**Separating Spheres:**
**Cohort Differences in Gender Attitudes about Work and Family in China**

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Extended abstract prepared for the 2019 Population Association of America Annual Meeting in Austin, TX, April 10-13, 2019.

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**Abstract**

We investigate whether attitudes about gender in China have changed across birth cohorts. Using data from the 2010, 2012, 2013, and 2015 Chinese General Social Surveys, we differentiate two distinct dimensions of beliefs about gender: gender equality in the labor market and gender roles in the family. Multiple linear regressions reveal continued increases in support for egalitarianism in the public sphere across cohorts, even after controlling for compositional change in successive birth cohorts' sociodemographic attributes. In contrast, all else being equal, we observe rising support for traditional ideology about gender in the private sphere across cohorts. Moreover, women hold more egalitarian gender attitudes toward work and family, and this gender gap has widened among more recent cohorts. The results highlight the multidimensionality of gender and gender ideology in China. We conclude by discussing the findings in the context of the uneven gender revolution and two-sphere separation in contemporary China.

## Introduction

Gender ideology is an "underlying concept of an individual's level of support for a division of paid work and family responsibilities that is based on the notion of separate spheres" (Davis & Greenstein, 2009, p. 89). Individuals' gender role attitudes are found to influence work and family behaviors such as labor force participation, entry into gender-atypical occupations, and divisions of household labor (Corrigall & Konrad, 2007; Dodson & Borders, 2006; Fortin, 2005; Qian & Sayer, 2016). Thus, examining change in gender role attitudes has far-reaching implications for future gender equality in society (Fortin, 2015). Prior research shows that adhesion to more traditional gender ideology has risen in recent decades in China (Attané, 2012). Less examined is how gender ideology has changed across birth cohorts in China, although the concept of the birth cohort has long been considered key to the study of social change (Ryder, 1985). Furthermore, until recently, little attention has been paid to the multidimensionality of gender and gender ideology; most gender attitudes research treated gender ideology as one dimensional without explicitly distinguishing between attitudes about support for gender equality in the workforce and beliefs in gendered family roles (Pepin & Cotter, 2018). To fill the knowledge gaps, the current study examines the extent to which the endorsement of gender egalitarianism in the family and in the marketplace varies by birth cohort in China.

## Theoretical Perspectives and Hypotheses

We draw on two theoretical perspectives to develop our hypotheses. An "uneven gender revolution" perspective posits that progress toward gender equality has been uneven, as evidenced by change in heterosexual relationships being more limited than change in paid work (England, 2010). This theoretical perspective was first developed to characterize the gender

revolution in the United States. In recent decades, U.S. women's employment has increased and the gender pay gap has declined (Blau & Kahn, 2007; England, 2010), whereas men are still expected to propose marriage (Sassler & Miller, 2011) and the male breadwinner norm persists (Qian, 2017; 2018). Scholars argue that the uneven gender revolution in the public and private spheres is in part due to the prevalent gender-essentialist ideology in the U.S. culture (Cotter et al., 2011; England, 2010). The widely-believed essentialist notion of gender believes that men and women are innately different in strengths and interests (Charles 2011; Cotter et al., 2011). Influenced by such separate-but-equal gender beliefs, people tend to reject overt discriminatory gender attitudes and agree with the idea that men and women should have equal opportunities in the labor market, but the separate spheres that link men and women to gendered roles in the family are justified. Overall, the uneven gender revolution perspective suggests that the private and public spheres are distinct from each other and highlight the multidimensional nature of gender and gender ideology. Hence, it is not surprising that the United States has witnessed rising support for gender equality in the workforce yet persistent beliefs in gender essentialism in the family (Kane & Sanchez, 1994; Mason & Lu, 1988; Pepin & Cotter, 2018).

This "uneven gender revolution" perspective is well applicable to understanding the gender revolution in China. Like most former socialist states, the Chinese government was active in promoting gender equality as a policy goal, with women's participation in paid employment considered as the key to women's liberation and China's economic development (Zhou, 2003). Although equality with men was never attained even during the collectivist period, female employment rate was among the highest in the world (Attané, 2012; Parish & Busse, 2000). Women's involvement in paid work, however, is not equivalent to the achievement of women's full liberation, because men's participation in housework and childcare was rarely promoted

even under the communist regime (Zhou, 2003). Hence, the breadwinner role of the husband and the homemaker role of the wife remain firmly in place in Chinese families (Qian & Qian, 2015). For example, even in the 2000s, over half of Chinese men and women agreed with the statement that men should be turned toward society and women should devote themselves to their family (Attané, 2012). Given how gender equality in the labor market and in the family has been differentially organized and promoted since the socialist time, Chinese people's attitudes about gender in the family likely differ from their attitudes about gender in the marketplace.

The second perspective that we draw on comes from a recent theorization of how the two-sphere (i.e., the public sphere vs. the private sphere) separation perpetuates gender inequality in contemporary China (Ji et al., 2017). As China has transitioned from a socialist centralized economy to a profit-driven market economy, the social value that stresses "equality of opportunity" may be promoted. Meanwhile, in post-reform China, the state has retreated from providing socialist welfare such as publicly-funded childcare services and from promoting gender egalitarian ideology. Not surprisingly, the public and private spheres have become increasingly separated and gender inequality (e.g., in employment and earnings) has worsened in recent decades (Attané, 2012; Ji et al., 2017). As a result of the weakening of gender equity ideology and the growing insecurity of the labor market for women, traditional male-breadwinner/female-homemaker roles in the family are being reinforced (Attané, 2012). Hence, all else equal, compared with individuals growing up in the socialist time, individuals who were born and raised in the reform era likely express greater support for gender equality in the labor market but hold more traditional attitudes about gender in the family.

To sum up, in light of the uneven gender revolution perspective and the two-sphere separation perspective (England, 2010; Ji et al., 2017), we hypothesize that *all else equal, market*

*attitudes become more egalitarian while family attitudes embrace more essentialism across birth cohorts*. When comparing gender ideology across marriage cohorts, Pimentel (2006) found that men of the youngest cohort hold less egalitarian gender attitudes than earlier marriage cohorts, due to a backlash to men's threatened status within the family and in the workplace. Similarly, we hypothesize that *cohort trends toward greater egalitarianism in market attitudes are more evident among women than among men, whereas cohort trends toward greater essentialism in family attitudes are more evident among men than among women.*

**Data**

To test our hypotheses, we use data from the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS: http://cgss.ruc.edu.cn), a repeated cross-sectional survey conducted by Renmin University of China. Using a multistage stratified random sampling strategy, the CGSS surveys one random member aged 18 years or older from each household, with response rates of about 72% for the years we use. We analyze the 2010, 2012, 2013 and 2015 CGSS ($N$ = 11,783, 11765, 11,438, 10,968 for each year), because in each year respondents were asked identical questions that measured market attitudes and family attitudes. To minimize mortality bias and examine individuals born after the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, we limit our sample to individuals born in 1950 or later ($N$ = 36,357). After dropping 1,683 observations with missing data on variables used in our analysis, we obtain a pooled sample of 34,674 individuals.

**Measurement**

We have two dependent variables. The first dependent variable measures market attitudes with one item: "When the economy is bad, female employees should be fired first." The second one

measures family attitudes with one item: "Men should put career first whereas women should put family first." The responses are on a five-point scale, with 1 representing completely disagree and 5 representing completely agree. We reverse-code these two items, so that higher scores indicate more egalitarian gender role attitudes.

Our key independent variable is birth cohort. We use 10-year intervals to measure birth cohort (Brooks & Bolzendahl, 2004), considering strong collective identity in China based on the decade of people's birth (as evidenced by the popularity of labels such as "the post-80's generation"). The birth cohort indicators include the cohorts born in the 1950s (reference), 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.

We control for a hold of covariates. First, we control for region and survey year indicators. According to National Bureau of Statistics of China (2011), China's 31 provinces are divided into four regions: Eastern (reference), Central, Western, and Northeastern. To control for potential shifts in gender ideology or other differences across the four years of surveys, we include a set of dummy variables: Year 2010 (reference), Year 2012, Year 2013, and Year 2015.

To examine cohort differences in gender ideology, we control for a set of variables measuring life course statuses, because aging effects on individual-level opinion change are negligible once major life course transitions are taken into account (Brooks & Bolzendahl, 2004). We did not control for age, partly because the extremely high correlation between age and birth cohort indicators would cause multicollinearity problems. In addition, after we controlled for variables indicating life course statuses, age was insignificant in our models. Variables measuring life course statuses include employment status, marital status, and number of children. Employment status is measured through three categories: employed (reference), full-time homemaker, and non-employed. Marital status is grouped into three categories: currently married

(reference), never married, and previously married. Number of children is a continuous variable that ranges from 0 to 11. We top-code this variable at 4, because only less than one percent of individuals have more than four children.

Because gender role attitudes might vary by cohorts due to cohort change in sociodemographic composition, we investigate cohort trends in gender ideology net of compositional change in successive birth cohorts' characteristics (England et al., 2016). The compositional covariates include both individuals' own attributes (i.e., education, party membership, religion, and urban residence) and those of their parents (i.e., parental education and mother's employment). Individuals' education is measured through five dummy variables: primary education or less (reference), junior high school education, senior high school education, vocational college, and university or above. Party membership is a dummy variable with 1 indicating Communist party membership and 0 otherwise. Religion is divided into two categories: non-religious (=1) and religious (=0). Urban residence is a categorical variable with 1 indicating living in the urban areas and 0 indicating living in the rural areas. Parental education, measuring the highest educational level attained by either parent, is grouped into five categories: no schooling (reference), primary education, junior high school, senior high school, vocational college or above. Individuals' attitudes about gender in the family and in the labor market may be shaped by exposure to their mothers' employment (Pepin & Cotter, 2018). We thus control for maternal employment when respondents were 14 years old through three dummy variables: non-agricultural employment (reference), agricultural employment, and non-employment.

We use ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to separately model market attitudes and family attitudes. We adjust standard errors of the regression coefficients by estimating cluster-robust standard errors within each birth year (Cameron & Miller, 2015). Because we hypothesize

that cohort trends in gender role attitudes vary by gender, we run all the models by gender. In analysis not shown here, we ran two-level linear regression models, with individuals nested within birth years (Pepin & Cotter, 2018) and found similar results to those reported below. We choose to present single-level models because likelihood ratio tests for our full models indicate no need for multilevel models ($p > 0.05$).

**Descriptive Results**

In Figure 1, we present the mean value of market attitudes (the left panel) and family attitudes (the right panel), respectively, by birth cohort and gender. On average, both men and women express more egalitarian attitudes about gender in the marketplace across cohorts, but the increase in egalitarianism appears to be greater among women than among men. Specifically, the average value of market attitudes increases from 3.66 for men born in the 1950s to 3.92 for men born in the 1990s (7.1% increase), whereas the increase among women is from 3.74 for women born in the 1950s to 4.36 for those born in the 1990s (16.6% increase). Compared with market attitudes, Chinese people on average hold much more traditional attitudes about gender in the family, as indicated by the much lower average values of family attitudes regardless of birth cohort and gender. Family attitudes held by men do not exhibit monotonic increases across cohorts, with the mean value being 2.44, 2.40, 2.55, 2.62, and 2.69 for men born in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, respectively. Women across successive birth cohorts express more egalitarian family attitudes: The mean value of family attitudes increases from 2.39 for women born in the 1950s to 3.33 for those born in the 1990s. Recall that these two gender ideology measures range from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating completely agree, 3 indicating neither agree nor disagree, and 5 indicating completely disagree. Thus, even in the youngest cohort (the

cohort born in the 1990s), although men and women on average disagree with gender inequality in the labor market, they do not seem to reject the gendered roles in the family.

[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the covariates used in the analysis by birth cohort and gender. The upper (lower) panel shows the results for men (women). Life course statuses differ by cohort. Cohorts of prime working age (those born in the 1960s through the 1980s) are more likely to be employed than the oldest cohort reaching retirement age and the youngest cohort who may not have finished school. Compared with people born in the 1970s or earlier, those born in the 1980s or later are more likely to be never married but less likely to be previously married. The number of children respondents have decreases across cohorts.

There are indeed cohort shifts in sociodemographic attributes. Consistent with prior research documenting marked increases in educational attainment in China over the twentieth century (Treiman, 2014), own education and parental education increase across cohorts for both men and women. Party membership rates decrease across cohorts for men but remain relatively stable for women. The vast majority of Chinese people are non-religious. The percentage of urban residence is higher among people born in the 1970s or later than among those born in the 1950s and 1960s. The percentage of men and women whose mother was doing non-agricultural work when they were 14 years increases across cohorts whereas the percentage of respondents whose mother had agricultural jobs decreases. Notably, the share of respondents with a non-employed mother is higher in the cohort born in the 1990s than in the cohorts born in the 1960s through the 1980s, which likely reflects the recent decrease in female employment rates.

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

**OLS Regression Results of Market Attitudes and Family Attitudes**

Table 2 presents OLS regression results of gender role attitudes for men. Model 1 uses only birth cohorts, regions, and survey years to predict market attitudes. We find that all the coefficients for cohort indicators are positive, indicating the endorsement of more egalitarian attitudes about gender in the labor market across cohorts. In Model 2, we add variables that measure life course statuses, including employment status, marital status, and number of children, and find that the cohort coefficients are still significantly positive. This suggests that cohort trends are not artifacts of the aging effects on individual-level attitudinal change. In Model 3, we add individual and parental sociodemographic attributes to control for cohort shifts in compositional characteristics. We find that men's education, party membership, and urban residence as well as parental education are all positively associated with more egalitarian views towards gender in the marketplace. After accounting for compositional covariates, the difference in market attitudes between the cohort born in the 1960s and the cohort born in the 1950s is no longer significant, but cohorts born in the 1970s or later still hold significantly more egalitarian market attitudes than the cohort born in the 1950s. In sum, by and large, there is growing support for gender equality in the labor market across birth cohorts of Chinese men, even after the aging effects as well as cohort trends in individual and parental education are taken into account.

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

The results for men's family attitudes are different. In Model 4 where only regions and survey years are controlled for, men born in the 1970s or later report more egalitarian family attitudes than men born in the 1950s. In Model 5 where variables indicating life course statuses are included, compared to men born in the 1950s, men born in the 1960s hold less egalitarian family attitudes, and men born in the 1970s or later express similar family attitudes. In Model 6,

we add individual and parental sociodemographic characteristics, and find that individual and parental education, party membership, and urban residence are associated with more egalitarian family attitudes for men. In addition, compared with having a mother working at non-agricultural jobs when men were 14 years old, having a mother working at agricultural jobs or being non-employed is significantly associated with men's lower levels of disagreement with traditional gender roles in the family. Overall, holding covariates constant, the average value of family attitudes for men born in the 1960s, 1980s, and 1990s is 0.1-point, 0.08-point, and 0.1-point, respectively, lower as compared to men born in the 1950s. Thus, all else equal, except the cohort born in the 1970s, all the other cohorts (those born in the 1960s, 1980s, and 1990s) report less egalitarian attitudes about gender in the family, compared to the cohort born in the 1950s.

In Table 3, we present multivariate results of gender role attitudes for women. In Models 1, we include only birth cohorts, regions, and survey years to predict market attitudes. We find that all the coefficients for cohort indicators are positive, indicating the endorsement of more egalitarian attitudes about gender in the labor market across cohorts. Results remain the same in Model 2 where we add variables that measure life course statuses. We add compositional characteristics in Model 3, and find that women's education, party membership, and urban residence as well as parental education are all positively associated with more egalitarian views towards gender in the marketplace. Women who had a non-employed mother at age 14 hold less egalitarian market attitudes than women who had a mother working at non-agricultural jobs. After accounting for compositional covariates, the difference in market attitudes between the cohort born in the 1960s and the cohort born in the 1950s becomes insignificant, but cohorts born in the 1970s or later still hold significantly more egalitarian market attitudes than the cohort

born in the 1950s. Generally, among Chinese women, there is growing support for gender equality in the labor market across birth cohorts, holding covariates constant.

[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

Next, we turn to the results of women' attitudes about gender in the family. In Model 4 of Table 3 where only regions and survey years are controlled for, women born in the 1960s or later report more egalitarian family attitudes than women born in the 1950s. In Model 5, after we control for variables indicating life course statuses, compared to women born in the 1950s, women born in the 1960s hold similar family attitudes, and women born in the 1970s or later express more egalitarian family attitudes. In Model 6, we add individual and parental sociodemographic characteristics, and find that individual education, party membership, being non-religious, and urban residence are associated with more egalitarian family attitudes for women. Parental education seems to play a limited role in shaping women's family attitudes but mother's non-agricultural employment is associated with greater egalitarianism. Overall, holding covariates constant, compared with women born in the 1950s, the average value of family attitudes is 0.08-point lower for women born in the 1960s but 0.2-point higher for women born in the 1990s. Thus, all else equal, cohort change in family attitudes among women is quite limited. The youngest cohort born in the 1990s seems to express high levels of disagreement with traditional gendered roles in the family, even after controlling for a host of covariates.

To facilitate interpretation, in Figure 2, we present predicted values of market attitudes and family attitudes by gender and cohort, based on Models 3 and 6 in Tables 2 and 3, with all the other covariates set at their means in the gender-pooled sample. The left panel in Figure 2 presents predicted values of market attitudes, and the right panel is for family attitudes. Holding other variables constant, we see a gradual trend toward more egalitarian market attitudes for both

men and women. In addition, controlling for other variables, the level of egalitarianism in market attitudes held by women born in the 1950s are on average 0.20-point higher than that held by their male counterparts, and this gender gap widens to 0.28 in the cohort born in the 1980s and 0.31 in the cohort born in the 1990s. Significance test indicates that the gender difference in the level of egalitarianism in market attitudes is significantly larger in more recent cohorts than in the 1950s cohort (0.28 vs. 0.20, $p = 0.049$; 0.31 vs. 0.20, $p = 0.044$).

[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]

As for family attitudes, holding other variables constant, the cohort trend among women is relatively flat, where only women born in the 1960s are more traditional and women born in the 1990s are more egalitarian, compared to those born in the 1950s. In contrast, for men, the downward trend across cohort is clear, indicating that men in more recent cohorts are more traditional than men born in the 1950s, all else being equal. Controlling for other variables, women are more egalitarian than their male counterparts regardless of cohort. Moreover, the gender gap in the level of endorsement of egalitarian family attitudes increases from 0.15-point in the 1950s cohort to 0.28-point in the 1980s cohort and 0.45-point in the 1990s cohort. Significance test indicates that compared with those born in the 1950s, men in younger cohorts further lag behind their female peers in terms of holding egalitarian attitudes about gender in the family (0.28 vs. 0.15, $p = 0.015$; 0.45 vs. 0.15, $p < 0.001$).

**Conclusion and Discussion**

To summarize, descriptively, attitudes about gender in the marketplace and in the family become more egalitarian across cohorts. Our full models indicate that cohort differences in market attitudes are largely due to value shifts, because controlling for compositional characteristics

does not alter the results. In contrast, cohort differences in family attitudes are largely due to cohort shifts in compositional characteristics, particularly the rising levels of individual and parental education across cohorts. Thus, the raw cohort trends toward more egalitarian family attitudes observed in Figure 1 mainly reflect shifts toward more-educated populations, rather than greater endorsement of egalitarianism across cohorts at each educational level. Strikingly, among men, family attitudes in generally become less egalitarian across cohorts. It is worth noting that men and women increasingly diverge across cohorts in terms of gender role attitudes, which can have far-reaching implications for family lives. For example, prior research suggests that due to a shortage of men who share similar levels of egalitarian gender ideology, highly-educated women in China experience a "marriage squeeze" and choose to delay or even forgo marriage (Jones, 2007; Qian & Qian, 2014). Markedly different gender ideology between husbands and wives may also lead to lower marital satisfaction, more marital conflicts, and eventually higher divorce risks. In sum, the current study highlights the multidimensionality of gender and gender ideology in China. In light of the uneven gender revolution and two-sphere separation in contemporary China, there is rising support for gender equality in the workforce yet persistent and even growing beliefs in gender essentialism towards family roles.

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*Table 1. Percentage Distributions (%)/Means of Covariates, by Birth Cohort and Gender*

| | Cohort born in the 1950s | Cohort born in the 1960s | Cohort born in the 1970s | Cohort born in the 1980s | Cohort born in the 1990s |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Men** | | | | | |
| ***Life course statuses*** | | | | | |
| Employment status | | | | | |
| Employed | 66% | 89% | 94% | 90% | 49% |
| Full-time homemaker | 3% | 2% | 1% | 1% | 1% |
| Non-employed | 31% | 10% | 5% | 9% | 50% |
| Marital status | | | | | |
| Married | 88% | 90% | 89% | 62% | 8% |
| Never married | 3% | 3% | 6% | 36% | 92% |
| Previously married | 10% | 7% | 5% | 2% | 0% |
| Number of children | 1.82 | 1.57 | 1.32 | 0.66 | 0.08 |
| ***Compositional attributes*** | | | | | |
| Education | | | | | |
| Primary education or less | 37% | 24% | 19% | 8% | 2% |
| Junior high school | 34% | 38% | 37% | 29% | 21% |
| Senior high school | 21% | 25% | 21% | 23% | 39% |
| Vocational college | 5% | 7% | 11% | 17% | 14% |
| University or above | 2% | 6% | 12% | 22% | 24% |
| Party membership | 19% | 14% | 16% | 11% | 3% |
| Non-religious | 91% | 90% | 89% | 90% | 90% |
| Urban residence | 54% | 56% | 65% | 71% | 70% |
| Parental education | | | | | |
| No schooling | 53% | 37% | 21% | 7% | 2% |
| Primary education | 35% | 41% | 40% | 26% | 19% |
| Junior high school | 7% | 12% | 21% | 32% | 38% |
| Senior high school | 4% | 7% | 13% | 26% | 29% |
| College or above | 2% | 3% | 5% | 8% | 11% |
| Mother's employment | | | | | |
| Non-agricultural jobs | 15% | 17% | 21% | 34% | 46% |
| Agricultural jobs | 63% | 66% | 64% | 51% | 33% |
| Non-employment | 22% | 18% | 15% | 15% | 20% |
| ***Sample Size*** | 4,274 | 4,584 | 3,988 | 2,886 | 1,190 |
| **Women** | | | | | |
| ***Life course statuses*** | | | | | |
| Employment status | | | | | |
| Employed | 37% | 68% | 75% | 67% | 43% |
| Full-time homemaker | 19% | 17% | 19% | 23% | 11% |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Non-employed | 44% | 15% | 6% | 10% | 46% |
| Marital status | | | | | |
| Married | 83% | 89% | 92% | 77% | 23% |
| Never married | 1% | 1% | 2% | 21% | 77% |
| Previously married | 16% | 10% | 6% | 2% | 0% |
| Number of children | 1.97 | 1.65 | 1.47 | 0.92 | 0.23 |
| ***Compositional attributes*** | | | | | |
| Education | | | | | |
| Primary education or less | 57% | 40% | 31% | 12% | 5% |
| Junior high school | 23% | 32% | 33% | 33% | 22% |
| Senior high school | 16% | 19% | 18% | 19% | 33% |
| Vocational college | 3% | 5% | 9% | 16% | 17% |
| University or above | 1% | 3% | 9% | 20% | 23% |
| Party membership | 6% | 4% | 5% | 7% | 6% |
| Non-religious | 84% | 85% | 87% | 88% | 89% |
| Urban residence | 57% | 55% | 64% | 70% | 66% |
| Parental education | | | | | |
| No schooling | 54% | 41% | 23% | 10% | 4% |
| Primary education | 33% | 36% | 38% | 26% | 23% |
| Junior high school | 7% | 13% | 22% | 32% | 38% |
| Senior high school | 4% | 7% | 12% | 26% | 25% |
| College or above | 2% | 3% | 5% | 6% | 10% |
| Mother's employment | | | | | |
| Non-agricultural jobs | 17% | 17% | 19% | 29% | 40% |
| Agricultural jobs | 62% | 66% | 66% | 54% | 39% |
| Non-employment | 21% | 17% | 15% | 17% | 21% |
| ***Sample Size*** | 4,136 | 4,750 | 4,381 | 3,275 | 1,210 |

*Note*: To save space, descriptives for regions and survey years are not presented (available upon request).

*Table 2. OLS Regression Results of Market Attitudes and Family Attitudes, Men*

| | Market Attitudes | | | Family Attitudes | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | M1 | M2 | M3 | M4 | M5 | M6 |
| ***Birth cohort*** | | | | | | |
| Born in the 1960s | 0.068* | 0.055* | 0.027 | -0.031 | -0.065* | -0.100*** |
| | (0.026) | (0.027) | (0.027) | (0.023) | (0.025) | (0.027) |
| Born in the 1970s | 0.183*** | 0.163*** | 0.104** | 0.112** | 0.043 | -0.027 |
| | (0.029) | (0.033) | (0.032) | (0.036) | (0.034) | (0.030) |
| Born in the 1980s | 0.236*** | 0.218*** | 0.134*** | 0.176*** | 0.033 | -0.079* |
| | (0.019) | (0.028) | (0.031) | (0.027) | (0.026) | (0.030) |
| Born in the 1990s | 0.277*** | 0.289*** | 0.202*** | 0.224*** | 0.025 | -0.104* |
| | (0.031) | (0.042) | (0.042) | (0.025) | (0.036) | (0.040) |
| ***Regions + Survey years*** | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| ***Life course statuses*** | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| ***Compositional attributes*** | | | | | | |
| Education (ref. = Primary education or less) | | | | | | |
| Junior high school | | | 0.141*** | | | 0.185*** |
| | | | (0.020) | | | (0.028) |
| Senior high school | | | 0.165*** | | | 0.353*** |
| | | | (0.023) | | | (0.031) |
| Vocational college | | | 0.215*** | | | 0.394*** |
| | | | (0.035) | | | (0.043) |
| University or above | | | 0.229*** | | | 0.454*** |
| | | | (0.039) | | | (0.047) |
| Party membership | | | 0.101*** | | | 0.122*** |
| | | | (0.026) | | | (0.028) |
| Non-religious | | | -0.049 | | | 0.058 |
| | | | (0.033) | | | (0.033) |
| Urban residence | | | 0.071*** | | | 0.099*** |
| | | | (0.020) | | | (0.025) |
| Parental education (ref. = No schooling) | | | | | | |
| Primary education | | | 0.084*** | | | 0.042* |
| | | | (0.020) | | | (0.020) |
| Junior high school | | | 0.087** | | | 0.061 |
| | | | (0.032) | | | (0.030) |
| Senior high school | | | 0.116*** | | | 0.105** |
| | | | (0.027) | | | (0.035) |
| College or above | | | 0.075 | | | 0.039 |
| | | | (0.051) | | | (0.040) |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mother's employment (ref. = Non-agricultural jobs) | | | | | | |
| Agricultural jobs | | | 0.004 | | | -0.086** |
| | | | (0.024) | | | (0.029) |
| Non-employment | | | -0.053 | | | -0.099** |
| | | | (0.027) | | | (0.034) |
| Constant | 3.763*** | 3.849*** | 3.594*** | 2.380*** | 2.668*** | 2.204*** |
| | (0.021) | (0.032) | (0.055) | (0.026) | (0.031) | (0.055) |

*Note:* ref. = reference category. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. To save space, coefficients for regions, survey years, and life course statuses (employment status, marital status, and number of children) are not presented here (available upon request). ***$p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

*Table 3. OLS Regression Results of Market Attitudes and Family Attitudes, Women*

| | Market Attitudes | | | Family Attitudes | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | M1 | M2 | M3 | M4 | M5 | M6 |
| ***Birth cohort*** | | | | | | |
| Born in the 1960s | 0.103*** | 0.066* | 0.017 | 0.055* | -0.023 | -0.076** |
| | (0.025) | (0.025) | (0.024) | (0.021) | (0.024) | (0.025) |
| Born in the 1970s | 0.306*** | 0.254*** | 0.147*** | 0.196*** | 0.087** | -0.039 |
| | (0.029) | (0.031) | (0.028) | (0.024) | (0.027) | (0.027) |
| Born in the 1980s | 0.467*** | 0.358*** | 0.210*** | 0.501*** | 0.242*** | 0.049 |
| | (0.020) | (0.024) | (0.025) | (0.044) | (0.033) | (0.036) |
| Born in the 1990s | 0.640*** | 0.414*** | 0.312*** | 0.910*** | 0.314*** | 0.205*** |
| | (0.033) | (0.036) | (0.038) | (0.053) | (0.045) | (0.054) |
| ***Regions + Survey years*** | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| ***Life course statuses*** | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| ***Compositional attributes*** | | | | | | |
| Education (ref. = Primary education or less) | | | | | | |
| Junior high school | | | 0.201*** | | | 0.290*** |
| | | | (0.022) | | | (0.029) |
| Senior high school | | | 0.315*** | | | 0.563*** |
| | | | (0.031) | | | (0.036) |
| Vocational college | | | 0.390*** | | | 0.743*** |
| | | | (0.031) | | | (0.045) |
| University or above | | | 0.388*** | | | 0.782*** |
| | | | (0.041) | | | (0.057) |
| Party membership | | | 0.076* | | | 0.185*** |
| | | | (0.038) | | | (0.040) |
| Non-religious | | | 0.007 | | | 0.067** |
| | | | (0.023) | | | (0.020) |
| Urban residence | | | 0.113*** | | | 0.137*** |
| | | | (0.018) | | | (0.026) |
| Parental education (ref. = No schooling) | | | | | | |
| Primary education | | | 0.104*** | | | 0.015 |
| | | | (0.020) | | | (0.019) |
| Junior high school | | | 0.130*** | | | 0.068* |
| | | | (0.025) | | | (0.031) |
| Senior high school | | | 0.137*** | | | 0.059 |
| | | | (0.028) | | | (0.039) |
| College or above | | | 0.154*** | | | 0.065 |
| | | | (0.039) | | | (0.049) |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mother's employment (ref. = Non-agricultural jobs) | | | | | | |
| Agricultural jobs | | | -0.020 | | | -0.069* |
| | | | (0.027) | | | (0.029) |
| Non-employment | | | -0.103*** | | | -0.081* |
| | | | (0.029) | | | (0.035) |
| Constant | 3.908*** | 4.097*** | 3.659*** | 2.404*** | 2.798*** | 2.121*** |
| | (0.023) | (0.035) | (0.043) | (0.028) | (0.046) | (0.055) |

*Note:* ref. = reference category. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. To save space, coefficients for regions, survey years, and life course statuses (employment status, marital status, and number of children) are not presented here (available upon request). ***$p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

***Figure 1: Mean Values of Market Attitudes and Family Attitudes, by Birth Cohort and Gender***




***Figure 2: Predicted Values of Market Attitudes and Family Attitudes, by Birth Cohort and Gender, Based on Models 3 and 6 of Tables 2 and 3, With All the Covariates Set at the Mean of the Gender-Pooled Sample***