Militarised masculinity in the Colombian armed conflict: gender attitudes and configurations of practice

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Abstract

I explore a number of outcomes relating to the concept of militarised masculinity in Colombia, combing nationally representative data on individual women's health and behaviour with regional historical data on armed conflict violence from 1998–2016. Militarised masculinity is operationalised both as attitudes towards gender equality and as configurations of practice. Using multiple department fixed effects linear probability models, the preliminary results show that conflict related positively to four different outcomes. The probability of emotional, less physical, as well as sexual intimate partner violence by men against women increased with more conflict violence. As did women's tolerance towards violence against women. Conflict further related negatively to the probability of women taking part in decisions surrounding their health care, and the probability of women's violence against their male intimate partners. Experiences of severe intimate partner violence and sexual violence perpetrated by others than the respondent's partner did not associate to armed conflict.

Introduction

Militarised masculinity conceptualises a shift in male gender norms, attitudes and behaviours towards the soldier as hegemonic within contexts of armed conflict (Goldstein, 2001; Rones & Fasting, 2017; Wadham, 2017). A growing body of research has analysed sexual violence in war (e.g. Cohen, 2013; Eriksson Baaz & Stern, 2009; M. L. Leiby, 2009; Muvumba Sellström, 2016; Solangon & Patel, 2012). But the gendered dynamics of war in the private sphere are less known and have scarcely been addressed quantitatively. This creates a gap in the understanding of how attitudes and behaviour related to gender equality unfold in contexts of widespread social violence.

To my knowledge, there are no studies that quantitatively address gender attitudes in relation to armed conflict. Only two studies to date have empirically tested the relationship between armed conflict and intimate partner violence (IPV) against women, which represents one aspect of militarised masculinity beyond armed groups. Noe & Rieckmann (2013; Rieckmann, 2014) looked at this relationship in Colombia, while Leiby, Østby & Nordås (forthcoming) analysed it in Peru. Both studies found a positive relationship between conflict violence and intrahousehold violence against women committed by her male partner. The authors explained this finding with the idea that violence begets violence. Armed conflict has a desensitising effect on violent behaviour and increasing post-traumatic stress will lead to two different outcomes: the perpetrator exercising violence and the victim of violence being disempowered or reluctant to leave the relationship. However, neither had a gendered perspective in mind. If war increases anxiety that leads to violent behaviour, shouldn't women in conflict settings be equally prone to conduct violence? Only studying male violence against women implies that female violence against men does not relate to armed conflict. But is this actually true? If so, *why* aren't women as likely to exercise violence as men? How do changes in violent behaviour relate to shifts in gender norms and attitudes? This study contributes to the understanding of the gendered patterns of gender attitudes and intrahousehold violence during war.

Colombia constitutes an interesting case study since it has had a uniquely longstanding conflict since the 1960s that provides extensive tempo-spatial variation in conflict violence intensity (Franco, Suarez, Naranjo, Báez, & Rozo, 2006, p. 352; Garfield & Llanten Morales, 2004). This enables an exploration of whether a potential relationship between conflict and militarised masculinity has been constant or varying across space and time. Gender inequality and violence against women are also widespread and severe problems in Colombia (DHS,

2000, 2005, 2011, 2017) with highly detrimental effects on the empowerment and health of women, but the relationship to armed conflict is largely unexplored. Though sexual violence has been discussed in terms as both a weapon of war as well as a crime of opportunity in Colombia (Amnesty International, 2004, 2011), less is known about the dynamics between war and gender dynamics in the private sphere.

Militarised masculinity is operationalised in this study as both gender attitudes and configurations of practice (Connell, 2002a, p. xviii) and analysed with a spectrum of outcomes. The main research question is: *How does local conflict violence intensity relate to militarised masculinity in Colombia?*

Perspectives on militarised masculinity

Goldstein (2001) ascertains that there is no innate characteristic for men to be more war-prone than women. On the contrary, battle killing is fundamentally unnatural for humans. What fosters men into warriors is cultural norms through socialisation processes. A central goal in military training is to teach soldiers the ability to suppress fear when faced with the atrocities in moments of battle. Violence is not inevitable to male behaviour but related to culture and context. A framework on the link between armed conflict and violence in the private sphere must rest on the assumption that gender roles, norms and behaviours are constructed and diffused through socialisation. By contrast, an essentialist account would be deterministic and provide little room for change (Goldstein, 2001, p. 52; Melander, 2005, p. 698).

Militarised masculinity is a concept that identifies the soldier as hegemonic within armed groups. In these fundamentally male dominated organisations, militarised masculinity is socialised through military training in violent rites of passage, rewarding heroism, bravery and discipline (Goldstein, 2001, p. 253; Rones & Fasting, 2017; Wadham, 2017). Militarised masculinity is not a cultural constant, but is pervasive across societies and time with very few exceptions (Goldstein, 2001). Although most men are not soldiers, most soldiers are men (Connell, 2000, p. 22).

Cockburn & Zarkov (2002) identify nationalism, militarism and patriarchy as mutually supportive brother ideologies. Nations are born out of warfare and are inherently involved in the project of controlling their subjects, maintaining external borders, and excluding Others. The gender regime is highly present in war, demanding different sacrifices and offering

different rewards; it designates men a role of politics, arms and glory, and women a role of family, mourning and birthing. The basic assumptions in militarism, argues Enloe (2002, pp. 23–4), is that armed struggle is the best solution to conflicts and that human nature is prone to conflict. Militarism also puts pressure on men to defend and protect women in times of war; a man who will not participate in armed struggle is not deemed masculine.

Feminist scholars have argued that in war, pre-existing gender norms grow into extreme forms such as sexual violence on massive scale (Brownmiller, 1976; El Jack, Bell, & Narayanaswamy, 2003; Farwell, 2004; Milillo, 2006). Ethnographic field research from the heavily war-affected region Acholi in northern Uganda revealed that interpersonal violence became normalised due to conflict as "an amplification of prevailing patriarchal attitudes and practices before the conflict" (Sengupta & Calo, 2016, p. 291). Before the multiple armed conflicts, the hegemonic masculinity claimed biblical superiority of men over women. The conflicts shifted these roles and norms towards violent behaviour, reinforced by the state through increased militarisation. A crisis in masculinity followed because of a conflict-related loss in internal resources (socially constructed identity and purpose) as well as external resources (wealth, lands, productive assets etc.). The inability for men to fulfil their traditional roles as providers and protectors of the family led to self-abuse through alcoholism and abuse towards other persons deemed as inferior – women and children. This crisis in masculinity was reinforced as humanitarian organisations encouraged women to claim more rights and responsibilities – such as wage labour and influence over household decisions. Meanwhile the social role of men was largely ignored, thus creating a backlash against female empowerment and an increasingly militant form of masculinity.

Cynthia Cockburn (2004) speaks of a continuum of gendered violence, connected between kinds and occasions. Gender and violence range from the international to the personal spheres; in homes, stealth bombings, honour killings, female genital cutting/mutilation, prostitution, sexualised war torture, military rape, women's bodies are constructed as battlefields in both peace and war. In fact, war and peace are not a dichotomy but a scale – of preconflict, conflict, postconflict, peacemaking, and reconstruction – in which gendered patterned are persistent. This continuum of violence flows through social, economic and political structures, all of which are shaped by gender power dynamics. She argues that Johan Galtung's concept of structural violence must be understood from a gendered perspective; conflict is not only direct violence, but also the culture that legitimises violence, holds back individuals and groups from potential development, and uneven distributions of power and

resources. Hence, those states, groups, classes or individuals with more power can exercise power over those with less without the means of physical violence. This, Cockburn ascertains, leads us to an understanding of male-dominant gender relations as a form of violence that is not necessarily physical. Patriarchy, then, is a form of structural violence against women.

Hegemonic masculinity

The concept of militarised masculinity derives from Raewyn Connell's (1995; 2002) theory about hegemonic masculinity. She argues that masculinity is a collective and systematic practice in which there exists a hierarchy between different types of masculinities. On top there is a hegemonic masculinity, to which all must relate in some way. Different projects of masculinity arise under and produce different conditions as men and women are "doing gender" in socioculturally specific ways, so the position of hegemony is always contestable and not a fixed type. But regardless of space or time, masculinity and femininity are inherently relational concepts, with meaning only in opposition to each other[1]. The social practice of gender also goes beyond gender: intersections with e.g. ethnicity and class construct more relationships between masculinities.

Hegemony does not imply total control but a dialectic, affecting the balance of power and direction of social change in society. It refers to the Gramscian concept of "the cultural dynamic by which a group claims and sustains a leading position in social life". Hegemonic masculinity is "the configuration of gender practice … which guarantees … the dominant position of men and the subordination of women" (Connell, 1995, p. 77). Within that framework, there are hierarchical relationships between groups of men, e.g. the contemporary Euroamerican domination of heterosexual men over homosexual men. Not many men live up to the notion of hegemonic masculinity, but the majority benefit from hegemonic masculinity because women are generally subordinated in the patriarchal dividend.

Gender is an embodied social process because the body is central to the construction of masculinity. Men are portrayed as naturally more violent than women and rape is perceived as the result of intrinsic violent urges or uncontrollable lust. Behaviours are often identified as biological "mechanisms", likening the body to a machine: men are "programmed" for

[1] For example, a common notion within patriarchal ideology is that men represent reason/mind, while women represent emotion/body. Hegemonic masculinity claims the power of reason, and "masculine" realms such as science and technology are seen as the motors of progress in advanced capitalist societies.

aggression. Constructions of masculinity thus often build on stories of a sociobiological "natural masculinity" presupposing that men and women are different. This is problematic as biology is often thought of as more real and inevitable than the social.

In this gendered structure, men gain honour, prestige, material wealth, state command – and the means of violence. Men have more access to arms and the monopoly on violence than women[2]. Women are culturally disarmed as the patriarchal definitions of femininity often builds on traits as incompetence, dependence and helplessness. Men practice their dominance through different forms of gendered violence, including street catcalling, office harassment, boys getting more food than girls when means are scarce, domestic violence, rape, and femicide. Often the perpetrator is the woman's patriarchal "owner", i.e. her intimate partner. Although most men are not violent towards women, those who are often feel they are exercising a right. Patriarchy is an ideology of intimate supremacy, as it involves and acts within close social relationships. It is also an ideology that authorises violence. Violence is a part of gender politics among men, as well as transactions of violence (military combat, violent assault and homicide) mostly occur between men and can become a way of claiming masculinity.

The machismo/marianismo duality

Analysing the historical process that has led to modern day masculinity, Connell (2002a) argues the colonisation by Europe of Latin America and other continents has played a key role. European/American masculinities, in fact, has both shaped and been shaped by this imperial expansion, among other things through the worldwide violence used to establish their dominance. The "conquistadors" were perhaps the first archetype of the masculine ideal: Spanish soldiers who were difficult for the state power to control and used extreme violence to gain control of territory, natural resources, and people through colonisation. The term sometimes used to describe the hegemonic masculinity ideal in Colombia and other Latin

[2] It is historically rare for women to participate in combat (Goldstein, 2001). The FARC guerrilleras is an exception, but their breaking free of traditional macho culture pervading the Colombian countryside has come at a cost of strict reproductive control (Brodzinsky, 2017). Men dominate armies, police forces, prisons (both as guards and as inmates) and private security companies. Men are more likely to own a weapon and to be sentenced for armed assault, murder and manslaughter. Intimate partner abuse and rape is overwhelmingly by men against women. Men mainly practice body-contact sports ritualising combat (such as boxing, martial arts, ice hockey, rugby and American football). This is not to say that men are inherently violent, but the hegemonic masculinity may be in a given place and time (Connell, 1995, 2002).

American contexts is *machismo*, whose feminine counterpart is known as *marianismo*.

Machismo is a masculine ideology "stressing domination of women, competition between men, aggressive display, predatory sexuality and a double standard" (Connell, 1995, p. 31). It has a close relationship to militarism, which has been a characteristic trait of Latin American politics since colonisation (Rouquie & Suffern, 1995). Due to its strong foundations in militarism, machismo can be understood as a culture-specific expression of militarised masculinity that is hegemonic to the context of Latin America.

As Stevens (1973) put it, marianismo can be seen as the "other face" of machismo. The ideal woman is constructed as pious, emotional, virtuous, pure, passive, spiritual, vulnerable, compliant, kind, instinctive and morally superior to men. Her status is higher if she has children, especially if she has sons. A good woman who goes to church, abstains from sex before marriage, and obeys her husband may be venerated like Virgin Mary. A bad woman, for example one who enjoys sex outside of marriage or otherwise does not adhere to the feminine ideal, is constructed as a whore.

The machismo/marianismo duality are not the only role models for Latin American men and women and not all live up to them, but they represent hegemonic ideals of masculinity/femininity[3] to which all have to relate in one way or another. Such "traditional gender roles not only prescribe male violence as a means of establishing domination […] but also legitimate the subordination of women" (Melander, 2005, p. 698) in both war and peace.

Violence begets violence

Leiby, Østby & Nordås (forthcoming) and Noe & Rieckmann (2013; Rieckmann, 2014) used the "violence begets violence" concept to understand increased intimate partner violence against women in relation to armed conflict. They emphasised that war has a desensitising effect on the perception of violence, a dehumanising effect on victims, as well as an increasing effect on anxiety due to the pervasive threat of societal violence. Wood (2014, p. 467) uses a similar explanation as to why sexual violence perpetrated by soldiers occurs in

[3] Machismo and marianismo are not static, universal or unchallenged in Latin America. Region-wide grassroots movements have taken forms under banners such as #NiUnaMenos (not one [woman] less) and #VivasNosQueremos (we want us alive) against intimate partner violence and femicide. Starting in Argentina 2015 and growing throughout Latin America, female mass demonstrations and strikes have gained international momentum and inspired scholars to speak of a new feminist movement (Alcoff et al., 2017; Goñi, 2016; Santomaso, 2017).

armed conflict. Witnesses to violent acts also change their norms and behaviour when faced with violence; intimate partner violence may be a stress release due to anxiety when living under the threat of conflict violence.

I argue that the violence begets violence must be understood in light of militarised masculinity. Goldstein (2001) theorises around how war-related trauma may be understood from a gender-sensitive perspective. He argues that while war trauma (i.e. post-traumatic stress disorder, PTSD) itself is not gendered, the cultural responses to this problem are. Although young boys and girls express emotions similarly, they are raised to do it differently, as illustrated by the phrase "big boys don't cry". Growing up in a context such as Colombia, which hasn't known real peace in more than 50 years, may be especially detrimental to the socialisation of children for later violence. Boys and men are socialised to suppress emotion and never surrender, even when faced with the atrocities of war, or risk facing humiliation and shame. Shaming is a powerful form of social control, as "prestige in the social group is among the most central motivations for human behaviour" (ibid., 269). It may be exercised both by women and men, civilians and soldiers. The gender identity of soldiers is closely connected to a test of "manhood" in many cultures. Traits connected to this ideal are heroism, courage, strength, honour, toughness and emotional control – a hegemonic, militarised masculinity upheld by stigma of cowardice. Emotional suppression "plays a key role in male violence against women, including domestic violence and rape. Because the culture constructs masculinity to enhance the war-making capabilities of men in general, the damage to men's emotional abilities impacts most men, not just combat veterans" (ibid., 284).

In their study of the Acholi region in northern Uganda, Sengupta & Calo (2016) found that negative masculinities were reinforced as men turned to alcohol to deal with trauma and loss of a productive male social identity. Dealing with frustration over food insecurity and poverty through drinking sustained violent behaviour. Alcoholism exacerbated socio-economic depletion as men's capacity to generate income was wasted and household resources were relocated from of food, livestock and savings to alcohol. While international aid focused on women's empowerment, men's disempowerment thus undermined women's safety.

Given the gendered nature of socialisation processes, "violence begets violence" is likely a gendered response to a pervasive cultural standard of differentiation in gender roles. Consequently, women and men may deal with war trauma and loss of resources in different ways, leading to gender differences in the propensity for violence as a stress release. Coupled with a desensitising effect on the perception of violence and a dehumanising effect on

perception of victims, these dynamics may enable and perhaps even encourage violence. Gender differences in propensity for war-time violence within the private sphere may also result from men being more direct exposed to armed conflict, as main perpetrators, witnesses, and victims. Women's exposure to conflict may be more indirect.

Towards a model

How are the concepts presented above related to one another? Hegemonic masculinity is by far the broadest due to its context-non-specificity. Militarised masculinity is *one form* of hegemonic masculinity that is dominant in contexts of war and/or armed groups. Machismo is a certain type of hegemonic masculinity specific to Latin America, with strong roots in the militarism inherited from Spanish colonisation. While this theoretical framework puts men and their social roles at the forefront, women uphold and reproduce militarised masculinity alongside men – not least as primary caregivers in most societies, thereby "in charge" of the socialisation of children (Goldstein, 2001). The concepts are therefore to some extent hierarchical. I illustrate the relationship between the three concepts in Figure 1 below:



Figure 1. Hegemonic masculinity, militarised masculinity and machismo.

The violence begets violence theorem draws more on behaviour-psychological mechanisms of war that to some degree are the same for men and women; regardless of gender, facing armed conflict leads to stress and anxiety. But *how* a certain individual deals with negative emotions is a highly gendered process. Here, violence begets violence meets militarised masculinity. Men in context where the hegemonic masculinity ideal only offers strength, hardness and

aggression will likely deal with emotional stress very differently than men who do not risk stigma when expressing sensitivity. Intimate partner violence may then increase in armed conflict as a coping mechanism because men are taught no other way to deal with their emotions.

The literature on armed conflict and gender equality suggests that the two phenomena are mutually co-constitutive (Goldstein, 2001, p. 6; Hudson, Caprioli, Ballif-Spanvill, McDermott, & Emmett, 2009, p. 36). Hudson et al. argue that since conventional notions of causality cannot be applied if violence against women and state violence are co-constitutive, "… scholars must confine themselves to an arbitrary temporal separation to show causality, co-constitutive phenomena will defy the logic of a conventional empirical investigation – perhaps ruling out the very notion of a gendered analysis" (2009, p. 26). Following this argument, the relationship between the concepts can be linked as presented in the causal loop in Figure 2 below.



Figure 2. Causal loops of armed conflict and militarised masculinity.

It illustrates that armed conflict and militarised masculinity may be both causes and effects of one another, as armed conflict moulds hegemonic masculinity into a more militant version, which in turn leads to shaping more men into higher propensity for organised violence. The same circularity goes for militarised masculinity and violence against women: if men are socialised into a dominant, aggressive and violent role, abuse against women becomes more socially acceptable and frequent. In turn, more violence against women in the socialisation context of boys and men will lead them to perceive men's abuse towards women as legitimate behaviour, thus developing a masculinity ideal that is more militarised.

Violence begets violence derives from the conflict-militarised masculinity dynamic and leads

to more violence against women. (Female) victims become dehumanised in the views of (male) perpetrators, people are desensitised to violence, men cope with anxiety by exercising violence, and women's anxiety and disempowerment make them more reluctant to leave abusive relationship.

The hypothesis for the present study is: Violence due to armed conflict is associated to militarised masculinity, as expressed by intimate partner violence and gender unequal attitudes.

Empirical approach

Data

I combine two sets of data. The Colombian Demographic and Health Surveys [DHS] have been conducted each fourth to fifth year in Colombia between 1986 and 2015. Each survey round of the DHS samples a nationally representative selection of households. I include the survey rounds with comparable indicators for intimate partner violence and gender equality attitudes: 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015 (DHS, 2005, 2011, 2017).

The Uppsala Peace and Conflict Database Georeferenced Event Data [UPCD-GED] measures each single event of organised violence in which it is believed that at least 1 person was killed, based on global newswire reporting, monitoring and translation of local news performed by the BBC, as well as secondary sources such as local media, NGO and IGO reports, field reports, books, etc. It also includes information on the number of deaths caused by each event (Croicu & Sundberg, 2017; Sundberg & Melander, 2013). Each respondent is linked to conflict events and number of deaths in the department where she resides, by different time frames.

The sample selection consists of women aged 13-49 who have lived with a partner in the 12 months before interview, as those are the women at risk of suffering or perpetrating intimate partner violence during that time period.

Method

I use fixed effects linear probability models (LPMs) to analyse hierarchical data with binary

outcomes. They estimate the probability that a certain outcome will occur using a linear function. Since Colombia is a very regionalised and diverse country, the method used must take into account variation within and between country subdivisions, i.e. departments. I control for the unobserved heterogeneity between departments by applying fixed effects, allowing the baseline risk (the intercept) of intimate partner violence to vary across departments and using variation within departments to generate estimates. The cluster variable *department* indicates which of Colombia's 33 departments the respondent resides in at the time of interview.

Dependent variables

Militarised masculinity is operationalised using a spectrum of outcomes related to both gender attitudes and configurations of practice.

A number of intimate partner violence indicators are included that measure the reports of respondents who have ever been in a relationship. Incidents of violence are identified as either ever-experience of violence, or events that happened in the last year, both perpetrated by the respondent current or former partner. To avoid endogeneity issues, I focus on the experience of intimate partner violence in the last 12 months before interview.

Emotional violence is a composite measure of whether or not the respondent's (ex)partner was jealous if she talked to other men, accused her of unfaithfulness, did not permit her to meet female friends, tried to limit contact with her family, insisted on knowing where she was, didn't trust her with money, ignored or didn't address her, didn't request her opinion for family or social gatherings and on important family matters.

Less violence indicates whether or not the respondent's (ex)partner had: pushed, shook, thrown something at, slapped, punched, or hit her.

Severe violence captures if the respondent's (ex)partner in the last year had: kicked, dragged, strangled or burnt her; or threatened or attacked her with a knife, gun or other weapon.

Sexual violence measures whether the respondent's (ex)partner physically forced her into having unwanted sex.

Other sexual violence indicates whether or not someone else than the respondent's (ex)partner forced her into having unwanted sex. It was only available in survey rounds 2010 and 2015.

Abused partner regards whether the respondent physically abused her partner and was only

available for the 2015 survey round.

Beating justified measures whether or not the respondent answered affirmatively to considering beating is justified if a wife: goes out without telling husband, neglects the children, argues with husband, refuses to have sex with him, or burns the food. It was only available survey rounds 2010 and 2015.

Health care decision maker is dichotomised into a binary dependent variable that measures whether or not the respondent had a say in decisions about her own health care. The original variable had the values: respondent alone, respondent and partner, respondent and other, partner alone, someone else/other/no one.

Independent variables

Conflict is identified as personal violence according to Galtung's (1969) typology. The main independent variable is location- and time-specific events of violent conflict. I perform model fit tests to assess which specification represents the data best in each model: number of conflict events vs. deaths, different timings of conflict in relation to the time of interview, and whether conflict should be represented as a linear or a categorical measure.

I control for a number of sociodemographic characteristics that may stratify the probability of each outcome.

Age is included to account for life-course as well as generational differences, and *survey round* to account for period effects.

Type of place of residence is included because living in a rural area often insulates women from intimate partner violence (Diallo & Voia, 2016; Kishor & Johnson, 2005; Owusu Adjah & Agbemafle, 2016), which is counterintuitive as machismo mostly pervades rural areas more than urban. This could result from reporting bias, a crisis of masculinity when faced with modern city values, or lack of social control that would protect women from violence in rural areas. Either way, armed conflict violence has been more present in rural than in urban areas in Colombia.

Marital status measures whether the respondent is married to or cohabits with her partner.

Respondent's highest *level of education* and *household wealth quintiles* are included as lower socio-economic status may be linked to more militarised masculinity. Women with better economic and educational resources may have better chances of leaving abusive relationships

as well as conflict-affected areas. Household wealth is a composite measure offered by the based on a composite number of the household's cumulative living standard, including household ownership of assets such as televisions and bicycles, materials used for housing construction, water access and sanitation facilities (DHS, 2017).

Working status, measuring whether or not the respondent is working at the time of interview, captures both women's empowerment as well as socioeconomic position.

If a woman or her partner have experienced family violence during childhood, i.e. if their father beat their mother or vice versa or if they were victims of abuse themselves, they are often more likely to suffer from or perpetrate violence (Friedemann-Sanchez & Lovaton, 2012; Kishor & Johnson, 2005; Owusu Adjah & Agbemafle, 2016; Pollak, 2002). I only have information on whether respondent's father ever beat her mother, captured in the variable *family violence*.

Preliminary results

Preliminary results from the department fixed effects LPMs are presented in tables 1 and 2.

I tested multiple specifications of armed conflict to explore which fit the data best: events or deaths, and different time periods (24–13, 18–13, 15–13, 12, 6 and 2 months before interview). For each model, I chose the indicator that contributed most to model fit. Not all specifications of armed conflict had a statistically significant relationship to the outcomes of each model. These results are not presented here, but are available upon request.

(TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE)

The preliminary results show that conflict related positively to four outcomes and negatively to two outcomes, while two outcomes had no statistically significant association to conflict.

Each single event of conflict deaths in the 18 to 13 months preceding interview related to a 0.01 percent higher gross probability and a 0.001 percent higher net probability of emotional violence. The same conflict indicator also related to a 0.001 percent higher basic as well as adjusted probability of less violence.

The probability of sexual violence increased by 0.0004 percent in the basic model and 0.0002 percent in the adjusted model by each single conflict death in the 24 to 13 months preceding

interview. This conflict indicator did not have a statistically significant relationship to the attitude that beating is justified in the basic model, but net of sociodemographic characteristics it related to a probability that was 0.0003 percent higher.

The probability for women being a health care decision maker decreased by -0.005 percent by each event of conflict in the 15 to 13 months before interview, both in the basic and adjusted models.

Conflict deaths 15 to 13 months before interview associated to a -0.007 or a -0.006 percent lower probability of the respondent reporting that she had abused her partner in the year preceding interview, in the basic and adjusted models respectively.

Severe violence did not associate to armed conflict adjusted by sociodemographic factors, and other sexual violence was unrelated to conflict in both the basic and adjusted models. Both indicators pointed towards a positive relationship.

The results of sociodemographic control variables will be commented upon in future drafts.

Since the indicators of armed conflict all refer to one single event or death, it is difficult to ascertain the social effects by only looking at the adjusted probabilities. Hence, predicted probabilities shown in the figures 2–9 below illustrate the relationships between conflict and outcomes related to militarised masculinity at different levels of conflict violence intensity. For each figure respectively, I used the same conflict indicator as in the above LPMs. The range of conflict deaths or events was set to 100 as an illustration; the maximum number of events or deaths varied from 24 to 127 depending on measure.



Figure 3. Predicted probabilities of emotional violence across number of conflict deaths

within 18 to 13 months before interview.

Figure 3 presents predicted probabilities of experiencing emotional violence by intensity of conflict. The increase in emotional violence ranges from 0.67 in a context of no conflict violence to 0.74 when 100 conflict deaths had occurred in a department between 18 to 13 months before interview.



Figure 4. Predicted probabilities of less violence across number of conflict deaths within 18 to 13 months before interview.

Figure 4 illustrates predicted probabilities of experiencing emotional violence by intensity of conflict. In a context of no conflict violence, the probability of less violence is 0.17. When 100 conflict deaths had occurred in a department between 18 to 13 months before interview, the probability was 0.23.



Figure 5. Predicted probabilities of severe violence across number of conflict deaths within 24 to 13 months before interview.

Figure 5 displays that the probabilities of experiencing severe violence by intensity of ranges from 0.054 in a context of no conflict violence to 0.64 when 100 conflict deaths had occurred in a department between 24 to 13 months before interview.



Figure 6. Predicted probabilities of sexual violence across number of conflict deaths within 24 to 13 months before interview.

The predicted probabilities in figure 6 reveal that sexual violence increases spans from 0.35 in a context of no conflict violence to 0.51 when 100 conflict deaths had occurred in the department between 24 to 13 months before interview.



Figure 7. Predicted probability of health care decision maker across number of conflict events

within 15 to 13 months before interview.

In figure 7, the predicted probabilities of the respondent being involved in decisions regarding her own health care is presented by intensity of conflict. The probability decline ranges from 0.91 in a context of no conflict violence to 0.40 when 100 conflict events had occurred in a department between 15 to 13 months before interview.



Figure 8. Predicted probabilities of other sexual violence across number of conflict deaths within 24 to 13 months before interview.

Figure 8 reveals predicted probabilities of experiencing sexual violence perpetrated by someone else than an intimate partner by number of conflict deaths. The increase in emotional violence ranges from 0.055 in a context of no conflict violence to 0.6 when 100 conflict deaths had occurred in a department between 24 to 13 months before interview.



Figure 9. Predicted probabilities of beating justified across number of conflict deaths within 24 to 13 months before interview.

Figure 9 presents predicted probabilities of acceptance of wife abuse by intensity of conflict. The increase in emotional violence ranges from 0.67 in a context of no conflict violence to 0.74 when 100 conflict deaths had occurred in the department between 18 to 13 months before interview.



Figure 10. Predicted probability of abused partner across number of conflict deaths within 15 to 13 months before interview.

In figure 10 the predicted probability of the respondent reporting she abused her partner decreases from 0.2 with no conflict violence to -0.4 had 100 conflict deaths occurred in the department between 15 to 13 months before interview.

Concluding remarks

This study explored multiple outcomes related to the concept of militarised masculinity in the context of Colombia. Preliminary findings from the department fixed effects LPMs and predicted probabilities show that women in more conflict-intense times and places are more likely to suffer from various – albeit not all – forms of intimate partner violence. They are more prone to accepting attitudes towards wife abuse. Finally, women are less likely to have a say in their own health care, as well as report that they abused their partner in the 12 months preceding interview. This multifaceted framework suggests that military masculinity indeed

did increase in Colombia during the 2000s because of armed conflict. These, and new, results will be discussed in relation to previous literature in future drafts of the present study.

Future work and limitations

I will develop the study by including violent behaviour and attitudes to gender equality aggregated to community level in the models to account for contextual effects of militarised masculinity. DHS provides some individual-level measurements on the gendered conditions in which boys and girls are socialised, which aggregated to community level can be treated as proxies for militarised masculinity. IPV prevalence in the near area is associated to higher risk of one's own risk of IPV in Colombia (McQuestion, 2003). Local attitudes towards gender equality (measured as if it is sometimes justified to beat a woman) and emotional violence or partner control (whether the respondent's (ex)partner e.g. was jealous if she talked to other men, accused her of unfaithfulness, or insisted on knowing where she was within the last year) conceptualises male domination in patriarchal structures. These have been linked to unwanted pregnancy and individual risks of IPV in Colombia (Pallitto & O'Campo, 2005).

Future models will contain interaction effects between conflict and e.g. highest educational level, household wealth, and type of place of residence, to explore whether the effects of armed conflict vary by socio-economic status.

As some women may be more prone to e.g. becoming victims of partner abuse or expressing gender unequal attitudes, I will apply Heckman's two-step efficient estimator to fit future models with selection.

Respondent-to-partner abuses does not specify forms of violence, making direct comparisons to women's and men's self-reported experiences of violence difficult. Because women may be less prone to report violence perpetrated by themselves, future analyses will include an indicator on female-to-male intimate partner violence collected from the men's questionnaire in DHS round 2015.

Women's reports of violence against their intimate partners were only available in the 2015 survey round, and sexual violence perpetrated by non-partners as well as attitudes to violence against women were only available in 2010 and 2015. This entails that there was less conflict variation and thus statistical power compared to other models.

The sample is nationally representative of Colombia's population, but those most affected by conflict are likely not in the dataset due to migration including internal displacement and mortality. The study does not regard non-sexual abuse perpetrated by other than the respondent's partner or physical punishment of children (the latter information was not time-specified). There is no information about frequency of violence, rendering estimations of the real magnitude of violence difficult. Partner's characteristics may influence the risk of IPV, including occupational status, educational level, and alcohol consumption (Hindin, Kishor, & Ansara; Kishor & Johnson, 2005; Koenig et al., 2003). However, this information was not included in each survey round and is therefore not included here.

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Table 1: Department fixed effects linear probability models of multiple militarised masculinity outcomes, 2000–2016

		Emotional violence		Less violence		Severe violence		Sexual violence	
		Prob. (t-value)	Adj. prob. (t-value)	Prob. (t-value)	Adj. prob. (t-value)	Prob. (t-value)	Adj. prob. (t-value)	Prob. (t-value)	Adj. prob. (t-value)
Survey round	2005		(ref.)		(ref.)		(ref.)		(ref.)
	2010		-0.348***		-0.014**		-0.010***		-0.012***
			(-57.64)		(-2.99)		(-3.77)		(-5.68)
	2015		-0.469***		-0.036***		-0.016***		-0.019***
			(-68.57)		(-6.60)		(-5.06)		(-7.67)
Age group	13–19		(ref.)		(ref.)		(ref.)		(ref.)
	20–24		-0.020*		0.014		0.012*		0.003
			(-1.98)		(1.67)		(2.28)		(0.84)
	25–29		-0.038***		-0.013		0.013**		0.009*
			(-3.76)		(-1.57)		(2.58)		(2.10)
	30–34		-0.051***		-0.015		0.011*		0.014***
			(-5.05)		(-1.82)		(2.21)		(3.39)
	35–39		-0.066***		-0.040***		0.009		0.017***
			(-6.45)		(-4.66)		(1.75)		(4.03)
	40–44		-0.074***		-0.059***		0.001		0.013**
			(-7.16)		(-6.74)		(0.19)		(3.09)
	45–49		-0.086***		-0.081***		-0.004		0.008
			(-8.05)		(-9.06)		(-0.76)		(1.85)
Residence	urban		(ref.)		(ref.)		(ref.)		(ref.)
	rural		-0.042***		-0.051***		-0.021***		-0.006*
			(-6.68)		(-9.55)		(-6.74)		(-2.18)
Marital status	married		(ref.)		(ref.)		(ref.)		(ref.)
	cohabiting		0.087***		0.062***		0.027***		0.010***
			(18.99)		(15.92)		(12.28)		(5.36)
Highest education	primary		(ref.)		(ref.)		(ref.)		(ref.)
	secondary		0.011*		-0.012**		-0.014***		-0.012***
			(2.14)		(-2.89)		(-5.57)		(-5.98)
	higher		-0.017*		-0.046***		-0.029***		-0.016***
			(-2.54)		(-7.93)		(-8.81)		(-5.98)

Household wealth	lowest quintile		-0.015		0.031***		0.027***	0.010**
			(-1.87)		(4.37)		(6.70)	(3.03)
	second quintile		0.002		0.017**		0.015***	0.005*
			(0.38)		(3.19)		(4.79)	(2.10)
	middle quintile		(ref.)		(ref.)		(ref.)	(ref.)
	fourth quintile		-0.015*		-0.040***		-0.014***	-0.012***
			(-2.21)		(-6.84)		(-4.18)	(-4.48)
	highest quintile		-0.021**		-0.050***		-0.018***	-0.017***
			(-2.69)		(-7.49)		(-4.83)	(-5.31)
Working status	no		(ref.)		(ref.)		(ref.)	(ref.)
	yes		0.034***		0.025***		0.009***	0.011***
			(8.12)		(6.93)		(4.42)	(6.81)
Family violence	no		(ref.)		(ref.)		(ref.)	(ref.)
	yes		0.099***		0.107***		0.036***	0.021***
			(23.33)		(29.01)		(16.90)	(12.35)
	don't know		0.056***		0.049***		0.014**	0.013**
			(5.24)		(5.26)		(2.69)	(3.13)
ConflictDeaths24to13m						0.0002***	0.0001	0.0004*** 0.0002**
						(4.16)	(0.90)	(8.23) (2.58)
ConflictDeaths18to13m		0.01***	0.001*	0.001***	0.001*			
		(48.46)	(2.11)	(6.09)	(2.16)			
ConflictEvents15to13m								
ConflictDeaths15to13m								
Constant		0.607***	0.948***	0.172***	0.161***	0.052***	0.039***	0.032*** 0.024***
		(237.46)	(73.54)	(81.00)	(15.34)	(42.29)	(6.66)	(31.65) (5.04)
N		46,438	46,438	49,349	49,349	54,858	54,858	56,676 56,676
R-squared overall		0.05	0.17	0.00	0.04	-0.00	0.02	0.00 0.01

*** p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001**

Table 2: Department fixed effects linear probability models of multiple militarised masculinity outcomes, 2000–2016

		Health care decision maker		Other sexual violence		Beating justified		Abused partner	
		Prob. (t-value)	Adj. prob. (t-value)	Prob. (t-value)	Adj. prob. (t-value)	Prob. (t-value)	Adj. prob. (t-value)	Prob. (t-value)	Adj. prob. (t-value)
Survey round	2005		(ref.)						
	2010		-0.018***		(ref.)		(ref.)		
			(-5.36)						
	2015		0.009*		-0.003		0.012***		
			(2.33)		(-1.26)		(6.00)		
Age group	13–19		(ref.)		(ref.)		(ref.)		(ref.)
	20–24		0.089***		0.012*		-0.012*		0.023
			(13.83)		(2.07)		(-2.42)		(1.34)
	25–29		0.112***		0.017**		-0.016**		-0.015
			(17.85)		(2.86)		(-3.29)		(-0.91)
	30–34		0.114***		0.024***		-0.021***		-0.038*
			(18.02)		(4.17)		(-4.24)		(-2.34)
	35–39		0.108***		0.026***		-0.022***		-0.080***
			(16.87)		(4.44)		(-4.31)		(-4.78)
	40–44		0.103***		0.019**		-0.020***		-0.070***
			(15.96)		(3.24)		(-4.00)		(-4.12)
	45–49		0.088***		0.024***		-0.016**		-0.106***
			(13.38)		(3.92)		(-3.03)		(-6.18)
Residence	urban		(ref.)		(ref.)		(ref.)		(ref.)
	rural		-0.029***		-0.020***		0.022***		-0.035**
			(-7.46)		(-5.63)		(7.08)		(-3.17)
Marital status	married		(ref.)		(ref.)		(ref.)		(ref.)
	cohabiting		-0.003		0.021***		0.006**		0.046***
			(-1.00)		(8.03)		(2.90)		(6.32)
Highest education	primary		(ref.)		(ref.)		(ref.)		(ref.)
	secondary		0.068***		-0.014***		-0.032***		0.031***
			(22.50)		(-4.93)		(-13.08)		(3.78)
	higher		0.084***		-0.022***		-0.043***		0.026*
			(20.18)		(-5.71)		(-13.59)		(2.56)

Household wealth	lowest quintile		-0.036***		0.003		0.012**	-0.006
			(-7.22)		(0.54)		(2.91)	(-0.45)
	second quintile		0.005		0.007		-0.007*	0.013
			(1.29)		(1.87)		(-2.13)	(1.32)
	middle quintile		(ref.)		(ref.)		(ref.)	(ref.)
	fourth quintile		0.003		-0.003		0.000	-0.005
			(0.81)		(-0.77)		(0.14)	(-0.48)
	highest quintile		0.005		-0.017***		0.007	-0.018
			(1.04)		(-3.73)		(1.72)	(-1.35)
Working status	no		(ref.)		(ref.)		(ref.)	(ref.)
	yes		0.022***		0.007**		0.001	0.018**
			(8.45)		(3.03)		(0.46)	(2.63)
Family violence	no		(ref.)		(ref.)		(ref.)	(ref.)
	yes		0.004		0.037***		0.005*	0.070***
			(1.47)		(15.40)		(2.47)	(10.39)
	don't know		-0.008		0.051***		0.007	0.010
			(-1.52)		(8.41)		(1.48)	(0.56)
ConflictDeaths24to13m				0.0001	0.0001	0.0001	0.0003*	
				(0.86)	(0.40)	(0.82)	(2.56)	
ConflictDeaths18to13m								
ConflictEvents15to13m		-0.005***	-0.005***					
		(-10.83)	(-8.33)					
ConflictDeaths15to13m							-0.007**	-0.006*
							(-2.67)	(-2.19)
Constant		0.905***	0.769***	0.054***	0.020**	0.039***	0.059***	0.225***	0.195***
		(654.30)	(101.09)	(35.99)	(3.06)	(30.72)	(10.62)	(60.30)	(9.92)
N		59,572	59,572	40,714	40,714	40,882	40,882	16,840	16,840
R-squared overall		0.00	0.04	-0.00	0.01	-0.00	0.02	-0.00	0.03

*** p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001**