enforcement programs adopted by the Department of Homeland Security over the time period under examination. It relies on partnerships among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to ensure the identification and removal of undocumented immigrants. The program, which has been responsible for the large increase in deportations between 2008 and 2014, was replaced by the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP) in 2015. On January 25, 2017, it was reinstated by the Department of Homeland Security per an executive order signed by President Donald Trump.

[9] PEP is an Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE) program that works with state and local law enforcement to identify for removal migrants who come into contact with law enforcement and are among the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) immigration enforcement priorities.

[10] https://www.ice.gov/factsheets/287g

county level is compiled from ICE's releases on activated jurisdictions.[11] Once it reaches nationwide coverage, Secure Communities is replaced by the Priority Enforcement Program in 2015. Finally, data on state level omnibus immigration laws is gathered from the National Conference of State Legislatures.[12]

Since these immigration policies have been enacted at different geographic levels and points in time, we construct an index that serves as a proxy for the intensification of immigration enforcement and provides several advantages over inclusion of multiple policy indicators.[13] *First*, the index not only addresses the distinct geographic coverage of various measures (some at the county level, others at the state level) through the construction of a population weighted measure of immigration enforcement but, in addition, it accounts for the number of months each measure was in place in that particular year. In that manner, it allows us to capture the depth and intensity of immigration enforcement in a given MSA, as opposed to just whether enforcement existed or not. *Second*, immigration enforcement is an interconnected system administered by various federal, state, and local authorities and agencies with similar missions and, some measures, such as Secure Communities, were enacted as a continuum of prior existing measures, like the 287(g) program. Not only are the various immigration enforcement initiatives correlated but, in addition, the effectiveness of any given measure is often linked to its combination with other initiatives. The index allows us to better address this interconnectedness by combining the various policies into an index. *Third*, the index provides a more manageable and comprehensive way of measuring and assessing the overall impact of intensified interior immigration.

[11] See: https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/sc-activated.pdf
[12] See: http://www.ncsl.org/documents/statefed/omnibus_laws.pdf
[13] It is worth noting that the index is a proxy of the intensity of immigration enforcement to which respondents in a particular MSA might be exposed to. At the end of the day, the true intensity of any enforcement measure will inevitably vary across jurisdictions as each one is different and might implement alike measures more or less strictly depending on who is in charge of its implementation or other unobserved local traits. To address that limitation, we include area fixed-effects as well as area-specific time trends intended to capture such idiosyncrasies.

To construct our index, we calculate the following population-weighted index for each enforcement initiative *k*:

(1) $$IE^{k}{}_{st} = \frac{1}{N_{2000}} \sum_{c \in s}^{S} \frac{1}{12} \sum_{m=1}^{12} \mathbf{1}(E_{m,c}) P_{c,2000}$$

where $\mathbf{1}(E_{m,c})$ is an indicator function that informs about the implementation of a particular policy in county *c* during month *m* in year *t*. The index $IE^{k}{}_{st}$ takes into account: (1) the number of months during which policy *k* was in place in year *t*,[14] as well as (2) the size of the state's population affected by its implementation.[15] The overall enforcement to which women living in state *s* and year *t* are exposed to is then computed as the sum of the indices for each enforcement initiative at the (state, year) level:[16]

(2) $$Total\ Enforcement_{s,t} = \ IE_{s,t} = \sum_{k \in K}^{K} IE_{s,t}^{k}$$

Figure 2 displays the evolution of interior immigration enforcement as captured by the index from equation (2) over the time period under examination. Interior immigration enforcement took off after 2006, following the rolling adoption of 287(g) agreements and, later on, Secure Communities, reaching a peak around 2012. Over the period under examination, the intensity of police-based immigration enforcement averaged 0.21 (see Table 1).[17]

**1.3 Trust Acts and Sanctuary Cities:** We also collect data on the various cities, counties, and states that have adopted laws –also called Trust Acts, ordinances, regulations, resolutions,

[14] Specifically, the summation over the 12 months in the year captures the share of months during which the measure was in place in any given year.

[15] To weigh it population-wise, we use the term: $P_{c,2000}$ –namely, the population of county *c* according to the 2000 Census (prior to the rolling of any of the enforcement initiatives being considered), and *N* –the total population in state *s*.

[16] Where *k* refers to each policy, *i.e.*: 287(g) local agreements, 287(g) state agreements, Secure Communities, Omnibus Immigration Laws.

[17] The index values ranged from 0 (no enforcement) to 3.98 (close to full-year state-wide implementation of all four police-based immigration enforcement measures being considered).

policies, or other practices to limit their cooperation with federal immigration authorities.[18, 19] This is often done by refusing to observe ICE detainers.[20] Because these regulations are intended to palliate the impact of tougher interior immigration enforcement initiatives, we opt to construct a separate index to gauge their impact. Specifically, using information on the adoption of such practices, along with equation (1), we construct a population-weighted index indicative of the presence of a Trust Acts or sanctuary city, which we refer to as: $TA_{s,t}$.[21] Figure 2 displays the evolution of Trust Acts and sanctuary cities, which takes off after a peak in interior immigration enforcement and seems to stabilize after 2014. Because the vast majority of Trust Acts creating the so-called sanctuary cities were not enacted until 2013, the share of the immigrant population residing in sanctuary areas averaged 5 percent between 2000 and 2016 (see Table 1).[22]

## 2. Methodology

We exploit the temporal and geographic variation in the adoption of both tougher interior immigration enforcement measures and Trust Acts or alike regulations to gauge their impact on the rate of VAWA self-petitions. To that end, we estimate the following model using panel data for the 2000-2016 period:

$$(3) \qquad y_{s,t} = \alpha + \beta_1\ IE_{s,t} + \beta_2\ TA_{s,t} + X'_{s,t}\ \beta_3 + \gamma_s + \theta_t + \gamma_s t + \varepsilon_{s,t}$$

[18] See: https://cis.org/Map-Sanctuary-Cities-Counties-and-States

[19] For instance, California Senate Bill 54 effectively makes California a "sanctuary state" by legalizing and standardizing state-wide non-cooperation policies between California law enforcement agencies and federal immigration authorities. See: https://www.fairus.org/legislation/state-local-legislation/california-sanctuary-state-bill-sb-54-summary-and-history

[20] An ICE detainer—or "immigration hold"—is one of the tools used by ICE to apprehend individuals who come in contact with local and state law enforcement agencies. It is a written request that a local jail or other law enforcement agency detain an individual for an additional 48 hours (excluding weekends and holidays) after his or her release date in order to provide ICE agents extra time to decide whether to take the individual into federal custody for removal purposes.

[21] Where *k* refers to whether the adoption of the policy occurred state-wide or locally, *i.e.*: state-wide Trust Acts and local ordinances, regulations, resolutions, policies, or practices.

[22] Table 1 also displays the means and standard deviations for other controls included in our study. For instance, population wise, the states in our sample have, on average, 10 percent Hispanics and 6 percent unemployment rates.

where $y_{s,t}$ is our outcome variable – the share of VAWA self-petitions per 1,000 foreign born population in state *s* and year *t*. The vector $IE_{s,t}$ represents the immigration enforcement index capturing the intensity of enforcement to which individuals living in state *s* in year *t* are exposed to according to equation (2). $TA_{s,t}$ represents the Trust Act/sanctuary city index, and it captures the share of individuals in state *s* and year *t* covered by Trust Acts or residing in sanctuary localities.

In addition to our key controls, equation (3) includes a vector of state-level time-varying characteristics ($i.e.\ X_{s,t}$).[23] The latter include: the ratio of female to male wages constructed following Aizer (2010)[24], the annual unemployment rate in the state and the natural log of per capita income in the state and year. These are included to identify the impact of relative income separately from the impact of general economic conditions in the state. We also include a series of race and ethnicity controls capturing the share of Hispanics, blacks and Asians, as well as the natural log of the number of women between the ages of 15 and 44 in the state in a given year. Lastly, the vector $X_{s,t}$ includes information on the natural log of non-intimate homicides to address secular trends in violent crime.

Finally, equation (3) includes a series of state and year fixed effects, as well as state-specific linear trends. Combined, the aforementioned controls allow us to capture statewide policy changes, such as welfare reform, expansions in the EITC, changes in Medicaid eligibility, or state laws regarding the prosecution of domestic violence. They also address linear trends in domestic violence. Our observations are weighted by the foreign born population in the cell, and standards errors are clustered at the state level.

[23] Table B in the Appendix defines each additional regressor and its source.

[24] Following Aizer (2010), we construct the ratio of female to male wages. This measure overcomes the endogeneity of individual wages and accounts for the fact that theory predicts that potential, not actual, wages affect domestic violence. The measure is reflects the exogenous demand for female and male labor, and it is based on the index of labor demand originally proposed by (Bartik 1991). Exploiting the history of sex and race segregation by industry, we construct measures of local labor market wages of women (men) based on wage changes in industries dominated by women (men).

## 3. Immigration Policy and VAWA Self-Petitions

### 3.1. Preliminary Findings

Our preliminary results from estimating equation (3) are shown in Table 2. The first model specification does not include any of the state-level time-varying traits that might be considered endogenous, whereas the second model specification does. Both model specifications include state and year fixed-effects, as well as state-specific time trends to account for any unobserved state-level time-varying traits not accounted for in our modeling.

Regardless of the model specification used, the estimated coefficients reveal the damage caused by intensified immigration enforcement, as well as the important role played by Trust Acts and alike regulations in counteracting undocumented immigrants' fear to report to the police in the midst of intensified enforcement. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in immigration enforcement, approximately equal to two-thirds of the average increase in interior immigration enforcement over the 2000-2016 period we examine, curbs the rate of VAWA self-petitions by 5.5 percent, whereas the subsequent creation of sanctuary cities helped raise the rate of petitions by close to 2 percent.

### 3.2. Identification Challenges

One of the main underlying assumptions in our empirical strategy is that differences in the VAWA self-reports across states did not predate the adoption of intensified immigration enforcement or the enactment of Trust Acts and alike regulations. To asses if that was the case, we estimate equation (4), which adds a full set of dummies spanning from four years prior to the adoption of any immigration enforcement or Trust Act initiative in the state in question to the controls in equation (3), as follows:

$$(4) \quad y_{s,t} = \alpha + \sum_{b=-4}^{-1} \delta_b^{IE} D\_IE_{s,b} + \sum_{b=-4}^{-1} \delta_b^{TA} D\_TA_{s,b} + \beta_1 IE_{s,t} + \beta_2 TA_{s,t} + X'_{s,t} \beta_3 + \\ + \gamma_s + \theta_t + \gamma_s t + \varepsilon_{s,t}$$

where $D\_IE_{s,b}$ is a dummy for $b$ years prior to the enforcement index turning positive and $D\_TA_{s,b}$ is a dummy for $b$ years prior to the Trust Act index turning positive.

Table 3 shows the results from estimating equation (4) via OLS. It is evident that reductions in VAWA self-petitions did not take predate the adoption of tougher immigration enforcement measures by the states, as none of the coefficients for the years preceding the adoption of tougher immigration enforcement are statistically different from zero. Furthermore, the point estimate on the immigration enforcement index continues to be statistically different from zero, with the same one standard deviation increase in immigration enforcement lowering the VAWA self-petition rate by approximately 10 percent. Similarly, the estimates in Table 3 confirm that the positive impact of Trust Acts and alike regulations in promoting the VAWA self-petitions did not precede the adoption of those policies by the states. Rather, despite the inclusion of the additional placebo indicators, the point estimate on the Trust Act regressor is still statistically different from zero and of alike magnitude to the estimate in the second model specification of Table 2.

Another concern when assessing the impact of policies, especially when focusing on a migrant population, is the endogenous exposure to the policies. This endogeneity might stem from the non-random adoption of immigration policies by cities, counties and states, as well as the self-selection of migrants into different locations. For example, undocumented migrants might be sensitive to immigration enforcement due to the inherent risk of deportation in areas with tougher enforcement. Since migrants, especially undocumented ones, are a relatively mobile population, they might move in response to the adopted enforcement measures. In those instances, exposure to tougher immigration enforcement, in itself, is likely to be endogenous and, in the example just given, result in a downward biased estimate of the impact of intensified immigration enforcement on self-petitions. By the same

token, undocumented migrants might feel attracted to more permissive sanctuary locations. If that is the case, the impact of those policies might be overstated.

To assess the degree to which our estimates might be biased due to the non-random adoption of policies and the also non-random residential choices made by undocumented immigrants, we instrument migrants' likely exposure to the two types of immigration policies being examined using information on what their probable residential choices would have been in the absence of such measures. To that end, we utilize information on the past residential locations of non-citizens (in the spirit of Bartel, 1989; Card, 2001; and Cortes and Tessada, 2011; among many others). Specifically, we rely on data from the 1980 Census to construct the share of undocumented immigrants in each state –a share we use to gauge what their most probable location would have been prior to the implementation of the two sets of immigration policies as follows:

(5) $Share\ of\ Undocumented\ Immigrant_{s,1980} = \frac{undocumented\ immigrants_{s,1980}}{undocumented\ immigrants_{1980}}$

We then interact the share in equation (5) with the enforcement and Trust Act indexes in each state and year to instrument for the likely exposure to those measures. The *shift-share* instruments, where the *shifts* are the levels of enforcement or permissiveness adopted by each state in any given year and the *shares* coincide with the share in equation (5) above, are highly correlated to our two policy measures. The correlation is based on immigrants' entrenched tendency to reside in areas with established networks of their countrymen (Bartel 1989; Card 2001; Cortes and Tessada 2011, among others).

Table 4 displays the results from this additional identification check. The last rows confirm that the instrument fulfills basic requirements. The F-stats from the first stage regressions are larger than the recommended size of 10 (Stock and Yogo 2005). The estimated coefficients from the first stage regressions are positive and statistically significant, confirming the entrenched tendency for immigrants to locate in areas with established

networks of their countrymen. Additionally, the estimates from the second stage regression reveal that the same one standard deviation increase in the enforcement index lowers the VAWA self-petition rate by close to 8 percent, whereas the one standard deviation increase in the Trust Act index raises the share by 1.5 percent. Hence, as predicted above, our prior estimates provide us with a lower bound of the true impact of tougher immigration enforcement, and a possibly upper bound of the true impact of Trust Acts and alike regulations on VAWA self-petitions.

### 3.3. Robustness Checks

Thus far, we have demonstrated that immigration enforcement has curtailed VAWA self-petitions, whereas the adoption of Trust Acts and similar regulations has helped counteract that impact. We have also shown that the suggested impacts did not predate the adoption of the policies, and that the impacts are not largely different once we address the potential endogeneity biases afflicting out estimates.

In what follows, we address another common concern when measuring the intensity of immigration enforcement, in particular. The latter refers to the fact that the index collapses information on the adoption of various immigration enforcement measures that, despite all of them engaging the local or state law enforcement in alike ways, might look different in other regards, such as their propensity to result in actual deportations. To address this concern, we repeat the estimation of equation (3) using, instead, deportation figures. Specifically, we substitute the immigration enforcement index with the number of deportations related to immigration charges per 100,000 immigrants in any given (state, year). Table 5 shows the results from this exercise. A doubling of deportations would lower the VAWA self-petition rate by approximately 0.5 percent. And, just as we had in Tables 2-4, Trust Acts would counteract that impact by raising the share of VAWA self-petitions by approximately 2.6 percent when the respective index rises by one standard deviation increase.

## 4. Preliminary Conclusions and Policy Relevance

Using data on VAWA self-petitions by state and year for the 2000 through 2016 period, and exploiting the temporal and geographic variation in the adoption of tougher immigration enforcement, as well as more permissive policies embodied in state-wide Trust Acts and alike local regulations, we identify the impact of immigration policies on the rate of VAWA-self petitions. Specifically, we find that a one standard deviation increase in immigration enforcement, approximately equal to two-thirds of the average increase in interior immigration enforcement over the 2000-2016 period we examine, curbs the rate of VAWA self-petitions by 5.5 percent, whereas the subsequent creation of sanctuary cities helped raise the rate of petitions by close to 2 percent. The findings, which prove robust to a number of identification and robustness checks, underscore one of the many unintended consequences of tougher immigration enforcement, as well as the value of safeguards to guarantee immigrants feel safe to come forward when they are victims of crimes.

To our knowledge, this is the first study examining how tougher enforcement is affecting the reporting of domestic violence by immigrants, as well as the effectiveness of sanctuary cities created by Trust Acts and alike regulations in counteracting that impact. Aside from contributing to the literature on the consequences of immigration policy on undocumented immigrants and their families (*e.g.* Amuedo-Dorantes *et al*. 2018), the analysis informs about domestic violence survivors' behavioral responses to public policies (*e.g.* Iyengar, 2009). Learning about these responses is crucial at a time of growing police mistrust by minorities and heightened immigrant vulnerability to crime given migrants' reluctance to contact law enforcement.

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**Table 1: Descriptive Statistics**

| Statistic | Mean | S.D. | N |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Dependent Variable* | | | |
| VAWA Self-petitions rate | 0.21 | 0.14 | 867 |
| *Independent Variables* | | | |
| *Key Policy Regressors:* | | | |
| Immigration Enforcement | 0.49 | 0.65 | 867 |
| Trust Acts | 0.05 | 0.22 | 867 |
| *State-level Time-Varying Characteristics:* | | | |
| Wage Ratio | 1.03 | 0.18 | 867 |
| Ln(Income Per Capita) | 6.10 | 0.17 | 867 |
| Unemployment Rate | 0.06 | 0.02 | 867 |
| Share Hispanic | 0.10 | 0.10 | 867 |
| Share Black | 0.11 | 0.11 | 867 |
| Share Asia | 0.01 | 0.03 | 867 |
| Ln Female Population | 0.30 | 0.02 | 867 |
| Ln(Violent Crime) | 9.48 | 1.26 | 867 |

**Table 2: Immigration Policy and VAWA Self-petitions – OLS Estimates**

| **Model Specification:** | **(1)** | **(2)** |
|---|---|---|
| **Regressors** | **Coefficient (S.E.)** | **Coefficient (S.E.)** |
| **Immigration Enforcement (IE)** | -0.0176* | -0.0176* |
| | (0.010) | (0.009) |
| **Trust Acts (TA)** | 0.0236* | 0.0188** |
| | (0.012) | (0.008) |
| Wage ratio | | 0.0046 |
| | | (0.013) |
| Unemployment rate | | 0.1116 |
| | | (0.205) |
| Ln(Income Per Capita) | | 0.2007 |
| | | (0.407) |
| Share Hispanic | | -0.2176 |
| | | (0.342) |
| Share Black | | -0.4958 |
| | | (0.362) |
| Share Asian | | 1.0867 |
| | | (1.295) |
| Ln(female population) | | 0.3592 |
| | | (0.490) |
| Ln(violent crime) | | -0.0025 |
| | | (0.095) |
| Observations | 867 | 867 |
| R-squared | 0.863 | 0.865 |
| State FE | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes |
| State-Trend | Yes | Yes |
| Dependent Variable Mean | 0.21 | |

**Notes**: All regressions include a constant term. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and standards errors are clustered at the state level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.

**Table 3: Identification Check #1 – Event Study**

| **Regressors** | **Coefficient (S. E.)** |
|---|---|
| Four Year Prior to the Enactment of the IE | -0.0002<br>(0.007) |
| Three Year Prior to the Enactment of the IE | -0.0020<br>(0.013) |
| Two Years Prior to the Enactment of the IE | -0.0107<br>(0.015) |
| One Year Prior to the Enactment of the IE | -0.0348<br>(0.023) |
| **Immigration Enforcement (IE)** | **-0.0331***<br>**(0.019)** |
| Four Years Prior to the Enactment of the TA | -0.0005<br>(0.009) |
| Three Years Prior to the Enactment of the TA | 0.0030<br>(0.012) |
| Two Years Prior to the Enactment of the TA | -0.0008<br>(0.008) |
| One Year Prior to the Enactment of the TA | 0.0066<br>(0.008) |
| **Trust Acts (TA)** | **0.0162****<br>**(0.008)** |
| Observations | 867 |
| R-squared | 0.875 |
| State-level Time-Varying Characteristics | Yes |
| State FE | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes |
| State-Trend | Yes |
| Dependent Variable Mean | 0.21 |

**Notes:** The model includes a constant term, as well as the controls in specification (2) of Table 2. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

**Table 4: Identification Check #2 – Instrumental Variable Estimation**

| **Regressors** | **Coefficient (S. E.)** |
|---|---|
| **Immigration Enforcement (IE)** | **-0.0257**** |
| | **(0.011)** |
| **Trust Acts (TA)** | **0.0143***** |
| | **(0.004)** |
| Observations | 867 |
| R-squared | 0.866 |
| State-level Time-Varying Characteristics | Yes |
| State FE | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes |
| State-Trend | Yes |
| Dependent Variable Mean | 0.21 |
| *First Stage for "IE"* | 19.55 |
| IV | (2.37) |
| Sanderson-Windmeijer Multivariate F-test | 136.57 |
| *First Stage for "TA"* | 10.21 |
| IV | (0.48) |
| Sanderson-Windmeijer Multivariate F-test | 525.2 |

**Notes:** The model includes a constant term, as well as the controls in specification (2) of Table 2. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

**Table 5: Robustness Check Using Alternative Measure of the Intensity of Enforcement**

| **Regressors** | **Coefficient (S. E.)** |
|---|---|
| **Deportations** | -0.0288** |
| | (0.013) |
| **Trust Acts (TA)** | 0.0252*** |
| | (0.009) |
| Observations | 867 |
| R-squared | 0.863 |
| State FE | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes |
| State-Trend | Yes |
| Dependent Variable Mean | 0.21 |

**Notes:** Table 4 reports the estimates from equation (3). The model includes a constant term, as well as the controls in specification (2) of Table 2. Deportations refer to those due to immigration charges. They are measured per 100,000 immigrants. The data is obtained from http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/charges/deport_filing_charge.php. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

**Figure 1**
**WAVA Self-Petitions per 1,000 Immigrants**




**Source:** Average VAWA-self petitions form the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services.

**Figure 2**
**Average Values of the Immigration Enforcement and Trust Acts Indexes**



## APPENDIX

**Table A: Immigration Enforcement Programs**

| Nature of the Law | Law | Years | Where? | Objective | Who implements it? | Scope | Signed by | What it Consists of: |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Police-Based Measures** | **287(g)** | 2002-2012 | Street/Jail | Make communities safer by the identification and removal of serious criminals | State and local law enforcement entities | State and Local (County, City or Town) | State and local enforcement entities signed a contract (Memorandum of Agreement - MOA) with the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) | There are various functions:<br>**Task Force**: allows local and state officers interrogate and arrest noncitizens during their regular duties on law enforcement operations.<br>**Jail enforcement** permits local officers to question immigrant who have been arrested on state and local charges about their immigration status.<br>**Hybrid model:** which allow participate in both types of programs. |
| | **SC** | 2009-2014<br>2017- | Nation's jail and prisons | Identify noncitizens who have committed serious crime using biometric information | Police | Local (County) | Jurisdictions | The program allows for the submission of biometric information on detainees that is contrasted against records in FBI and DHS databases. |
| | **OILs** | 2010- | Street/Jail | Identification noncitizen | State and local law enforcement entities | State | State governor | Comprehensive laws that may include:<br>• A "show me your papers" clause, enabling the police to request proper identification documentation during a lawful stop.<br>• Require that schools report students' legal status. |

**Table B: Variable Definitions and Sources**

| Variable Name | Definition | Source |
|---|---|---|
| VAWA Self-petitions Rate | Share of VAWA self-petitions per 1,000 foreign born by state and year. | United States Citizenship and Immigration Services by Freedom of Information Act request. |
| Wage Ratio | Ratio of female to male wages constructed as in Aizer (2010) | American Community Survey (2000 to 2016) |
| Income Per Capita | Per Capita Income by state and year | |
| Unemployment Rate | Unemployment Rate by state and year | |
| Share Hispanic pop | Share of Hispanic Population by state and year | |
| Share Black | Share of Black Population by state and year | |
| Share Asia Pop | Share of Asia Population by state and year | |
| Share Female Pop | Share of female population between 15 and 44 years old | |
| Violent Crime | Violent Crime by state and year | Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics |