Gender Attitudes in Africa: Liberal Egalitarianism across 34 Countries

Maria Charles
University of California, Santa Barbara

October 2018

Keywords: Gender, Ideology, Attitudes, Africa, Global

Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Sociological Association in Philadelphia and at colloquia at UC Irvine, UC San Diego, and Stockholm University; I thank participants for generative discussions and generous feedback. I am also grateful to Anne Wong and Rujun Yang for research assistance, Roger Friedland and Shengwei Sun for thought-provoking comments on earlier drafts, and Matthew Pearce for help with data acquisition. Direct correspondence to Maria Charles, Department of Sociology, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-9430, mcharles@soc.ucsb.edu.

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This study provides a first descriptive mapping of support for women's equal rights in 34 African countries and assesses diverse theoretical explanations for variability in this support. Contrary to stereotypes of a homogeneously tradition-bound continent, African citizens report a high level of agreement with women's equal rights that is more easily understood with reference to global processes of ideational diffusion than to country-level differences in economic modernization or women's public-sphere roles. Multivariate analyses suggest, however, that gender liberalism in Africa is spreading through mechanisms not typically considered by world-society scholars: While it is largely unrelated to countries' formal world-society ties, it increases with exposure to extra-local culture, including through Internet and mobile phone usage, news access and urban residency. Forces for gender liberalism are conditioned, moreover, by more local religious cultures and gender structures.

"Equality between women and men is a matter of human rights and a condition for social justice and is also a necessary and fundamental prerequisite for equality, development and peace." (Mission statement to the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing 1995)

"Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls" (Goal 5 of United Nations' 17 Sustainable Development goals, 2015)

In linking gender equality with human rights, Hillary Clinton's widely publicized address to the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women built upon decades-long efforts by global feminists and other civil-society leaders to resolve North-South debates about the meaning of women's empowerment in the context of massively uneven development (Tripp 2006; Wyrod 2008; Purkayastha 2018). In 2015, twenty years after the Beijing conference, this rights-based framing helped pave the way for 193 heads of state to unanimously adopt gender equality as one of 17 UN Sustainable Development goals.

Global affirmations of women's equal rights have drawn upon principles laid out after World War II in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the UN General Assembly and in the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. These documents established the intrinsic equality and moral standing of all persons as a central organizing principle of world society institutions. They also helped embed in these institutions a liberal cultural logic that treats individual persons as the fundamental building blocks of society and defines equality in formal procedural terms – as nondiscrimination and equal opportunity. Although liberal egalitarian principles are limited in the scope of inequities that they can address, and are often loosely coupled to actual behaviors and outcomes (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Tripp 2006; Charles 2011a; Cole and Ramirez 2013), they can be powerful ideological instruments supporting more local collective actions to extend equal human rights to historically unrecognized groups, including women (Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan 1997; Berkovitch 1999; Snyder 2006; Ferree 2006; Meyer 2010; Frank and Moss 2017).

Perhaps because of this perceived emancipatory potential, social scientists have devoted

considerable effort to exploring the characteristics of persons and societies that predict support for gender equality. Within-country analyses have identified education, gender, and religiosity as consistent individual-level predictors, and comparative analyses have revealed egalitarian effects of societal affluence, Christian religious culture, and/or exposure to global cultural scripts (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Davis and Greenstein 2009; Pierotti 2013; Chatillon, Charles and Bradley 2018).

The existing literature leaves important conceptual and empirical gaps, however. One is an inattention to the multidimensional structure of gender attitudes. Despite strong evidence to the contrary (Cotter, Hermsen and Vanneman 2011; Knight and Brinton 2017), many comparative and historical studies treat gender ideology as a unidimensional entity whose diverse indicators rise and fall together in response to increasing societal egalitarianism or traditionalism. Another gap relates to geographic coverage. We know little about variability in gender attitudes within and across less economically developed countries, especially in Africa. Micro-level investigations have been based mostly on samples from the United States and other affluent societies, and macro-level analyses have mostly involved comparisons among industrial societies or across countries spanning a wide range of economic development. This is an important omission, because two important theoretical accounts of ideological variation – by world society and modernization scholars – differ in their predictions about levels and patterns of attitudinal liberalism in less developed countries.

This article explores variability within Africa on one specific tenet of gender ideology: the belief that "women should have equal rights and receive the same treatment as men do." Based on individual- and country-level data covering more than 45,000 persons in 34 African countries, I address the following questions: To what extent is this liberal understanding of gender equality that is endorsed by world society elites evident in the attitudes of ordinary African citizens? And what accounts for

variability in support for "gender liberalism" within and across African countries?

In addition to the standard individual-level predictors of gender attitudes, I assess macro-theoretical arguments that have not yet been considered in an African context. The latter include influential world society and modernization theories, which locate forces for ideological change at the global and national levels, respectively. World society scholars describe a broad global dissemination of liberal egalitarian norms – including to poor African countries and especially to those with stronger formal ties to world-societal institutions (Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez 1997; Frank and Moss 2017). Modernization theorists treat egalitarian values as an outcome of socioeconomic forces that operate in more proximate socioeconomic environments – for example through the higher costs of discrimination and/or the weaker salience of concerns about material security in more economically developed countries (Treiman 1970; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Other possible country-level sources of variation in gender liberalism include differential levels of women's participation in public-sphere institutions (Baker and Letendre 2005; Wiseman et al. 2009) and differential exposures to political conflict and women's leadership and activism during men's extended absences (Hughes and Tripp 2015).

Survey responses reveal widespread support (or reported support) for women's equal rights in Africa that is more easily understood with reference to global processes of ideological diffusion than to country-level differences in economic modernization or women's social roles. Multivariate analyses suggest, however, that gender liberalism in Africa is spreading through mechanisms not typically considered by world-society scholars: While it is largely unrelated to countries' formal world-society ties, support for women's equal rights increases with individuals' exposure to extra-local culture, including through Internet and mobile phone usage, news access, and urban residence. Forces for liberalism appear to be conditioned, moreover, by more local religious cultures and gender structures.

The following section presents a review of the comparative literature on gender attitudes and introduces four theoretical accounts of cross-national variability.

Gender Ideology and its Genesis

Ideology is a central force in the generation and maintenance of gender inequalities, and understanding its variability over time and across societies and social groups has long been a key concern of gender and inequality scholars (Ridgeway 2011; Knight and Brinton 2017; Chatillon et al. 2018). Comparative researchers have often measured gender beliefs by combining diverse attitudinal tenets into summary measures of "gender egalitarianism" that are presumed to rise or fall depending upon a society's level of modernity or patriarchy.[1] Recent comparative and historical analyses have identified multiple independent tenets of gender ideology, however. Charles and Grusky, for example, distinguish between *male primacy,* which represents men as hierarchically superior (and therefore entitled to more rights), and *gender essentialism,* which represents men and women as fundamentally different but not necessarily unequal (2004; see also Cotter, Hermsen and Vanneman 2011).[2] Knight and Brinton also provide clear evidence of multidimensionality in their analysis of attitudinal trends in 17 European countries. While gender traditionalism (male primacy) declined in all of these societies between 1990 and 2009, it was replaced by three distinct varieties of egalitarianism: "liberal," "familist," and "flexible," which are characterized by different mixtures of essentialist and individualistic beliefs (2017).

The present study focuses on just *one* of the ideological contrasts identified by Knight and Brinton – namely the relative strength of liberal individualist and traditional gender beliefs, measured

[1] The pervasiveness of this unidimensional conceptualization partly reflects its homology with linear, evolutionary accounts of social stratification and modernization. Robert Max Jackson (1998), for example, attributes growing egalitarianism to the competitive pressures of modern political and economic systems, and Inglehart and Norris (2003) point to the egalitarian cultural effects of broad-based material security.

[2] Ideologies of male primacy have been linked to "vertical" forms of segregation, such as men's overrepresentation in high-prestige professions and elite universities, while gender essentialism has been linked to "horizontal" inequalities, such as segregation by field of study and between service work and manual labor (Charles 2011a; Levanon and Grusky 2016).

here as agreement with the statement that men and women have equal rights and should be treated equally – as opposed to women remaining subject to traditional laws and customs. This item, available in the fifth wave of the Afrobarometer survey, maps closely onto the "rights-based" conceptualization of gender equality that is hegemonic in modern world society institutions. Although these liberal universalistic principles do not undermine all forms of inequality and injustice (Charles 2011a; Epstein 2017), they have been embedded historically in collective actions to expand the categories of persons entitled to basic human rights (Soysal 1994, Meyer 2010) and they can become quite powerful when they come into conflict with persons or institutions that treat women's rights as secondary to ethnic, religious and other particularistic practices (Snyder 2006; Tripp 2006; Moghadam 2013).

Most of what we know about variability of gender attitudes is based on analyses in relatively affluent, democratic, and Christian-majority societies – in particular the U.S. and Europe since the 1960s. Race and gender are the demographic characteristics with the best-documented relationships to gender ideology in the United States, although the nature of the association depends on the specific attitudinal tenet that is at issue (Davis and Greenstein 2009; Chatillon et al. 2018). Other demographic predictors of specific gender beliefs include religion, age, social class, educational attainment, labor force participation, parental role models, place of residence, and family structure. There is also much evidence that race, class, gender, religion, and other identities interact in the production of gender attitudes (Davis and Greenstein 2009; Damaske 2011; Scheible and Fleishmann 2012).

I use data from the Afrobarometer and other international sources to measure the overall level of support for gender liberalism in Africa and to assess how this support varies across social groups within countries, and across countries with differential exposures to world cultural scripts, socioeconomic modernization, women's public-sphere incorporation, and disrupted gender regimes. The relevant macro-theoretical arguments are described below.

Exposure to World Culture

World society scholars treat exposure to world cultural scripts as a primary driving force in the mass dissemination of egalitarian belief systems. According to John Meyer and others, liberal individualistic principles of intrinsic human equality that are rooted in Western European Christian thought have gained worldwide cultural authority, especially since World War II (Meyer 1989; Meyer and Jepperson 2000). The interpretive frames and legitimacy demands that grow out of these ideals lead governments and nongovernmental organizations around the world to endorse – although not always enforce – principles of equality, including gender equality (Boli and Thomas 1997; Berkovitch and Bradley 1999; Meyer 2010).[3] Through ongoing exposure to the liberal egalitarian ideals propagated by world society elites, ordinary citizens absorb and respond to a universalistic "worldwide picture of how women should live and be educated" (Meyer 2004, p. 45).

Comparative research in this tradition has consistently identified international nongovernmental organizations (INGOS) and other formal institutional linkages to world society as central drivers of universalistic policies and practices – related, for example, to educational attainment, legislative representation, civil rights, and legal protections (Ramirez et al. 1997; Schofer and Meyer 2005; Paxton, Hughes and Green 2006; Koo and Ramirez 2009; Frank and Moss 2017). While the effect of world society linkages on *attitudes* has received relatively little sustained empirical attention, the same arguments imply that people learn world-society norms through mass media, schools, and other carriers of global culture. In Africa, exposure to extra-local culture increasingly occurs through digital media, including Internet-connected computers and mobile phones (Burrell 2012; Pew 2015a,b). Residence in

[3] In practice, state policies fall short of these liberal ideals (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Cole and Ramirez 2013). Some African governments, for example, sanction overt restrictions on women and girls that are difficult to reconcile with their endorsement of the African Union's 2003 Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa (Al Nagar and Tønnessen 2017).

urban areas also affords exposure to world-cultural values because cities are home to more diverse populations, including world society elites (Pierotti 2013).

I model exposure to global culture using country-level indicators of INGO density, foreign direct investment, remittances received, and official development aid, as well as information on individual respondents' Internet, mobile phone, and news access, and urban residence. Based on the idea that English language and British culture may contribute to a stronger penetration of liberal individualistic culture (Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov 2010), I also examine the effect of British colonial legacy.

Modernization

Socioeconomic development is perhaps the most studied macro-level predictor of gender equality. Traditional modernization theories treat egalitarian values and structures as byproducts of (post)industrialization and the growing competitive pressures that drive societies to move from ascriptive to achievement-based systems of social stratification (Treiman 1970; Inkeles and Smith 1974; Jackson 1998). More recently, political scientist Ronald Inglehart and his collaborators have documented an association at the country level between broad-based material security and "postmaterialist" values, including the proliferation of gender egalitarian attitudes (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). They argue that freedom from concern about existential security allows people to focus more on individual rights to self-expression, which are gradually extended to include previously marginalized categories of persons. Although modernization scholars have generally not distinguished how specific dimensions of gender ideology will respond to the rise of postmaterialist values, other research suggests that the liberal "equal rights" dimension is the form most closely associated with societal affluence.[4]

[4] Gender essentialist ideologies, for example, appear to remain relatively intact in advanced industrial societies (Charles 2011a; Cotter et al. 2011).

Some modernization arguments suggest nonlinear or lagged cultural effects, with attitudinal variability evident only beyond a certain threshold level of development, or with long delays between the experience of material security and the rise of postmaterialist values (Inglehart, Ponarin and Inglehart 2017). This implies that African countries may not have reached a level of prosperity that is high enough to generate gender-egalitarian values, or that they have not been at that level for long enough. To account for these possibilities, I model lagged, unlagged, and nonlinear effects of societal affluence on support for gender equality.[5]

Inglehart and collaborators also suggest cultural limits on modernization, specifically that the rise of egalitarian values is inhibited by religious traditionalism (especially Muslim cultural dominance) and facilitated by political democracy (see also Adams and Orloff 2005; Cole and Geist 2018; Hadler and Symons 2018). I also examine effects of political and religious culture on Africans' support for equal gender rights.

Modernization and world society theories differ not only in how they understand the *drivers* of gender liberalism; they also imply different *levels* of support. Accounts of global ideational diffusion suggest widespread support (or at least purported support) for women's equal rights in Africa that should be more or less independent of national economic development and should be strongest in countries with most exposure to world cultural scripts. Modernization accounts, by contrast, imply generally weak support for gender equality in Africa (due to its generally low level of economic development), with strongest support in the more economically developed of the African societies.

Women's Public-sphere Incorporation

Some scholars posit second-order ideological effects of the egalitarian structural changes that accompany socioeconomic modernization. By this account, the mass-incorporation of women into labor

[5] Although economic development varies a great deal within African countries, comparable indicators are not available at a level more fine-grained than country.

markets, educational systems, and political institutions contributes independently to women's cultural redefinition as equal citizens, and this in turn increases popular support for gender equality (Bradley and Ramirez 1996; Wiseman et al. 2009). David Baker and Gerald LeTendre argue, for example, that "(b)y the very act of educating students as students regardless of their gender…, a powerful meaning about the irrelevance of gender in academic matters arises" (2005:28). In this sense, the gender-integration of major societal institutions may be both cause and consequence of liberal gender attitudes. I assess attitudinal effects of public-sphere incorporation using indicators of women's representation in the economy, education, and politics.

Local Feminism and Unstable Gender Orders

While world society scholars describe top-down diffusion processes, others emphasize the capacity for grass-roots egalitarian change through local feminist mobilization and networking (Ferree 2006; Fallon 2008; Robinson 2015, 2016). Hughes and Tripp (2015) suggest, for example, that the traditional gender order is more easily renegotiated following periods of political instability, and that this "post-conflict" effect has been strengthened by the global legitimacy and visibility associated with the project of gender equality since the 1995 UN Conference on Women.[6] This scholarship has produced convincing evidence that feminist activism and social disruption have produced egalitarian *policy and electoral outcomes* in some post-conflict African countries. But effects on *attitudinal* egalitarianism have not been investigated so far. This is an important distinction, since Western varieties of feminism have sometimes been received in the global South as overly individualistic, as pitting women against men, and/or as inconsistent with indigenous values (Tripp and Badri 2017).

[6] Snyder similarly describes the UN as the "unlikely godmother" of global feminism" (2006), and Moghadam describes the role of the UN in creating a favorable opportunity structure for feminist organizing in the Middle East and North Africa (2013).

I explore the relationship between disrupted gender regimes and gender liberalism using country-level indicators of the density of women's social movement organizations, armed political conflict, and political instability since the 1995 UN Conference. I also examine whether INGO penetration and Internet access condition attitudinal effects of local activism.

Data and Methods

Data are drawn from the fifth wave of the Afrobarometer Surveys, conducted between 2011 and 2013. Afrobarometer is a pan-African research network with locally-based research teams in each participating country. In-person interviews are conducted by trained interviewers in the language of the respondent's choice.[7] The sample of persons with valid scores on all focal variables is comprised of 22,669 men and 22,557 women from 34 countries. While these countries do not represent the entire African continent, they do cover much of its landmass and provide considerable regional, economic, and cultural diversity.

Mixed effects logistic regressions were computed using Stata's XTMELOGIT procedure, with continuous covariates centered on the sample mean to facilitate interpretation. The mixed effects specification fits individual- and country-level effects while accounting for clustering of cases within countries.[8] Models are run separately for men and women. Intersections of gender with major religious denomination (Christian versus Muslim) are explored in supplementary analyses and discussed where relevant. To further assess contextual effects, I also computed individual-level models for men and women for each country separately, with weights applied to make samples nationally representative.

Measuring gender liberalism

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[7] Afrobarometer is a joint enterprise of the Institute for Democracy in South Africa, the Center for Democratic Development, the Institute for Development Studies at the University of Nairobi in Kenya, and the Institute for Empirical Research in Political Economy in Benin (http://www.afrobarometer.org/). Additional technical support is provided by Michigan State University (MSU) and the University of Cape Town (UCT).
[8] Using individual-level models for clustered data would violate the assumption of independent error terms, and the standard errors for the regression models would likely be too small (Luke, 2004; Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002).

Respondents to the fifth Afrobarometer survey wave were presented with two statements and given the opportunity to agree or agree strongly with either or to agree with neither. Statement 1: "In our country, women should have equal rights and receive the same treatment as men do." Statement 2: "Women have always been subject to traditional laws and customs, and should remain so." The wording of statement 1 closely represents the "equal-opportunity" egalitarianism represented in liberal feminist ideology and world society institutions. The forced choice between "equal rights" and "traditional laws and customs" implicitly equates gender egalitarianism with modernity, a contrast that aligns well with Western liberal understandings. The primary objective of this study is to understand variability within and across African countries in *strong agreement* with statement 1, which I interpret as a claim of unqualified endorsement of gender liberalism.[9]

Sensitivity tests assess variation on two alternative dependent variables: one that combines agreement and strong agreement in a single a binary indicator, and one that preserves the full four-category scale of support for gender equality using an ordered logistic regression framework. Correlations among the three indicators of gender liberalism range from .78 to .98 at the country level; country scores for all three measures are shown in Table A1.

Explanatory and control variables

Individual-level variables include measures of social identity (gender, religion, class, race), age, urban versus rural residence, education, employment status, Internet and mobile phone access, and news consumption, as well as information on the interviewer and the interview experience. Country-level variables include indicators of economic development, political democracy, religious culture, ties to global culture, women's socioeconomic status, and social stability and conflict. Details on measurement follow.

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[9] Approximately 2.5% of respondents provided no response or responded that they did not know or that they agreed with neither statement. They were coded as missing.

Respondent-level covariates

Respondents were classified by the interviewer as either a man or a woman and as belonging to one of seven racial categories: Black, Arab/Lebanese/North African, Colored, South Asian, White, and Other. The vast majority of respondents (nearly 95%) were classified into one of the first two racial categories. To examine how race influences support for women's equal rights, I distinguish between national racial minorities and others. Although this does not come close to capturing the complexity of African racial and ethnic stratification, comparison of specific racial groups is less meaningful in a cross-national context because of differences across societies in the culturally salient racial identities. It is possible that the experience of racial minority status sensitizes people to discrimination and unequal treatment, although we know from South Africa and elsewhere that numerical minority status is not always associated with disadvantage.

Class position is measured using subjective responses to a question asking respondents to assess their living condition relative to compatriots: "In general, how do you rate your living conditions compared to those of other [Algerians, Beninese, etc.]?" Those selecting "better" or "much better" than others are classified as materially advantaged, those selecting "worse" or "much worse" are classified as disadvantaged, and those selecting "the same" serve as the reference category. In addition, a more objective measure of material living standard is taken from a survey item asking about whether the respondent's house had indoor plumbing. Intersections of perceived class with racial minority status were explored using interaction terms, but these showed no significant effects and were dropped from the final models.

Other demographic variables include age, educational attainment, and employment status. Unfortunately, no data are available on respondents' marital status or number of children. Education is measured by distinguishing between respondents with no formal education, some primary education, a

complete primary education, a complete secondary education, and at least some post-secondary education.[10] Only about one-third of the sample reports "having a job that pays a cash income" (11% part-time, 22% full-time). These persons are distinguished with a dummy indictor from respondents who are not in the formal labor force or looking for a paid job.

Attitudinal effects of religion are assessed with regard to intensity and denomination. The open-ended question, "What is your Religion?" yielded nearly 90 distinct categories, many very small (Afrobarometer 2015). These were collapsed into a five-category classification: Catholic (19%), Evangelical/Pentecostal (9%), Other Christian (32%), Muslim (33%), and Other (6%). The last category includes respondents who claimed a traditional African religion (2%), no religion" (2%), or something else (2%). To the question, "How important is religion in your life?" a vast majority (87%) responded "very important." The religious intensity variable distinguishes those respondents from all others.

Indicators of Internet usage, mobile phone ownership, daily news consumption, and urban residence are used to assess respondents' exposure to extra-local culture and information. Regular Internet use is defined as at least a few times a month, mobile phone owners are identified with the item "I use a mobile phone that I own," and daily news consumers are those who reported getting news every day from either radio, television, newspaper, or the Internet. The urban/rural distinction was interviewer-coded based on the sampling unit designation.

Dummy indicators for "woman interviewer" and "others present during the interview" are included to gather evidence on possible social desirability biases or external influences, which may tell us something about the perceived normativity of gender liberalism and tensions between world society ideals and individual positionality.

Country-level covariates

[10] Only about 4% of respondents reported having a university degree, and their gender attitudes are similar to those with some post-secondary education.

Country scores on the primary country-level covariates and their intercorrelations are shown in Tables A2 and A3. Societal affluence is measured using the 2010 Human Development Index (HDI), which takes into account life expectancy, education, and national income. The HDI fluctuates less in response to short-term ups and downs in the economic cycle and offers a broader perspective on living standards and existential security of the population than purely economic measures. Additional indicators of socioeconomic modernization include the natural log of the 2010 gross domestic product (GDP), the percentage share of the 2010 labor force working in the non-agricultural sector, and HDI in 1980.[11] Measures of societal affluence are from UNDP 2007 and 2016; labor force data are from ILO 2017. National democracy is measured based on each country's 2010 score (1-10) on the Polity Project's Institutionalized Democracy scale (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2014). A subjective democracy score, aggregated from Afrobarometer respondents' placement of "our country today" on a 0 to 10 democracy scale, was used for sensitivity tests. National religious culture is measured with an indicator of Muslim cultural dominance, defined as Muslim self-identification by more than 75% of national Afrobarometer respondents; findings are similar using a 50% cutoff.

Country-level indicators of exposure to extra-local culture include international nongovernmental organization (INGO) memberships, official development assistance, foreign direct investment, and remittances received, all measured in 2010. Data on the total number of INGO membership were collected by the Union of International Association and compiled into an archive licensed by the University of California, Irvine. Data on total official development assistance received, in $US millions is from OECD archives (2016), foreign direct investment as percent of gross domestic product is from World Bank (2017), and total personal remittances received as percent of gross domestic

[11] HDI data for the 1980s are not available for Guinea, Liberia, Namibia, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania; values for Cape Verde and Uganda are from 1985. GDP, nonagricultural employment, and 1980 HDI correlate with 2010 HDI at .92, .80 and .81, respectively.

product is from World Bank (2017). Effects of British colonial heritage is assessed using a dummy variable.[12] Continuous indicators are measured on a logarithmic scale to reduce the leverage of outliers. In sensitivity tests, I explored interactions of INGO memberships with a country-level indicator of transnational women's activism in order to capture gender-specific transnational influences.

Women's public-sphere incorporation is assessed based on representation in three major social institutions, measured as women's share of the formal labor force (World Bank 2013), the ratio of women's to men's average years of schooling (UNESCO 2017), and women's share of parliament or lower government House (Inter-Parliamentary Union. 2017) in 2010, or the closest available year.[13] In sensitivity tests, I used a composite "Gender Equality Index" (GEI), which combines information on reproductive health (maternal mortality and adolescent birth rates), empowerment (female education and parliamentary seats occupied), and economic status (female labor force participation) (UNDP 2018).[14]

Local feminism and disruptions to the traditional gender order are assessed with reference to armed political conflict, political instability, and transnational women's activism at the country level. Conflict is measured with a dummy indicator for one or more armed political conflict between 1994 and 2004 (taken from Marshall 2006 for sub-Saharan Africa; author coding for other countries), and political instability is measured as the number of times countries changed polities in the fifteen years between the 1995 Beijing Conference on Women and 2010 (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2014). Transnational women's activism is measured as the percentage of transnational social movement organizations (SMOs) that are dedicated to women's rights in each country in 2003, the latest available year (author's

[12] Botswana, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe are former British colonies.

[13] Women's parliamentary representation is as reported to the Inter-Parliamentary Union on January 31, 2010. Education data are missing for Botswana, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Swaziland, and Zambia. Consistent with multi-dimensional conceptualizations of gender equality (Bradley and Khor 1993), women's representation is weakly correlated across these three public-sphere domains (see Table A3).

[14] The GEI is calculated as 1- the UNDP's 2010 Gender Inequality Index (2012 for Egypt; 2011 for Niger and Tanzania). GEI scores are missing for Cape Verde, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar and Nigeria.

calculation from Smith and Wiest 2012). Because women's activism is theorized to have a stronger effect on the gender order in contexts with greater exposure to transnational gender-egalitarian ideals, I also explore interactions of transnational social movement organization with indicators of media use and urban residence. Supplementary analyses using diverse alternative measures of disrupted gender regimes (described further on) yielded similar results.

Results

Contrary to Western stereotypes of a homogeneously tradition-bound African continent, descriptive results indicate substantial support for liberal gender-egalitarian values, with a large plurality, 45%, of Afrobarometer respondents reporting strong agreement with equal rights for women and an additional 30% reporting agreement. Only 13% disagreed and 12% disagreed strongly.

Figure 1 shows the percentage of women and men in each national population that reported agreeing strongly with equal gender rights between 2011 and 2013. Not surprisingly, the figure reveals a strong positive correlation (.84) between men's and women's country mean scores (evident in the clustering around the parity line), and a tendency for women to express somewhat more egalitarian views than men (evident in the preponderance of data points to the left of the parity line). The rate of strong agreement ranges widely from just over 10% of men in Niger to just under 70% of women in Uganda. Intraclass correlation coefficients (ICC) from null mixed effect models (i.e., models with no covariates) indicate that approximately 7.4% of attitudinal variability occurs across countries for women and about 8.7% for men, with the remainder occurring within countries.

Table 1 gives means and standard deviations of respondent-level covariates, broken down by gender. Consistent with results in Figure 1, women are more likely than men to report strong egalitarian attitudes (50% versus 41%). Men on average have more formal education, and are more likely to report

paid work and access to technology and news media. Mobile phone ownership is much more common than Internet usage, suggesting that many Africans own mobile phones that are not Internet enabled.

Before exploring patterns of cross-national variability, it is useful to examine the general demographic predictors of gender liberalism in Africa. Table 2 shows results from models with individual-level covariates only, first for the full sample and then separately for men and women. Similar models broken down simultaneously by gender and major religious denomination (Muslim and Christian) are displayed in Table A4.

The attitudinal gender gap remains in the multivariate specification: Controlling for baseline demographic characteristics, women's odds of reporting strong agreement with gender equality is approximately 62% greater than men's (exp.[0.481]=1.62). Country-specific analyses (available on request) show a positive woman-to-man gender gap in all 34 countries, with statistical significance at the 5% probability level in 26 of 34 countries.[15]

Age shows no significant effect for women, but support for gender equality is higher among older than younger men. The latter was not expected and may be attributable to the greater likelihood that older men have daughters or wives (both unmeasured here) for whom they support equality, or to shifts toward traditional or anti-Western values among younger cohorts in some societies.[16] No nonlinear age effects were found in supplementary analyses.

Consistent with findings for the affluent West, men's and women's support for gender liberalism increases with education. Models in Table A4 suggest a somewhat stronger and more linear relationship among Christians than Muslims. This interaction requires further study; it may reflect liberal influences of European missionary activity on school curricula in Christian communities (Nunn 2010; see also

[15] Gender difference in Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Liberia, and Zambia are significant at $p<.10$, and differences in Burundi, Malawi, Mali, and Sierra Leon are not statistically significant.
[16] Country-specific models for men show the largest positive age coefficients in Guinea and Tunisia.

Manglos and Weinreb 2013 on how education's effects on attitudes may be conditioned by religion). Net of education, having a paid job is unrelated to support for gender equality among men and women, Christians and Muslims.

Effects of subjective social class (perceived material advantage) differ by gender. While no significant relationship is evident for men, women (and especially Muslim women) who perceive that their living conditions are "the same" as other compatriots report less liberal gender views than women who perceive either advantage or disadvantage. The observed positive effect of class advantage is consistent with previous US- and European-based research, but the finding for disadvantage was unexpected. Net of subjective class location, neither living in a structure with indoor plumbing nor minority racial status shows an association with gender attitudes. I find no significant interactions between race and class.

Religion and religiosity show effects on women's (but not men's) attitudes, with highly religious Christian women more likely to express strong support for gender equality than highly religious Muslim women. Previous scholars have attributed Christian-Muslim differences in attitudes toward gender and sexuality to the differential influence of individualistic values, the cultural influence of Islamic family law, and/or an emphasis on "gender complementarity" rather than "gender equality" in some versions of Muslim feminism (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Alexander and Welzel 2011; Friedland et al. 2016; Sadiqi 2017), although Muslim women and Muslim women's movements are ideologically quite heterogeneous (Scheible and Fleishman 2012; Moghadam 2013; Tripp and Badri 2017). Net of other variables in the model, men's support for women's equal rights is not affected by their personal denominational affiliation. As discussed further on, however, living in a country with a Muslim-dominant religious culture is a strong negative predictor of gender liberalism among both men and women.

Table 2 shows positive effects of media usage and urban residence that are consistent with cultural exposure arguments. Persons who use the Internet regularly are, for example, 19% more likely to report strong support for gender equality than those who do not (exp.[.174]=1.19). Comparing columns 2 and 3, it appears that daily news consumption is more closely associated with men's gender liberalism while urban residence and mobile phone usage are more closely associated with women's. Living in cities and using mobile phones likely expands and diversifies women's social networks, exposes them to liberal-egalitarian discourse, and presents opportunities for anonymity and interpersonal mobilization.[17] Instead of direct interpersonal exchanges with feminist stakeholders, men's attitudes may be liberalized through exposure to news and other carriers of world-society norms that equate gender equality with modernity. Results in Table A4 show that attitudinal effects of digital media and social networks are mediated by both gender and religion. For example, cell phone usage shows especially liberalizing effects for Christian women, urban residence is especially liberalizing for Muslim women, and daily news consumption is especially liberalizing for Muslim men. These results underscore the utility of an intersectional approach to understanding the production of gender ideology.

Contemporaneous data from the Arabbarometer surveys suggest that political activism may be one mechanism through which digital media usage increases gender liberalism. For a sample of five Northern African countries (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia), I find that men and women who report using mobile phones for political purposes are more likely to claim strong support for gender equality.[18] While the generalizability of this relationship beyond North Africa is unknown, it is consistent with the idea that liberal universalistic values can be diffused through digitally-enabled

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[17] Women may use phones more for interpersonal communication because their phones are less often Internet-enabled than men's (Pew 2015b).

[18] Among men in these five countries, the percentage strongly agreeing with women's equal rights is 28% for those who do not use mobile phones for political purposes and 37% among those who do. A positive effect of mobile phone activism remains in models with demographic controls, including for education, age, and class (results available upon request).

political discourse and activism (Sadiqi 2017; Altoaimy 2018). It is also consistent with the idea that more liberal attitudes spur digital activism.

Individual-level coefficients reveal significant effects of the *interview context* as well. Being interviewed by a woman increases men's odds of expressing strong support for gender equality by 37% and women's odds by 17% (exp.[.315]=1.37; exp.[.157]=1.17). Effects are especially strong for Muslim men (Table A4). The meaning of this interviewer effect likely depends upon the respondent's gender. Women may be more comfortable revealing agreement with gender equality to another woman, while men may be more comfortable revealing *disagreement* to another man (i.e., a woman interviewer may motivate men to inflate their agreement and allow women to be more honest in reporting theirs). This effect may also reflect respondents' general expectation that women – as presumed beneficiaries of gender equality – are more likely to hold them accountable to liberal gender-egalitarian principles.

Results also show that men, especially Muslim men, are less likely to report strong support for women's equality in the presence of others. This could reflect shame associated with transgressing local norms of masculinity, or men's interest in maintaining the legitimacy of their patriarchal privilege over those witnessing the interview (e.g., their wives or daughters). Muslim men may be more susceptible to social desirability bias because they sense a larger disparity between the tenets of their religious faith and the Western world society orthodoxy and may therefore feel more need to save face or protect privilege than their Christian counterparts. A recent ethnographic study in the Democratic Republic of Congo revealed a similar reluctance by men to be held publicly or morally accountable to the egalitarian principles promoted by a Western-led INGO, even when they were willing to embrace the prescribed egalitarian behaviors privately on a voluntary basis (Pierotti, Lake, and Lewis 2018).[19]

[19] These men, for example, increased their shares of domestic labor without discussing this change with their wives because they feared that "women would start to make orders" (Pierotti et al. 2018, p. 555).

One way to understand the magnitude of the observed interview effects is to compare reported levels of gender liberalism across respondent groups with different interview experiences. For men, the highest reported rates are 44.84% strongly agreeing and 28.69% agreeing (when interviewed by a woman with no other witnesses), compared to lowest rates of 38.41% and 30.49% (with a man interviewer and others present). For women, the highest reported rates are 52.06% strongly agreeing and 30.01% agreeing (with a woman interviewer and others present), compared to 48.88% and 28.07% (with a man interviewer and others present). Although these are substantial differences, even the minimum values suggest widespread identification with gender liberal principles among African citizens.

Although the present data do not allow us to determine the conditions under which liberal responses are more or less *honest*, the tendency for African men and women to adjust reports of their own gender liberalism depending on the audience would seem to indicate an awareness of global egalitarian norms, as well as an experienced tension between these norms and their quotidian gender relations.[20] It is notable that respondents are reporting their gender beliefs to country nationals (albeit educated nationals), and not to outside members of the global elite who might be presumed to hold them to "foreign" standards.

The models in Table 2 serve as baseline for the four macro-level accounts of gender ideology that are elaborated above: modernization, exposure to global culture, women's public-sphere participation, and grass-roots feminism. To conserve degrees of freedom, I consider the frameworks one at a time, adding to the baseline model four sets of theoretically relevant variables. Results are shown in Tables 3-6.

Modernization

[20] Supplementary regression models included information on interviewers' assessments of respondents' honesty and susceptibility to outside influence. Net of other variables in the model, interviewers described those who reported agreement with women's equal rights (both men and women) as more, not less, honest. There is no evidence, in other words, that interviewers perceived a general tendency toward false liberalism.

Table 3 represents modernization accounts of variability in liberal gender ideology. Coefficients are shown for three different indicators of socioeconomic development: the Human Development Index (HDI), per capita gross domestic product (GDP), and the size of the nonagricultural labor force. HDI is measured in 2010, using both linear and nonlinear terms, and in 1980 to allow for lagged effects. Each of these five measures is added separately to the baseline model along with controls for national political democracy and religious culture. The complete set of coefficients for the first model, with HDI as focal predictor, can be found in Table A5 (columns 1 and 4 for men and women, respectively).

Results in Table 3 are inconsistent across the board with accounts linking economic development to liberal individualistic gender attitudes. In fact, the two statistically significant modernization coefficients – for GDP and non-agricultural employment on men's attitudes – are *negative*. It may be that early stages of development and the decline of family-based agriculture allow men more latitude to assert patriarchal privilege in some cultures. Models 4 and 5 reveal no nonlinear or lagged effects of societal affluence on value change, although it is possible that a liberalizing influence of societal affluence occurs only beyond an affluence threshold that these African countries have not yet reached. In sensitivity tests, no significant economic development effects emerged when individual countries were eliminated one at a time from the regression model (i.e., in 34 different 33-country iterations of model 1). Zero-order correlations between "strong agreement" and the three different measures of economic modernizations are close to zero, moreover.

Political democracy scores are also unrelated to gender attitudes, including when the Polity Project measure is replaced with subjective democracy scores aggregated from Afrobarometer responses. In supplementary analyses, I found no significant interactions of political democracy or religious culture with economic modernization.

The one consistent macro-level predictor in Table 3 relates to religious culture. Net of personal religious denomination, countries with predominantly Muslim populations show odds of expressing strong gender-egalitarian beliefs that are about 50% lower for men and 43% lower for women (exp.[-.698]=.50; exp.[-.560]=.57). This country-level denominational effect is consistent with previous comparative studies of attitudinal variation (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Alexander and Welzel 2011; Hadler and Symons 2018). I find no evidence that it can be attributed to oil-dependence (Ross 2008), Middle Eastern geographic location, or skepticism about Western democracy in predominantly Muslim countries (results available on request).[21] An indicator of Muslim religious culture is included as a country-level control in all subsequent models.

Exposure to extra-local culture

World society scholars posit a process of global ideational diffusion, whereby countries and persons with more exposure to world society actors and institutions are more strongly influenced by liberal egalitarian ideology. Table 4 represents this theoretical account. In models 1-4 I add to the baseline model the most frequently-used measures of exposure to world culture, one at a time to conserve degrees of freedom. Model 5 explores effects of Anglo-American cultural exposure and English-language penetration using a country-level indicator of British colonial heritage. All models include the same individual-level measures of exposure to extra-local culture listed in Table 2: Internet and mobile phone usage, news consumption, and urban residence.

With one exception, country-level indicators of formal world-society linkage show small and statistically insignificant effects. The density of international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) and the amounts of foreign direct investment and international remittances are unrelated to men's and

[21] Existing evidence is mixed on whether greater attitudinal liberalism translates into Christian advantage with respect to women's representation in public-sphere institutions such as higher education, politics, and scientific labor markets (Charles 2011b; Fallon, Swiss, and Viterna 2012; Moghadam 2013; Tripp and Badri 2017; Cole and Geist 2018).

women's support for gender equality, as is British colonial heritage. In model 3, the positive effect of official development aid (ODA) for men is consistent with the argument that international aid agencies disseminate liberal egalitarian ideals or information about Western gender norms.[22] The insignificant relationship of ODA with women's gender liberalism may be attributable to aid representatives' more direct contact with men, who make up the majority of government employees and government contractors in Africa (Ransom and Bain 2011). In supplementary analyses, I found no interactions of INGO density with economic development, religious culture, women's social movement organization, or British colonial heritage. Conclusions are unchanged in variants of models 1-4 that excluded outliers on the focal covariates or measured them on linear instead of logarithmic scales.

While the standard country-level indicators of world-cultural exposure are poor predictors of variability in gender liberalism across these African countries, the individual-level results discussed above do suggest that African men and women may be exposed to liberal egalitarian values through extra-local urban networks, news reports, and digital media.

Women's public-sphere incorporation

The relationship between women's socioeconomic roles and endorsement of equal gender rights is weak and varies by indicator. Of six coefficients shown in Table 5, only one supports the idea that degendering of major public-sphere institutions promotes gender liberalism: Model 1 shows that men's odds of strong agreement with women's equal rights increase by about 3% with each percentage-point increase in women's share of the national labor force (exp.[.033]=1.03). This finding accords with evidence of more egalitarian values among US men who are married to employed women (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004). The macro-level association between women's employment and gender liberalism in Africa warrants further study, however, especially given the notoriously error-prone measurement of

[22] Increasing ODA by a factor of 2.72 (the base of the natural log) increases the odds of men's strong support for gender equality by about 23% (exp.[.211]=1.23).

labor force activity in developing countries.[23] Indicators of African women's educational attainment and political representation show no relationship to gender attitudes of men or women.

Results are robust to diverse alternative measures of women's socioeconomic status. I found no significant effects, for example, when the composite Gender Equality Index was used to measure women's public-sphere incorporation or when the UNESCO and World Bank indicators of female educational attainment and labor market participation were replaced with statistics aggregated to the country level from the Afrobarometer survey responses. It bears noting, moreover, that the models in Table 5 offer a generous evaluation of the cultural spillover argument, since the reverse causal relationship – from egalitarian values to women's educational, occupational and political participation – is also likely positive.

Local feminism and unstable gender orders

Table 6 assess attitudinal effects of disruptions to the traditional gender order. Political unrest and the density of women's social movement organizations (SMOs) show no relationship to gender liberalism, and although the coefficient for armed political conflict is statistically significant in the men's model, it is negative rather than positive. In sensitivity tests (not shown), I find no evidence that the attitudinal effect of social movement activism is conditioned by exposure to transnational gender-egalitarian ideals (as measured by interactions of SMO density with media use and urban residence). Substituting alternative measures of disrupted gender regimes did not change conclusions.[24]

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[23] This measurement error also confounds efforts to distinguish effects of women's employment from effects of Muslim religious culture, which are highly correlated (r=.70). In supplementary analyses, the coefficient for female labor force participation grew larger and became statistically significant for both men and women when the indictor for Muslim religious culture was omitted from model 1. One interpretation is that Muslim religious culture affects gender attitudes in part by constraining women's formal employment. An alternative interpretation is that the attitudinal effects of Muslim religious culture are spurious and largely attributable to exogenously determined differences in women's labor force activity (Ross 2008). Clear assessment of these causal relationships will require better historical data on labor force participation than is currently available for these countries.

[24] Alternative measures include a dichotomous indicator of political instability (defined as five or more polity changes since 1995), a scale of political instability that is capped at "6 or more" polity changes, and social movement variables based on a

While previous research has shown that disruption of traditional gender regimes opens up formal political and leadership roles for African women (El-Bushra 2003; Tripp 2015), effects of this unrest on *attitudes* are not evident here.

Sensitivity tests using alternative attitudinal measures

To assess the robustness of findings to changing definitions of gender liberalism, I regressed the same covariates on two alternative dependent variables. The first aggregates supporters and strong supporters of women's equal rights into a single binary response category, and the second measures responses to the same survey question on a 4-point ordinal scale of liberal egalitarianism (see Table A1 for definitions and country scores on all three measures).[25]

Table A5 shows the original modernization model (Table 3, model 1) applied to all three dependent variables. Results are similar across models, with a few exceptions. At the individual level, the size and statistical significance of some race and class coefficients depend upon the level of agreement being predicted. At the country-level, the most notable change is that the HDI coefficients become positive and statistically significant for women using the alternative dependent variables. It may be that greater material security provides women more freedom to imagine a gender-equal society (i.e., to agree), but that the intensification of egalitarian aspirations (i.e., strong agreement) depends upon other factors, such as exposure to legitimating liberal discourse. Consistent with this interpretation, results also suggest that Muslim religious culture discourages women's *strong agreement* but not their *agreement* with equal gender rights (model 5).[26] In additional analyses (not shown), I recomputed all

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broader definition of "gender-relevant" activism (calculated from Smith and Wiest 2012) and based on the absolute number (rather than percentage share) of women's SMOs.

[25] I used Stata's MEOLOGIT procedure to compute the multilevel ordinal models.

[26] Descriptive statistics show that 70% of women agree strongly *or* agree with gender equality in predominantly Muslim countries, compared to 81% in other countries. Among men, the corresponding figures are 57% and 75%.

models shown in Tables 3-6 using the two alternative attitudinal variables. Results showed no other new effects of macro-level covariates, including for the other measures of socioeconomic modernization.

Conclusion

This first descriptive mapping of gender attitudes in Africa reveals widespread support for the liberal variety of gender egalitarianism that predominates in elite world-society institutions and affluent Western societies. Between 2011 and 2013, nearly half (45%) of Afrobarometer respondents reported strong agreement with the statement that "women should have equal rights and be granted the same treatment as men do," and a full three-quarters reported agreement. Although men agree less than women and Muslims agree less than Christians, it is noteworthy that more than 62% of surveyed Muslim men report either agreement or strong agreement with equal gender rights. The pervasiveness of this gender-liberal response among African citizens is difficult to reconcile with linear modernization theories and with Western stereotypes of a homogeneously tradition-bound continent. It does accord with the predictions of world society theories of global ideational diffusion (Meyer 2010) – albeit with caveats on the mechanisms, as discussed further on.

The relationship between reported and actual gender beliefs and the effects of each on social outcomes remain open questions. The results of this study point to significant interviewer and audience effects on reported support for women's equal rights. While it certainly matters what people truly believe, survey responses can provide important information about what people understand to be normative – or safe – responses in a given context. Men's tendency to report more liberal beliefs to women than to men interviewers, for example, suggests an *awareness* of modern world society norms and a belief that women – as presumed beneficiaries – will view them more favorably if they report agreement with these norms (or that men will view them less favorably). While awareness is a poor predictor of individual behavior in the short term, even pretend conformity with equality scripts can

have long-term consequences by identifying and legitimating nondiscriminatory standards of behavior (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Pierotti 2013). Global and African feminists report that liberal world society norms provide powerful ideological leverage that can legitimate rights claims and better position local activists to press for change (Snyder 2006; Moghadam 2013). The codification of equal rights in the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action, for example, helped African women's groups marshal international pressure "to bolster their claims for representation and to construct women's political representation as the norm for modern nation states" (Hughes and Tripp 2015:1531).

With respect to attitudinal variation *within* Africa, neither modernization nor world society theory garners much support from observed country-level effects. Differences in gender liberalism across Africa are at best weakly related to the structural factors such as economic modernization, feminist activism, formal world-society linkages, and armed conflict that have been linked previously to degendering of roles and social policies. In other words, world society theory finds support in the *high prevalence* of gender liberalism reported by African respondents, but not in the *distribution* of these values across African countries (especially in their distribution across countries with differential linkages to world society). Results suggest that digital media and urban social networks may provide alternative channels for the diffusion of liberal equality norms to individual citizens. The penetration of these values appears to depend on more local religious cultures and gender structures, however.

What accounts for discrepancies between the present results and previous research that shows equalizing effects of formal world society linkages such as INGO memberships and foreign financial flows? One possible explanation is that *structures of inequality* (e.g., gendered educational and occupational policies and outcomes) and *popular attitudes about inequality* are governed by different causal logics. Formal ties to world society may make global norms highly salient to policy makers and other elites who can gain legitimacy (or development aid) for their countries through enactment of

egalitarian policies and practices. But these formal ties do not necessarily generate much awareness in the general African public. Similarly, the capacity of gender-egalitarian behaviors and structural forms (such as women's public-sphere incorporation) to liberalize popular attitudes will depend on the degree to which ordinary people are exposed to alternative gender schemas and on the relationship of these alternative schemas to the local gender order (Deutsch 2007; Wyrod 2008; Swidler and Watkins 2017; Ashwin and Isupova 2018; Pierotti et al. 2018).

The strong effects of religious denomination and religious culture on popular attitudes suggest an ongoing conflict and coexistence of globally- and locally-based cultural logics, especially as concerns the relationship between the individual and society. Most significantly, I find that men and women who live in Muslim-dominant cultures are considerably less likely to report strong support for women's equal rights. Although the precise mechanisms driving this difference likely vary by context, one likely contributor is the cultural influence of religious family law in many predominantly Muslim countries (Htun and Weldon 2011). In societal contexts where women are legally subordinated in families and segregated from men in public spaces, people's daily life experiences will more clearly contradict liberal individualistic understandings of universal human equality and autonomy (Friedland et al. 2016). This incommensurability with lived experiences may be amplified by the political connotations of Western liberalism. Challenges to patriarchal family law have almost always been met with fierce resistance from religious authorities, including in Anglo-European societies during the late twentieth century. But resistance may be especially intense in formally colonized Muslim societies, where national identity is partly constructed around the contrast between indigenous traditions and Western values, including gender liberalism (Htun and Weldon 2011). From this vantage point, it is not surprising that Christian cultures have been more receptive to liberal individualistic principles that are rooted in European Christendom (Meyer 1989; Meyer and Jepperson. 2000).

The role of digital media as a conduit through which liberal egalitarian values are disseminated, shaped, and debated around the world warrants much more sustained empirical attention. Although computers and mobile phones are increasingly important as information sources, modes of global exchange, and platforms for mobilization in Africa (Ferree and Pudrovska 2006; Pew 2015a,b; Badri and Tripp 2017; Altoaimy 2018), little is known about the ideological *content* of digitally-accessed information and about how this content is received in different geographic areas and social groups. The current analysis focuses on the liberal egalitarian content dimension, but there is some evidence that Western gender-essentialist stereotypes and Muslim feminist perspectives are also represented and disseminated through online communities in African and Arab societies (Burrell 2012; Altoaimy 2018).

The reception of world cultural scripts and their translation on the ground into policies, practices and political opportunity structures also requires more detailed study. In contrast to unidimensional accounts of ideological "modernization," recent comparative analyses have shown that different social, economic, and ideological indicators of "women's status" are governed by independent causal logics (Charles 2011a; Fallon et al. 2012; Moghadam 2013: Knight and Brinton 2017). It follows that the specific configuration of inequalities and ideologies observed in any context will depend on the interaction of global norms with locally-grown power structures and gender regimes.

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Figure 1.



Table 1.
Means for Individual-level Covariates

	Men N=22,669	Women N=22,557
Gender equality, strong support (=1)	.408	.500
Age, in years	38.540 (15.114)	35.701 (13.767)
No formal educ (=1)	.162	.228
Some primary educ (=1)	.164	.186
Completed primary educ (=1)	.142	.143
Some secondary educ (=1)	.211	.197
Completed secondary educ (=1)	.167	.142
Post-secondary educ (=1)	.154	.104
Paid job (=1)	.403	.264
Indoor plumbing (=1)	.244	.245
Subjective disadvantage (=1)	.351	.356
No advantage/disadvantage (=1)	.358	.360
Subjective advantage (=1)	.291	.284
Minority race (=1)	.042	.045
Highly religious (=1)	.854	.893
Catholic (=1)	.191	.191
Evangelical/Pentecostal (=1)	.083	.102
Other Christian (=1)	.317	.327
Muslim (=1)	.334	.328
Traditional/Other/No Religion (=1)	.075	.052
Other(s) at interview (=1)	.283	.350
Woman interviewer (=1)	.442	.473
Use Internet regularly (=1)	.207	.140
Own mobile phone (=1)	.790	.663
Access news daily (=1)	.674	.567
Urban residence? (=1)	.401	.408

Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.

Table 2.
Individual-level Predictors of Strong Support for Gender Equality in 34 African Countries

	1	2	3
	All	Men	Women
Woman (=1)	0.481***		
	(0.021)		
Age, in years	0.002*	0.004***	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
No formal educ (=1)[a]	-0.335***	-0.344***	-0.286***
	(0.038)	(0.056)	(0.052)
Some primary educ (=1)[a]	-0.183***	-0.215***	-0.130**
	(0.034)	(0.049)	(0.048)
Completed primary educ (=1)[a]	-0.135***	-0.170***	-0.0954
	(0.036)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Completed secondary educ (=1)[a]	0.128***	0.0642	0.197***
	(0.034)	(0.047)	(0.050)
Some post-secondary educ (=1)[a]	0.206***	0.137**	0.296***
	(0.039)	(0.052)	(0.060)
Paid job (=1)	0.0114	0.0215	0.0391
	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.034)
Indoor plumbing (=1)	0.0216	0.022	0.012
	(0.034)	(0.048)	(0.047)
Subjective class disadvantage (=1)[b]	0.047	-0.005	0.092**
	(0.024)	(0.035)	(0.034)
Subjective class advantage (=1)[b]	0.109***	0.053	0.152***
	(0.026)	(0.037)	(0.036)
Minority race (=1)	0.085	0.082	0.081
	(0.057)	(0.082)	(0.079)
Highly religious (=1)	0.017	0.150	-0.105
	(0.065)	(0.096)	(0.091)
Catholic (=1)[c]	-0.031	0.138	-0.175
	(0.090)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Evangelical/Pentecostal (=1)[c]	-0.067	-0.028	-0.091
	(0.130)	(0.180)	(0.180)
Other Christian (=1)[c]	-0.138	-0.028	-0.210
	(0.085)	(0.120)	(0.120)
Traditional/Other/No Religion (=1)[c]	0.050	0.291*	-0.218
	(0.092)	(0.130)	(0.140)
Highly relig × Catholic[c]	0.270**	0.102	0.432**
	(0.091)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Highly relig × Evangelical/Pentecostal[c]	0.280*	0.232	0.326
	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.18)
Highly relig × Other Christian[c]	0.302***	0.196	0.390**
	(0.085)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Highly relig × Traditional/other[c]	0.094	-0.103	0.305
	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.16)
Regularly use Internet (=1)	0.174***	0.193***	0.180***
	(0.033)	(0.044)	(0.050)
Own mobile phone (=1)	0.118***	0.054	0.148***
	(0.026)	(0.039)	(0.035)
Access news daily (=1)	0.128***	0.181***	0.058
	(0.023)	(0.033)	(0.032)
Urban residence (=1)	0.105***	0.054	0.162***
	(0.023)	(0.034)	(0.033)
Others at interview (=1)	-0.051*	-0.101**	-0.011
	(0.022)	(0.033)	(0.031)
Woman interviewer (=1)	0.234***	0.315***	0.157***
	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Constant	-0.947***	-1.025***	-0.409**
	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.13)
Std. Deviation, Constant	.494 (.061)	.559 (.070)	.468 (.059)
Log likelihood	-29,139.286	-14,350.56	-14,719.524
N (country N)	45,226 (34)	22,669 (34)	22,557 (34)

Note: Models are mixed effects logistic regressions computed using Stata's XTMELOGIT procedure. Standard errors are in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$ [a] Reference category is some secondary education; [b] reference category is no class advantage/disadvantage; [c] reference category is Muslim.

Table 3. Socioeconomic Modernization: Country-level Predictors of Strong Support for Gender Equality

	1		2		3		4		5	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men[a]	Women[a]
Human Development Index, HDI	-.712	1.044					-.508	.897		
GDP per capita (ln)			-.215**	-.025						
Nonagricultural employment, % labor force					-.008*	-.001				
HDI squared							-3.300	2.368		
HDI in 1980[a]									-.874	.622
Democracy score (Polity Project, 0-1 scale)	.000	-.032	.000	-.026	.007	-.025	.004	-.035	.011	-.018
Muslim religious dominance (=1)	-.698***	-.560**	-.635***	-.514**	-.607**	-.512**	-.655**	-.590**	-.713***	-.401*

Note: Models include all covariates shown in Table 2. N=22,669 men, 22,557 women; country N=34. [a] N=19,366 men, 19,300 women; country N=29. *$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$

Table 4. Exposure to World Culture: Country-level Predictors of Strong Support for Gender Equality

	1		2		3		4		5	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
INGO memberships (ln)	-.155	-.051								
Foreign direct investment, % GDP (ln)			.040	.052						
Official development aid in $US (ln)					.211*	.059				
Remittances received, % GDP (ln)							.028	-.014		
British colonial heritage (=1)									-.037	.020

Note: Models include all individual-level covariates in Table 2, plus a country-level indicator for Muslim religious dominance. N=22,669 men, 22,557 women; country N=34.*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

Table 5. Women's Public-sphere Incorporation: Country-level Predictors of Strong Support for Gender Equality

	1		2		3	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Women's % of labor force (World Bank)	.033*	.000				
Women/Men average years of schooling (UNESCO)[a]			-.279	.213		
Women's % of Parliamentary Seats					-.010	.005

Note: Models include all individual-level covariates shown in Table 2, plus a country-level indicator for Muslim religious dominance. N=22,669 men, 22,557 women; country N=34. [a] N=15,939 men, 15,862 women; country N=23. $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$, $***p < 0.001$

Table 6. Disruption of Traditional Gender Order: Country-level Predictors of Strong Support for Gender Equality

	1		2		3	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Armed political conflict (=1)	-.240	-.365*				
Polity changes since 1995			.050	-.020		
Women's social movement organizations					.010	.049

Note: Models include all individual-level covariates in Table 2, plus a country-level indicator for Muslim religious dominance. N=22,669 men, 22,557 women; country N=34. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

Table A1. Mean Country Scores on Support for Gender Equality

	Equal Rights for Women: Strongly Agree (response 4)	Equal Rights for Women: Agree + Strongly Agree (responses 3+4)	Equal Rights for Women 1-4 scale
Algeria	0.427	0.844	3.224
Benin	0.471	0.690	2.954
Botswana	0.500	0.791	3.175
Burkina Faso	0.398	0.711	2.996
Burundi	0.440	0.823	3.166
Cameroon	0.469	0.762	3.140
Cape Verde	0.604	0.898	3.460
Cote d'Ivoire	0.236	0.626	2.753
Egypt	0.313	0.709	2.955
Ghana	0.568	0.850	3.338
Guinea	0.316	0.589	2.709
Kenya	0.557	0.872	3.370
Lesotho	0.389	0.521	2.556
Liberia	0.520	0.807	3.227
Madagascar	0.412	0.822	3.176
Malawi	0.560	0.726	3.090
Mali	0.204	0.389	2.205
Mauritius	0.487	0.843	3.284
Morocco	0.344	0.792	3.061
Mozambique	0.556	0.813	3.279
Namibia	0.291	0.747	2.965
Niger	0.188	0.434	2.315
Nigeria	0.341	0.680	2.881
Senegal	0.271	0.551	2.555
Sierra Leone	0.393	0.730	3.056
South Africa	0.392	0.774	3.090
Sudan	0.420	0.682	3.002
Swaziland	0.426	0.737	3.029
Tanzania	0.625	0.826	3.374
Togo	0.531	0.882	3.357
Tunisia	0.445	0.781	3.142
Uganda	0.604	0.808	3.263
Zambia	0.570	0.796	3.262
Zimbabwe	0.464	0.780	3.154

Note: Scores are based on Afrobarometer item Q23: Which of the following statements is closest to your view? 1) In our country, women should have equal rights and receive the same treatment as men do. 2) Women have always been subject to traditional laws and customs, and should remain so. Responses are coded as follows: 4=Agree very strongly with Statement 1, 3=Agree with Statement 1, 2=Agree with Statement 2, 1=Agree very strongly with Statement 2. Agreement with neither is coded as missing, as are “don’t know” responses. Values in column 1 give proportion agreeing very strongly with statement 1; values in column 1 give proportion agreeing or agreeing very strongly with statement 1; values in column 3 give country means on the 1-4 scale.

Table A2. Scores on Country-Level Covariates

	Human Devel Index	GDP per capita	% Non-agric'l Employmt	Institutional Democracy Score (1-10)	75%+ Muslim? (=1)	Women's % Formal Labor Force, 2010	Women/Men Avg. Years Schooling	Women's % Parliament, 2010	Gender Equality Index, 2010	INGO Member-ships	Official Developmt Assist, $US millions	Foreign Dir Investmt, %GDP	Remittances Received, %GDP	British Colony (=1)	Armed Political Conflict (=1)	Polity Changes 1995-2010	Women's Rights SMOs (as % SMOs)
Algeria	.725	12494.10	87.50	3	1	17.40	0.75	7.70	0.48	1665	201.3	1.43	0.12	0	1	2	8.89
Benin	.468	1636.60	54.70	7	0	47.30	0.43	10.80	0.38	1240	687.3	0.77	2.00	0	0	1	6.59
Botswana	.681	13349.20	71.20	8	0	46.60		7.90	0.50	1063	154.7	1.71	0.17	1	0	2	8.33
Burkina Faso	.378	1417.70	19.20	2	0	47.50	0.50	15.30	0.39	1237	1,044.6	0.43	1.34	0	0	5	7.83
Burundi	.390	725.30	9.20	7	0	51.60	0.61	31.40	0.50	823	627.6	0.04	1.70	0	1	5	7.38
Cameroon	.486	2570.80	36.30	1	0	45.70	0.59	13.90	0.38	1818	540.2	2.27	0.49	0	0	1	9.43
Cape Verde	.629	6004.90	69.80	10	0	38.70	0.92	18.10		383	327.0	6.98	7.87	0	0	2	7.41
Cote d'Ivoire	.444	2892.20	39.70	5	0	37.80	0.58	8.90	0.32	1580	845.3	1.44	1.50	0	1	7	5.06
Egypt	.681	10620.60	71.20	0	1	24.30	0.69	1.80	0.43	3021	599.2	2.92	5.69	1	0	5	9.92
Ghana	.554	3064.90	46.60	8	0	47.70	0.71	8.30	0.43	1984	1,697.2	7.86	0.42	1	0	4	7.42
Guinea	.388	1185.40	25.70	4	1	45.10	0.28	19.30		770	221.0	2.14	0.98	0	0	4	6.11
Kenya	.529	2502.40	35.20	9	0	46.10	0.91	9.80		2632	1,631.3	0.45	1.71	1	0	7	6.73
Lesotho	.472	2228.50	58.00	9	0	48.10	1.24	24.20	0.43	746	256.1	0.40	25.48	1	0	5	6.67
Liberia	.405	688.50	52.70	7	0	45.50		12.50	0.34	706	1,416.1	34.99	2.43	1	1	5	6.90
Madagascar	.504	1390.40	20.40	6	0	49.00		7.90		1157	477.3	9.28	6.27	0	0	6	4.46
Malawi	420	737.30	29.50	6	0	51.30		20.80	0.38	1062	1,016.9	1.39	0.32	1	0	5	9.73
Mali	.409	1663.60	41.10	6	1	35.10	0.49	10.20	0.32	1124	1,091.5	3.48	4.43	0	1	7	9.26
Mauritius	.756	15225.30	90.90	10	0	38.00	0.87	17.10	0.62	1248	124.6	4.30	0.01	1	0	1	9.94
Morocco	.611	6465.70	63.70	1	1	26.40		10.50	0.44	2231	985.5	1.33	6.89	0	0	3	9.50
Mozambique	.401	932.80	24.50	6	0	52.90	0.58	39.20	0.38	1099	1,943.1	12.39	1.14	0	0	4	7.26
Namibia	.610	8438.00	68.30	6	0	46.50	0.95	26.90	0.49	1024	261.3	6.80	0.13	1	0	1	8.55
Niger	.326	841.20	36.00	7	1	31.10		9.70	0.29	858	741.4	13.92	2.35	0	1	8	4.50
Nigeria	.493	5113.70	69.40	4	0	42.60		7.00		2667	2,052.4	1.63	5.35	1	1	3	8.71
Senegal	.456	2181.70	44.50	7	1	43.70	0.56	22.70	0.43	1807	936.4	2.10	11.42	0	1	3	8.98
Sierra Leone	.388	1346.50	31.30	8	0	51.20		13.20	0.34	935	458.3	9.11	1.69	1	1	6	9.77
South Africa	.643	11650.80	95.40	9	0	42.80	0.95	44.50	0.58	4632	1,036.3	0.98	0.28	1	1	1	7.95
Sudan	.465	3326.70	65.70	0	1	29.60		18.90	0.38	1180	2,025.9	3.14	2.22	1	1	5	8.55
Swaziland	.525	6511.70	77.80	0	0	39.30		13.60	0.43	735	91.1	3.06	1.23	1	0	2	8.99
Tanzania	.500	1545.20	27.80	2	0	49.70	1.13	30.70	0.44	1797	2,960.3	5.77	1.10	1	0	2	7.63
Togo	.459	1246.00	36.90	1	0	50.50	0.39	11.10	0.40	1132	403.4	3.94	10.61	0	0	3	6.13
Tunisia	.714	10408.90	84.90	7	1	28.10	0.75	27.60	0.69	1928	550.2	3.03	4.68	0	0	5	9.09
Uganda	.473	1294.00	26.30	1	0	49.10	0.84	31.50	0.44	1677	1,690.1	2.70	3.82	1	1	3	9.50
Zambia	.555	3450.80	35.00	7	0	45.50		14.00	0.45	1478	919.3	8.53	0.22	1	0	4	7.92
Zimbabwe	.461	1484.20	31.60	5	0	49.00	0.85	15.00	0.42	1908	712.5	1.22	14.06	1	0	5	9.09
Mean	0.51	4312.81	49.40	5.26	0.27	42.38	0.72	17.12	0.43	1510.21	903.72	4.76	3.83	0.53	0.35	3.88	7.95

Table A3. Correlations Among Focal Country-Level Covariates

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1. Human Devel Index, HDI	1.00													
2. Democracy Score	0.11	1.00												
3. Muslim-dominant (=1)	0.10	-0.27	1.00											
4. Women's % Labor Force	-0.49	0.26	-0.76	1.00										
5. Women's Educ ratio	0.45	0.34	-0.34	0.00	1.00									
6. Women's % Parliament	-0.05	0.17	-0.18	0.33	0.34	1.00								
7. INGO Memberships (ln)	0.34	-0.19	0.13	-0.21	0.11	0.03	1.00							
8. Official Development Aid	-0.40	-0.12	-0.01	0.17	0.02	0.19	0.43	1.00						
9. Foreign Investment (ln)	-0.23	0.19	-0.10	0.10	0.06	-0.06	-0.35	0.18	1.00					
10. Remittances (ln)	-0.10	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.30	-0.01	-0.11	-0.09	-0.14	1.00				
11. British colony (=1)	0.21	0.08	-0.37	0.20	0.72	0.06	0.21	0.08	0.11	-0.03	1.00			
12. Armed conflict	-0.29	0.02	0.25	-0.22	-0.10	0.08	0.08	0.29	0.17	-0.10	-0.04	1.00		
13. Polity changes	-0.52	0.10	0.24	-0.05	-0.16	-0.27	-0.10	0.32	0.19	0.16	-0.12	0.27	1.00	
14. Women's Activism	0.39	-0.23	0.15	-0.22	0.20	0.09	0.28	-0.06	-0.27	-0.09	0.36	0.00	-0.36	1.00

Note: Values are zero-order correlations with pairwise deletion of cases with missing values. See Table A2 for country scores. N=34 Countries

Table A4. Individual Predictors of Strong Support for Gender Equality, by Gender and Religion

	1 Christian Men	2 Christian Women	3 Muslim Men	3 Muslim Women
Age, in years	0.003*	-0.001	0.005*	-0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
No formal educ (=1)[a]	-0.442***	-0.284***	-0.289**	-0.292**
	(0.082)	(0.070)	(0.101)	(0.096)
Some primary educ (=1)[a]	-0.276***	-0.111	-0.056	-0.094
	(0.061)	(0.058)	(0.105)	(0.101)
Completed primary educ (=1)[a]	-0.210***	-0.113	-0.023	0.032
	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.110)	(0.110)
Completed secondary educ (=1)[a]	0.110	0.192**	-0.174	0.236*
	(0.057)	(0.059)	(0.111)	(0.116)
Some post-secondary educ (=1)[a]	0.121	0.346***	0.171	0.245*
	(0.067)	(0.077)	(0.101)	(0.112)
Paid job (=1)	0.003	0.026	-0.014	0.073
	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.062)	(0.072)
Indoor plumbing (=1)	0.086	0.056	-0.041	-0.035
	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.090)	(0.085)
Subjective disadvantage (=1)[b]	-0.016	0.076	0.018	0.137*
	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.067)	(0.063)
Subjective advantage (=1)[b]	0.068	0.144**	-0.027	0.176**
	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.072)	(0.068)
High religiosity (=1)	0.323***	0.290***	0.103	-0.136
	(0.054)	(0.059)	(0.100)	(0.096)
Use Internet regularly (=1)	0.176**	0.150*	0.189*	0.177*
	(0.057)	(0.065)	(0.082)	(0.089)
Own mobile phone (=1)	0.001	0.146**	0.101	0.114
	(0.050)	(0.045)	(0.084)	(0.066)
Access news daily (=1)	0.132**	0.037	0.341***	0.095
	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.069)	(0.062)
Urban residence (=1)	0.082	0.125**	-0.003	0.245***
	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.062)	(0.059)
Woman interviewer (=1)	0.250***	0.104**	0.580***	0.385***
	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.060)	(0.058)
Others at interview (=1)	-0.076	0.045	-0.170*	-0.087
	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.066)	(0.058)
Constant	-0.701***	-0.436***	-1.423***	-0.659***
	(0.131)	(0.120)	(0.213)	(0.197)
Std. Deviation, Constant	.501 (.074)	.430 (.064)	.619 (.110)	.572 (.102)
Log likelihood	-87,33.578	-9,176.787	-3,901.528	-4,193.508
N (country N)	13,258 (25)	13,834 (25)	6,829 (18)	6,714 (18)

Note: Models are mixed effects logistic regressions computed using Stata's XTMELOGIT procedure. Standard errors are in parentheses. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 a Reference category is some secondary education; b reference category is no class advantage/disadvantage.

Table A5. Coefficients (Std Errors) from Modernization Model with Alternative Measures of Support for Women's Equal Rights

	Men			Women		
	Strong support	Support + Strong Support	Level of Support (1-4)	Strong support	Support + Strong Support	Level of Support (1-4)
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Individual-level variables						
Age, in years	0.004***	0.002*	0.003**	-0.001	0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
No formal educ (=1)[a]	-0.342***	-0.433***	-0.379***	-0.279***	-0.452***	-0.320***
	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.047)	(0.052)	(0.061)	(0.047)
Some primary educ (=1)[a]	-0.213***	-0.304***	-0.255***	-0.126**	-0.267***	-0.170***
	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.043)	(0.048)	(0.060)	(0.044)
Completed primary educ (=1)[a]	-0.168***	-0.166**	-0.151***	-0.093	-0.217***	-0.128**
	(0.050)	(0.056)	(0.045)	(0.050)	(0.064)	(0.047)
Completed secondary educ (=1)[a]	0.064	0.081	0.066	0.196***	0.164*	0.184***
	(0.047)	(0.054)	(0.042)	(0.050)	(0.066)	(0.047)
Some post-secondary educ (=1)[a]	0.137**	0.230***	0.153***	0.298***	0.389***	0.301***
	(0.052)	(0.061)	(0.046)	(0.060)	(0.084)	(0.057)
Paid job (=1)	0.022	0.000	0.013	0.038	-0.012	0.028
	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.044)	(0.032)
Indoor plumbing (=1)	0.037	0.024	0.02	0.016	0.027	0.001
	(0.048)	(0.054)	(0.042)	(0.048)	(0.060)	(0.044)
Subjective disadvantage (=1)[b]	-0.005	-0.149***	-0.070	0.092**	0.060	0.080*
	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.041)	(0.031)
Subjective advantage (=1)[b]	0.051	-0.027	0.011	0.151***	0.036	0.115***
	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.045)	(0.033)
Minority race (=1)	0.083	0.343***	0.168*	0.079	0.123	0.088
	(0.082)	(0.097)	(0.070)	(0.079)	(0.110)	(0.073)
Highly religious (=1)	0.147	-0.069	-0.001	-0.106	-0.147	-0.157
	(0.096)	(0.095)	(0.076)	(0.091)	(0.110)	(0.082)
Catholic (=1)[c]	0.113	0.000	0.047	-0.195	-0.107	-0.182
	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.110)	(0.130)	(0.160)	(0.120)
Evangelical/Pentecostal (=1)[c]	-0.054	-0.109	-0.103	-0.112	0.082	-0.090
	(0.180)	(0.190)	(0.160)	(0.180)	(0.220)	(0.160)
Other Christian (=1)[c]	-0.055	-0.073	-0.118	-0.233	0.032	-0.152
	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.099)	(0.120)	(0.150)	(0.110)
Trad'l/Other/No Religion (=1)[c]	0.265*	0.109	0.140	-0.24	-0.094	-0.151
	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.100)	(0.140)	(0.170)	(0.130)
Highly relig × Catholic[c]	0.106	0.369**	0.225*	0.432**	0.476**	0.473***
	(0.130)	(0.140)	(0.110)	(0.130)	(0.170)	(0.120)
Highly relig × Evangel/Pentec[c]	0.236	0.369	0.303	0.326	0.176	0.329*
	(0.190)	(0.200)	(0.160)	(0.180)	(0.230)	(0.170)
Highly relig × Other Christian[c]	0.201	0.302*	0.295**	0.391**	0.271	0.371***
	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.098)	(0.120)	(0.150)	(0.110)
Highly relig × Trad'l/other[c]	-0.098	0.127	0.03	0.305	0.321	0.277
	(0.140)	(0.150)	(0.120)	(0.160)	(0.190)	(0.140)
Regularly use Internet (=1)	0.193***	0.288***	0.195***	0.180***	0.183**	0.164***
	(0.044)	(0.051)	(0.039)	(0.050)	(0.070)	(0.047)
Own mobile phone (=1)	0.056	0.013	0.029	0.147***	0.161***	0.146***
	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.041)	(0.032)
Access news daily (=1)	0.182***	0.194***	0.175***	0.058	0.057	0.056
	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.038)	(0.029)
Urban residence (=1)	0.053	-0.011	0.035	0.161***	0.128**	0.154***
	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.041)	(0.030)
Others at interview (=1)	-0.099**	-0.083*	-0.087**	-0.010	0.011	0.000
	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.028)
Woman interviewer (=1)	0.316***	0.231***	0.264***	0.157***	0.134***	0.149***
	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.036)	(0.027)
Country-level Variables						
Human Development Index	-0.712	1.202	0.394	1.044	2.454**	1.621*
	(0.750)	(0.710)	(0.680)	(0.650)	(0.830)	(0.650)
Democracy Score	0.000	-0.019	-0.022	-0.032	-0.043	-0.046
	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.024)
Muslim religious dominance	-0.698***	-0.713***	-0.701***	-0.560**	-0.389	-0.549**
	(0.200)	(0.190)	(0.180)	(0.170)	(0.220)	(0.170)

Note: Values in columns 1 and 4 are original coefficients from model 1 of Table 3; values in columns 2 and 5 are analogous coefficients for models predicting "agree" and "strongly agree" responses combined; values in columns 3 and 6 are coefficients from multilevel ordinal logit models computed using Stata's MEOLOGIT procedure. See Table A1 for definitions of dependent variables. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 [a] Reference category is Muslim; [b] reference category is no class advantage/disadvantage; [c] reference category is some secondary education.